

Globalism, Terrorism and Islamism in Southeast Asia

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PREFACE

With the grace of God Almighty, this book finally appeared. Originally the papers in this book were papers (manuscripts) which were published various journals, newspapers and mass media, and were slowly collected and edited to be published as you can read.

We thank the late Prof. Ahmad Fedyani Saifuddin, Nanang Tahqiq, Azumardi Azra, Fachry Ali, Yudi Latif, Rohan Gunaratna, Blake Respini, Steven Fish, Laurie Sears, Loren Ryter, Tom Farer, Hamid Algar, and the academic communities at Fisip Universitas Indonesia, Malikussaleh University, Paramadina University and the University of Muhammadiyah Jakarta and the Ushuluddin Faculty and Philosophy of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. We also thank Centre for Strategic Studies University of Indonesia (CSS-UI) and LP3ES Jakarta. This book is the result of field and library research in the past few years.

This book is also part of our field research in the Southern Philippines and Malaysia in 2017-18. The Philippines is an archipelago with 7,107 islands, with a population of around 60 million, using 87 different language dialects that reflect the number of ethnic groups and communities. Muslims in the Philippines call themselves "Moro". But this name is actually political, because in reality Moro consists of many ethno linguistic groups, for example

Maranow, Maquindanao, Tausuq, Somal, Yakan, Ira Nun, Jamampun, Badjao, Kalibugan, Kalagan and Sangil.

In connection with actions of terrorism, the international communities have articulated and done about confronting threats directly, engaging the enemy, disrupting terrorist networks, denying enemies safe haven, building international coalitions, forging treaties that reinforce the rule of law, denying the enemy weapons of mass destruction, and changing the conditions that terrorists exploit.

In our opinion, exactly, such conditions include, among others, a shifting mix of international geopolitics, economics, religion, ideology, ignorance, cultural stress, and intolerant political systems that offer little room for political expression or personal freedom. This environment enables terrorist leaders to advance their own agenda, to exert influence, to recruit, and to escalate local conflicts. And we should be aware that terrorism-conducive conditions can converge in specific geographic areas, often in illiberal societies and lawless or nondemocratic states, where the enemy can establish safe haven. In such situation, we note that tribal regions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, illiberal and undergoverned by legitimate state authority, provide al Qaeda leaders to build their power base.

Last but not least, we hope this book will be useful for journalist, scholar, researcher, students and society in enriching knowledge about radicalism and terrorism in Southeast Asia .

Authors, 2019

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ISIS, TAMKIN TERRORISM AND NEW SECURITY THREAT

IN DEALING with the complexity of terrorism, including *tamkin* (territorial) terrorism, the House of Representatives unanimously passed in May the revision of Law No. 15/2003 on terrorism.¹

The endorsement came after a tough debate surrounding the division of labor between the police and the Indonesian Military (TNI). The revised Terrorism Law removes barriers for the police to move if the perpetrators are proven to have committed acts of terrorism.

The authority allows the police to prevent perpetrators from committing acts of terrorism through various functions. However, to anticipate the possible replication of *tamkin* terrorism in Mindanao, the South Philippines, efforts to revive the Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab) of the TNI now become urgent and relevant.

The new Terrorism Law defines terrorism as “an act that uses violence or threats of violence that creates a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear, which can cause mass casualties and/or damage or destruction to vital stra-

¹ Herdi Sahrasad & Al Chaidar, “Tamkin Terrorism a New Security Threat,” *The Jakarta Post*, opinion, Friday, October 26, 2018.

tegic objects, environment, public facilities or international facilities with political motives, ideology or security disturbances”.

Such precautions for *tamkin* terrorism in Indonesia are considered pressing following the defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in the South Philippines and Syria.

Over the last few years, Mindanao and Sulawesi have been carefully watched in connection with the conflict in the Middle East. Mindanao is believed to be the base of the Abu Sayyaf and Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist groups, whose role has been taken over by more moderate and nationalistic groups of freedom fighters such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Abu Sayyaf is perhaps the smallest but most dangerous separatist group in Mindanao, which operates around the southern Philippine archipelago, including Jolo, Basilan and Mindanao. The group has kidnapped and demanded ransoms to control the territory.

Tamkin terrorism was present in the Mindanao city of Marawi in 2017, while in Indonesia it was attempted in the attacks on Jl. Thamrin, Central Jakarta, in 2016 and Kampung Melayu in East Jakarta in 2017. In the context of war in Marawi, terrorist kingpin Isnilon Hapilon was both the Abu Sayyaf leader and chief of IS in the southern Philippines.

Tamkin terrorism as in the case of Mindanao has not yet been accommodated in the new Terrorism Law. In fact, this new development in the war on terrorism, was the root of the feud between the police and the TNI over their respective duties and functions pertaining to the fight against terrorism.

Prolonged division of authority between the two institutions in this regard will therefore put Indonesia at unnecessary risk.

Many researchers have adequately discussed the military involvement in dealing with *qital tamkin* (war in the liberation area) strategy, which is one of the characteristics of *tamkin* terrorist groups such as Eastern Indonesian Mujahideen (MIT), the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the Republic of South Maluku (RMS), the Free Papua Organization (OPM) and Abu Sayyaf.

Kamil Salamah (1994) found that *tamkin*-terrorism has a strong religious ideological basis. Djelantik and Akbar (2016) insist that terrorists who adopt territorial war strategies must be faced by security forces with adequate combat Capabilities. Thomas Koruth Samuel (2016) and Al Chaidar (2015) argue that improper handling of terrorists may show a lack of territorial awareness of political leaders as seen in Thailand, the Philippines and Syria.²

Sidney Jones (2015) has also reminded us of the emergence of *qital tamkin*, which aims to occupy a territory, unlike the conventional *qital nikoyah* (a war that deals a blow to the enemy), which relies on hit-and-run strategies in various locations.³

The police, through the National Policed Densus 88 counter-terrorism squad, has sufficiently handled non-territorial terrorism and arrested and brought to justice

² Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of DAESH in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines* (Kuala Lumpur: SEARCCT, 2016)

³ Sidney Jones, "Evolusi ISIS di Indonesia," paper for discussion on Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University, Jakarta, May 5, 2005. Jones is Director of Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC).

many perpetrators of this type of terrorism act.

But *tamkin* terrorism is not always easy to overcome. Perpetrators of a *tamkin* terrorism act, if arrested, must face a humanitarian or military court. Due to its juridical consequences, *tamkin* terrorism must be handled specifically by the TNI, which can be represented by Koopsusgab.

So far, terrorists have focused on *nikayah* (injuring), attacking and paralyzing people who they consider “infidels”.

A shift in the terrorist strategy to the *tamkin* war should be appropriately articulated in the new Terrorism Law, especially because for terrorist groups with Wahabi Takfiri ideology, the most important objective of their struggle is territory, or controlling an area under a leader who understands sharia and *fiqhul waqi* (political law).

Learning from the *tamkin* terrorism in the South Philippines, the new Terrorism Law needs further amendments so as to strike a balance between *tamkin* terrorism and conventional acts of terror that are increasingly barbaric.

The IS and Future Terrorism

Although the Islamic State (IS) group has recently lost territory and an estimated 80 percent of its revenue base, the 30 official and semiofficial IS channels and chat rooms still emphasize its longevity and strength.⁴

So far, its sharp territorial decline has also destroyed its ability to collect revenue from oil production and smuggling, taxation, confiscation and other similar activities. Its average

⁴ Herdi Sahrasad & Al Chaidar, “Alert on IS Must Continue,” *The Jakarta Post*, opinion, Friday, January 11, 2019.

monthly income has reportedly dropped from US\$81 million in the second quarter of 2015 to only \$16 million in the second quarter of 2017.

However, IS still strong in its role and existence on social media and the internet. They broadcast IS' development efforts to domestic and international audiences, from dam construction, digging wells, building infrastructure, to electrification of villages under IS control, and inoculating children in hospitals.

The scholars Mia Bloom and Chelsea Daymon cautioned in their book last year that the general use of peer-to-peer encrypted messages by IS shows no signs of declining despite early predictions. So far, the IS online platforms mix high-definition graphic audiovisual content with religious-ideological writings to justify violent terrorist tactics.⁵

In recent years, IS jihadist groups have grown and developed propaganda to open application programming interface platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Tumblr.

But IS elites and leaders are aware that platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are being increasingly monitored, along with aggressive elimination of accounts, so that Telegram has been selected as IS' priority platform for spreading propaganda and recruiting new members.

Researchers have shown how Telegram is used by IS and its worldwide supporters, and have assessed the kind of

⁵ Mia Bloom & Chelsea Daymon, "Assessing the Future Threat: ISIS's Virtual Caliphate," *Orbis* 62(3), April, 2018, p. 372-388. See also, Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) .

threat using Telegram toward IS' vision of its "virtual caliphate".

The encrypted platform remains the virtual weapon for radicalization, recruitment and planning. As Lucas Kello from Oxford University said, in the virtual domain, vital strategic operations can be "shrouded in secrecy", causing difficulties for scientific research, security forces, defense operators and policymakers to track them down.

IS elites and leaders understand that individuals shape perceptions of themselves based on identification with groups, core group values and their emotions. As a result, their continued presence in the cyber environment can encourage extreme political and religious views, excessive violence and competition, outside the group. In fact, IS also creates a spatial echo for radicalization.

Among social media and internet sites, Telegram applications are increasingly in demand as a platform of choice for clandestine activities of IS and its supporters. The uniqueness of Telegram in terms of privacy and security made it succeed in attracting 100 million users in 2016.

Telegram is commonly used by IS terrorists to recruit and coordinate attacks, including in Brussels in 2017. Telegram, among others, was also used to communicate among perpetrators of attacks in Paris in 2015, attacks on 2017 New Year's Eve in Turkey, and attacks in St Petersburg, Russia in April 2017. In Indonesia, a number of terrorism suspects arrested in December 2016 claimed to have learned to make bombs by following directions via Telegram. IS elites and leaders understand that Telegram cannot be traced after an attack.

Initially, most of its propaganda focused on IS development both physically and figuratively, offering an online “supra-national brand” of an Islamic super state. This virtual caliphate is framed as legitimizing and becoming the moral reasons for their actions and existence. Projections of state building is intended to create attractive options for prospective immigrants, but also for the IS transition from the rebel movement to a distinctive “Islamic State”, and “virtual caliphate”.

Even as a “virtual caliphate”, IS would be able to continue to use various information regarding areas of operation. This ability includes doctrinal military, strategic communication, civil-military relations, engagement of key leaders, supporting operations and military fraud, according to the analyst Harleen Gambhir. IS also markets jihad, information warfare and cyber propaganda in various parts of the world.

Thus, it is clear that even though IS has been defeated and cornered due to losing a lot of territory, its “virtual caliphate” can still disseminate its agenda, vision and mission to the domestic and international communities. Indonesia must to be complacent, and must continue to be vigilant in anticipating the development of terrorism, particularly by IS’ “virtual caliphate”, its networks and cells in various parts of the world, including in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, it is very possible that IS members and sympathizers are in the area around us and are targeting us to be part of their virtual territory.

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ISIS, INDONESIAN MUSLIMS AND GLOBAL TERRORISM: A REFLECTION

A STRIKING phenomenon of hundreds of Indonesians, who were actively involved in the political dynamics of the Islamic world and joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which declared itself as an Islamic Caliphate in June 28, 2014, shocks the public and government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in Indonesia. Since early 2013, ISIS has successfully consolidated various radical groups in conflict with one another to divert the target: to control the region of eastern Syria and western Iraq which cannot be maintained effectively by the government of Damascus and Baghdad.

The fall of Mosul with population of about 2 million people into the hands of ISIS, has been so severely bowed to Baghdad. Thousands of resident—especially the minorities and Shi'ite communities—out of Mosul, the provincial capital of Nineveh, look for survival.

ISIS army takes-over government buildings, oil wells, military bases, arsenals, and banks. ISIS, which claims to be the only *Daulah Islamiyah fit Iraq war ash-Sham*, has three main principles of the struggle, among others: *First*, establish monotheism; *second*, destroy polytheism and idolatrousness; and, *third*, enforce the law of God by force of arms. With these three principles, ISIS joins forces to exploit sentiments of Sunni versus Shi'ite sectarianism and caliphate as a political entity unifying Muslims worldwide. They also

called on the Muslim world, including Indonesia, to support and join it. With the three principles of struggle above, ISIS destroyed many mosques and holy places that are considered as a place of worship that could lead to polytheism and contrary to the creed of monotheism.

In this case, the involvement of some Indonesians in the ISIS in the Middle East region is not new because previously, there is precedent that some Indonesian citizens in the past had involvement in conflicts abroad when President Jimmy Carter used the CIA to weaken the power of the Soviets in Afghanistan, with fighters from all over the world mobilized, including not less 350 people from Indonesia, and Osama bin Laden himself from Saudi Arabia to destroy the Russian communists.¹

Indeed, we have had precedent on Indonesian involvement in armed actions since 1985, in which it can be found early in the war of Afghanistan and the conflict in Pakistan. In the past, a number of Indonesian citizens were also reported military training in Libya. Back to the country, among them become the actors of violence and terror that has been rife since the early 2000s.

Although ISIS has a variety of social networks in Indonesia, it failed to recruit Indonesian Muslims in large numbers to support their actions and goals. ISIS failed to persuade these groups to encourage intolerance and radicalization that can quickly be terrorism in the country.

Our deeper question is: Is this because ISIS supports the sentiments which tend to be universal *ummah* or domestic situation in Indonesia that is still conducive to the

¹ John Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

flowering of radical Muslim, understood as a form of state failure and civil society that provide an alternative discourse to the narrative of their violence? Or, are local and international factors equally dominant?²

Genealogy of ISIS

The fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq's Shi'ite regime spawned to not give place to the Sunnis. The failure of Iraqi leaders, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in building an inclusive political system, has given ways to grow militants across Iraq, including the Sunnis, in turn, gave birth to ISIS. Sunni militants protested the economic and political marginalization by the ruling Shi'ite. Supports given by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to the hardline oppositions in Syria also contributed to the birth of ISIS.³

Of course, the presence of ISIS, which originated from the Sunni, has shocked the Muslim World, including Indonesia. Some call it as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).⁴ There is also a call Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which specifically has a different coverage area. The term includes the Sham or the Levant region between the Mediterranean Sea and the Euphrates River means that the country coverage includes Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. The term Syria is confined to the state of modern Syria that is currently in conflict.

²Noor Huda Ismail, "NIIS Indonesia dan Evolusi Teror Mondial," *Kompas daily*, 7 August 2014. See also, Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

³Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), p. 6.

⁴*Elmihwar*, newspaper, Egypt (6/8/2014).

The genealogy of this radical religious organization can be traced to the Salafi Jihadist movement who has been fighting in Iraq and Syria that are on a mission to the formation of *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic State). ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), according to Zana Khasraw Gulmohamad of the University of Sheffield, stems from the birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2003. The initial declaration of the *Daulah Islamiyah* organization that conducted the insurgents in Iraq group is established by az-Zarqawi in 2004 who eventually reveals himself as part of al Qaeda.

After Az-Zarqawi was killed in battle against the army of the United States in mid-2006, AQI was established by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi from Jordan, who in 2006 was murdered by the United States. He was replaced by Abu Ayyoub al-Masri, Egyptian origin, who supports the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) or *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq*.

Helm of *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq* switched to Abu Hamza al-Mohajir until April 19, 2010. He was killed in an attack by American troops. The leadership then fallen into the hand of Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi for about a year. Then, that helm was transferred to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After standing ISI, Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi known as Abu Hameed Dawood Mohammed II or Khalil al-Zawri (Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai and Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qureshi al-Baghdadi) makes Baquba as his headquarters. Al-Baghdadi, the Iraqi people, replaced al-Masri, killed by American troops and Iraqis.

Under the control of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq* organization increasingly expanded its

influence until April 9, 2013 when appearing a voice recording associated with the voice of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The tape was stated, Jabhah Nushra (Victory Front) in Syria is a continuation Daulah Islamiyah of Iraq organization. The tape also described that the name Jabhah Nushrah and *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq* be removed, and later proclaimed *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq wa ash-Sham*, that is written by media as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as his successor, while Raqqa city located in Syria, which borders with Turkey, as its capital.⁵

In 2012, al-Baghdadi sent his men to form a branch of al-Qaeda Syria, named Jabhah al-Nusra. The group aims to get rid of President Bashar al-Assad and establish a Sunni Islamic state led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, a Salafist-oriented leader. According to the Australian National Security, they received funding and support from AQI and ISI. However, they subject to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda.

Al-Baghdadi who wants to be a single leader, in 8 April 2003 through a decree stating that AQI and Jabhah al-Nusra turned into ISIS/ISIL. However, Jabhah al-Nusra rejected it. Dispute between the ISIS and Jabhah al-Nusra prolonged and failed to be mediated by Ayman al-Zawahiri that ultimately claimed that Al-Qaeda cut off ties with ISIS because ISIS has its own conception and position not subject to the Al-Qaeda and Ayman Center.⁶

⁵ M. Hasan Mutawakkil Alallah, "ISIS dan Perlunya Pergub," *Jawa Pos*, 9 Agustus 2014.

⁶ Trias Kuncahyono, "Radikalisme: Genesis ISIS," *Kompas*, August 2, 2014.

According to German radio, Deutsche Welle (DW), ISIS takes money at the Central Bank of Mosul, some 500 billion Iraqi dinars, or about 429 million dollars plus a certain amount of gold. "With that much money, they used to pay 60,000 fighters," said Eliot Higgins, a resident scholar of the UK. Currently, ISIS has estimated about 10,000 armed members from different parts of the world: Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Australia, and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.

According to the Director of the Center for Research on the Arab World at the University of Mainz, Germany, Gunter Meyer, "The most important financial source of ISIS is the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates," especially from the rich people in the country.

The motivation of initial assistance they provide, according to Meyer, is to support the ISIS to face the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. This support is encouraged "hatred" sectarian: three-quarters of the Syrian population is Sunni Muslim, but most of the ruling elite are the Alawite minority, which is often called the part of the Shia Muslims.

BBC stated that ISIS received financial support from donors in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. It happened when they were still called Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). However, after the breakup of AQI with its central leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and proclaimed ISIS, according to CNN and The New York Times, they rely on the financial resources of criminal acts, such as kidnapping, extortion, and robbery.

Syrian conflict is initially localized, such as demonstrations to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad, then evolved into an international conflict, involving thousands of combatants from dozens of countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Chechnya, Turkey, America, England, France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Majority of Afghan alumni in Indonesia are *tawaquf* (silent) or be very careful in giving support to the ISIS openly because of their loyalty to al Qaeda today led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 2013, al-Zawahiri issued a *fatwa* that ISIS is not part of Al Qaeda because ISIS has acted very brutally; thus, it damaged not only the image of Al Qaeda in Syria but also the Islam as strategic religion. Al Qaeda has had its own army, Jabhah al-Nusra, which has been first to come and help the people of Syria long before the ISIS did.⁷

Breaking up the partnership between the ISIS and Jabhah al-Nusra is also carried over to Indonesia. In fact, in some areas, including in the prison that housed inmate terrorists, occur fierce hostility between ISIS supporters and Jabhah al-Nusra.

In Indonesia, said Noorhuda Ismail, one of the local factors that cause people interested in joining the ISIS and even willing to die for this choice is the weak system of law enforcement, especially in prison. Massive Distribution of ISIS message in Arabic translated by Aman Abdurrahman, terrorism inmates, is done from inside the prison in reclaiming. Its visitors then disseminate this translation via

⁷Noor Huda Ismail, "NIIS Indonesia dan Evolusi Teror Mondial," *Kompas*, 7 Agustus 2014. Noor Huda is a founder of Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian; he is currently a PhD student in Politics and International Relations, Monash University, Australia.

the internet.

Aman Abdurrahman has the record of accomplishment as terrorist that jailed twice since 2004. He was involved in Cimanggis bombing and military training in Aceh in 2010. He refused to cooperate with prison officials, as well as consistent with the *takfiri* ideology (infidelizing people outside the group), and he turns out to be the main attraction among Islamic activists who thirst the figure of the leadership.

Although there is no evidence that there is an official order from Aman Abdurrahman for his proteges to flee to Syria and join the ISIS, but through translation, writings, and sermons, it is then recycled by his followers and the media, through open discussion, marches, demonstrations, and social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube giving 'jihad' imagination beyond the nation-state concept for the readers, and then moves them to act.

What is interesting is the majority of the Afghan alumni in Indonesia has responded *tawaquf* (silent, quiet) or be very careful in giving support to the ISIS openly because their loyalty to al Qaeda, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, is stronger.

Responses of Indonesia

Although the concept is not clearly relevant, the issue of ISIS caliphate makes various parties in Indonesia wary of the spread of the ISIS teachings and recruitment. Although the potential for success is relatively small, the idea and praxis of ISIS can cause serious problems in politic, religion, and society in the country. Almost certainly, the main supporter of the caliphate of his ISIS is a radical person or a

small group of radicalists who have been active in Indonesia. Responses from state and society in Indonesia to the ISIS existence in Middle East are varied. In this regard, there are some important things to get attention.

First of all, The Indonesian government, through Minister of Coordinating for Politics, Law and Security Djoko Sujanto, has submitted that ISIS is a dangerous movement to look out for, it is against Pancasila (state ideology), and not allowed to flourish in Indonesia. Even, the government also stated ISIS as a terrorist organization.

Secondly, religious leaders, Nahdlatul Ulama (a traditional Islamic Scholar organization), Muhammadiyah, and the MUI (Indonesia Ulama Council) also stated that ISIS cannot be claimed as an Islamic movement, especially Sunni, but no more than a political organization, that justifies violence. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah increase efforts to socialize the Islamic concept rahmatan lil'alamin and commitment to the Indonesian nation-state as the final form of the struggle of the Indonesian Muslims with Pancasila as the state determination, based on NU Ulama National Conference in Situbondo (1983).

There are also a number of people who propose the revocation of nationality if there are citizens who swore loyally to ISIS. This fierce response may be because Indonesia has a long experience with the issue of religious violence and terrorism. In anticipation of the potential development of ISIS in Indonesia, however, some Ulama said, the emergence of the allegiance of loyalty to ISIS which spread in different places must be addressed with calm, not nervous, and redundant. They said that the proposed revocation of nationals (citizenship) might be considered as a

form of excessive nervousness. Community groups in Indonesia, giving support to ISIS, are small. Movement cells can also be quickly uncovered.

Thirdly, its vertices do not vary much with the radical movements that have already been known. Some of the groups known, as radicalists even do not all agree with ISIS. Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Salvation Front), for example, disagreed with ISIS. Although Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the head of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) swore his allegiance to ISIS, but in reverse not all components of JAT agree with him including his own sons. Ngruki boarding school led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir also stated not supporting ISIS.

Fourthly, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) also disagreed with ISIS although both have ideological similarity about caliphate. It shows, in terms of support, that ISIS does not need to be too scared. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) actually has the same understanding. They are both idealized caliphate state but have a different way in struggling it. If ISIS as done in Iraq and Syria struggled with brutal violence and indiscriminant war, HTI chooses the path of peace. However, both are anti-Pancasila and still aspiring Islam as a healing antidote. If there is a political opportunity, it is not impossible HTI and ISIS will work together. Even the burst of a number of Indonesian citizens reportedly joined the ISIS in Syria; many Islamic organizations refuse to support the ISIS.

Alliances to Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS will only be a momentary phenomenon that will disappear by itself. However, it can be ascertained, supporting footman's ISIS is the degree of radicalism that had reached to an end, including denying the Pancasila. Thus, ISIS issues

are not excessive but still important for Indonesian to give high vigilance.

Fifthly, in the context of radical movements in Indonesia, ISIS only generates momentum for the consolidation of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia. This movement will be enlarged in Indonesia in the event of national political instability. As in his native country, ISIS grows and develops because there is political instability in Iraq and Syria. It tells how the importances of Indonesia to still maintain its political stability to ensure the country able to standing strongly to face all kinds of threats.

Additionally, supporters of ISIS in Indonesia certainly are people who think Indonesia is infidel state, in which democracy and nationalism, according to them, are a pagan system.

Sixthly, In East Java and many vulnerable provinces, in which they are potential areas for the growth of terrorism and supporting to the existing ISIS, there is an initiative of the governors which publishes 'governor rule' (gubernatorial) in anticipation of the radical religious movements. In East Java, for instance, there is an experience for the birth of gubernatorial Number 55 Year 2012 on fostering the Guidance and Control for the Deviant of Religious activity and Misguided, which could become an interesting lesson because many benefits have been clearly perceived by the people of East Java. With the release of the regulation, as idealized together, the security forces have legitimacy to stem and anticipate any movements to develop ISIS and/or disturb the public. Many radical Muslim activists use websites and social media to spread out their information and influence to support ISIS.

In this case, on the recommendation of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the Ministry of Communication in 2015 blocked 19 websites it claimed to be spreading violent messages and recruiting Indonesians to join ISIS. Then the move was reversed, however, after a major public outcry, including from civil society groups often attacked by these very websites.

For the radical Muslims, this type of unthinking reaction and flip-flopping exposes a hasty and imprudent decision-making process that could undermine authority in the future, meanwhile the initial move to ban the websites sent the wrong message to civil society and mass media that saw it as a precedent of a repressive measure that could threaten freedom of speech.

Instead of arbitrarily blocking websites used as platforms to spread hateful religious sentiment, the government has to monitor them tightly to gather evidence to prosecute them for the content that really violates the ITE Law, the way it prosecuted other ITE cases. This is important as it sends a message that it does not tolerate the spread of terrorist ideology in Indonesia, while not being seen as indiscriminately targeting websites with merely hardline perspectives.⁸

The authorities and the security forces aware that the Internet has been used by ISIS and other radical movements effectively to spread their ideology and lure new recruits and they know too, Pew Research Survey found that an

⁸Devi Asmarani, "Indonesia struggles to keep citizens from joining ISIS," retrieved from <http://www.themalaymailonline.com/opinion/devi-asmarani/article/indonesia-struggles-to-keep-citizens-from-joining-isis#sthash.3j0s0UJd.dpuf>

astounding 72% of Indonesian Muslims would prefer to live under Sharia law, meanwhile The State Department details other Indonesian extremist groups in their most recent country report on terrorism from 2013. 40 separate raids led to the arrests of more than 75 suspects. One of the biggest incidents saw a planned attack on the Embassy of Burma in Jakarta thwarted. Many of the terrorist attacks were targeted at police.

Hundreds Indonesians Joined ISIS

On July 2015, a video showing Indonesian pro-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters, over 70 Indonesian-speaking men in military fatigues and armed with rifles are preparing for a field assignment. These men seem in good spirits as they smile and joke for the videographer, referring to themselves as the Ikhwan Nusantara, or the brothers of the archipelago - a reference to Indonesia as the world's largest archipelagic nation.

The videographer also introduced some of the men as he walked around, giving their names as Abu Salma, Abu Wurwah, Aman Abdurrahman. The video is strategic propaganda. It shows the Indonesians having a place, a force there. This would invite other pro-ISIS people in Indonesia to join.

The clip is the latest to show the existence of the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah, or Malay Archipelago unit for ISIS, and analysts say it is proof there is a significant number of members who have joined as fighters. The emergence of the new clip comes as officials in Indonesia are getting tough on ISIS supporters, readying charges against as many as 14 men accused of either creating

a website to promote ISIS, or funding and helping ISIS supporters to travel to the Middle East to link up with the militant group Syria and the number has increased each month. Many of those who have slipped into Syria pretended to be tourists or students. Aman Abdurrahman is one of the radical Muslim figures who help the ISIS to get supports from the young Muslims in Indonesia.

In this case, Aman Abdurrahman had use his influence to Sam, a Ring Banten terror network member who served a nine-year sentence for robbing a goldsmith to finance the first Bali bombing, visited his friend Rois Abu Syaukat in Kembang Kuning prison within the Nusakambangan prison complex. Aman Abdurrahman is a key figure in the Indonesia-Syria pipeline and he is the takfirist ideologue, who began translating ISIS tracts following its formal split from the Nusra Front in April 2013. He has been one of the most vocal advocates of ISIS from his cell at Nusakambangan prison. Aman Abdurrahman is Rois's cellmate. Shortly after the visit, Sam left for Syria.⁹

Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail noted that Sam professed in January 2012 that he did not intend to participate in any future "actions" in Indonesia. However, he would do what he could to "help oppressed Muslims anywhere." In addition, when Taufik Andrie, the director of the Institute for International Peace Building, met with Sam in late 2012, he found that Sam was distressed that no one was mobilizing either relief aid or jihad on behalf of the

⁹ Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria," *article*, Middle East Institute, January 27, 2015, <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/there-and-back-again-indonesian-fighters-syria>.

Rohingya minority in Burma. There was no mention of Syria. After meeting with Rois and Aman at Kembang Kuning in 2013, he decided to join the fight in Syria. Given that Aman is a key ISIS supporter, it is likely that he prevailed upon Sam to join ISIS. On arrival in Syria, Sam "remained in ready contact via Facebook and shared information on developments in Syria," especially as they pertained to ISIS. Sam became a cheerleader for ISIS with Facebook postings on Syria's "5-star jihad." Then he was killed in Ramadi in April 2014.¹⁰

The authorities in Indonesia see all of them as one group who has divided tasks among themselves. They are in one group with a wanted terrorist, Abu Jandal, who threatened to attack the government, especially the prisons that house terrorists in Indonesia.¹¹

We noted that of the more than 500 Indonesians that are believed to have joined ISIS, about half have gone on to fight in Syria or Iraq. Contrast this with the fact less than 200 Indonesians was estimated to have fought in Afghanistan for al-Qaeda, and since 1999, the police has arrested more than 450 terror suspects. Some of them were released after serving their sentences. These people, he said, could easily

¹⁰ Hwang and Ismail explain that, still others are leaving directly from Indonesia, using channels similar to those operationalized during the Soviet-Afghan war. Indonesians are traveling to Malaysia and from there departing for Syria. Much like the Afghan veterans who identified themselves as Filipinos on forged passports to head to the Afghan front, Indonesians are identifying themselves as Malaysians. Interestingly, Malaysians are also departing from Indonesia to avoid attracting the attention of their own security services. Moreover, there is now a sufficient enough number of Malaysian and Indonesian fighters on the ground in Syria that, as of July 2014, there was discussion of forming a Katibah Nusantara, or a special Malay-speaking unit, of ISIS.

¹¹ *The Straits Times* report, July 17, 2015.

go back to their old activities unless they shifted paradigm.

In this case, radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir -- viewed as the spiritual leader of the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah -- is currently in an Indonesian prison in Java, but has declared support for ISIS. Ba'asyir has pledged allegiance to ISIS from his jail cell and is encouraging radicals to join the group. Actually, like other radicals, Indonesian extremists have even brought their families to Syria and Iraq so they could live under full Islamic law, and reported, they receive stipends for housing, food, and education and radical schools.

Our field research found that the number of Islamic State (ISIS) recruits from Indonesia tripled to over 500 by the end of last year. Home to the world's largest Muslim population, Indonesia's more than 200 million Muslims make up 13% of the world's total Muslims. The nation's history of extremist movements makes it a ripe location for ISIS recruits.

Wildan Mukholland, for instance, was one of those recruits. He came from the same village in Indonesia as two militants convicted and executed for their role in the 2002 Bali terrorist bombings, which killed over 200 people and were carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda affiliate.¹²

Mukholland grew up admiring the two terrorists and eventually went on to join ISIS and move to the Middle East. Last year, he blew himself up in a terrorist attack in a

¹²About Wildan Mukholland, see, George Philipps, "ISIS in Indonesia: 500 Recruits and Counting," <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6002/isis-indonesia>. See also, *The Straittimes* report, "Jakarta grapples with Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters," <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jakarta-grapples-with-indonesian-pro-isis-fighters>

restaurant in Baghdad. In that similar case, Afief Abdul Madjid, 63, had travelled to Syria to allegedly attend military training. He was accused of spreading violent ideology when he returned home.

He was sentenced by the court on other charges, receiving four years' jail for funding a terrorist paramilitary training camp in Aceh in 2010, less than the eight years demanded by prosecutors.

The prosecutor handling the Afief case focused on events that occurred in Syria, which were more challenging to prove, meanwhile one of the men, Muhammad Amin Mude, 41, was arrested after police said they foiled his attempt to arrange for six people with fake passports to go to Syria. Amin is alleged to have arranged the trips of three batches of travelers to Syria prior to his arrest. Another of those arrested, Muhammad Fachry (M. Fachry), is accused of setting up and running a radical website that promotes ISIS and invites people to go to Syria.

ISIS is not the only terrorist group looking for a base in Indonesia. Hamas also tried to open an office there to help manage its fundraising operations in the region, but was denied by Jakarta government.

Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority country with 250 million people, practices a tolerant brand of Islam and has long eradicated terrorist networks such as the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah, but it is now grappling with a small radical fringe that includes pro-ISIS sympathizers.

Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail said that, of the approximately 8,000 foreign fighters from 74 countries believed to have joined the Syrian conflict, it is unclear how

many of them are Indonesian. Official government estimates vary from a low of 24, cited by General Ansyad Mbai, the director of the National AntiTerrorism Agency, to a high of 56, as stated by General Sutarman, the National Police commander. One Jemaah Islamiyah member stated that by his own count, some 150 fighters were in Syria with either ISIS or the Nusra Front.¹³ Aspiring jihadist are traveling to Syria by way of four main channels. Some join with Jemaah Islamiyah as part of its humanitarian arm, Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI), for a month-long tour providing relief and medical assistance. While on the tour, these individuals slip away. Most have joined the Nusra Front. However, when ISIS split from the Front, a portion of those fighters left for ISIS. Others have made it to Syria after performing the *'umrah*, the little hajj, taking a boat from Yemen through the Suez Canal to Latakia in Syria.¹⁴

For the Indonesian jihadist in Syria, their experiences as volunteer fighters would enrich their struggle as the real Muslims in the arena of global conflict in which they can meet, communicate and exchange of ideas each other with the volunteer Jihadist from European Union, Africa, the US and so forth. These historical experiences have been their pride as the global Muslim Jihadist in the context of the struggle for the real in the battle for God, to borrow 'Karen Armstrong's political metaphor'.

¹³Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again "

¹⁴Australian media estimates put the number of Indonesian fighters on the ground in Syria at closer to 300. Security analysts believe that official government estimates are understating the number of Indonesian fighters, while Australian estimates are overstating the number.

According to Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, among others, most notably alumni of the Al Mukmim Islamic boarding school in Ngruki near Solo, have used Facebook to connect with fellow alums studying in the Middle East. Nine alumni of Al Mukmim, also known as Ngruki, have been documented as having joined the fight, leaving from boarding schools in Yemen and Pakistan, where they had been doing follow-up study.¹⁵ Several were attending Al Iman, a boarding school in Sana, Yemen. Al Iman has been especially vocal in its support for Sunni fighters in Syria and thus provided the necessary conduits to travel there. These fighters connected other Al Mukmim alumni to contacts in Syrian militant groups. By way of the connection and networking the militant groups, there open the door to go Syria/Iraq.

Based on our interview with one of the returnees from Syria, the Indonesian jihadist are very confident that by joining ISIS in Syria or Iraq, they will get blessing by Allah and, even, they will be paid with high salary more than enough compared with their monthly salary in Indonesia as the cheap laborers as far as they get here. At least, they will get what the so-called a shortcut to heaven as the jihadist if they killed or die in the battleground.

As far as we know, the Indonesian Jihadist go to Syria through Turkey because Indonesian citizens are eligible for a visa-on-arrival in the country, meanwhile the other country like Iraq or Jordan is more strict and difficult to give a visa.

Hwang and Ismail found that, there are two major

¹⁵.IPAC Report," Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict," January 30, 2014, retrieved from http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/01/IPAC_Indonesians_the_Syrian_Conflict.pdf

routes that Indonesians tend to take when traveling to Syria to join ISIS or Jabhah al-Nusra. Most typically, they cross through Turkey since Indonesian citizens are eligible for a visa-on-arrival. One common route is to fly from Jakarta to Istanbul and then travel over land to Reyhanli, a town near Turkey's border with Syria. From there, arrangements are made to cross the Syrian border. Others have taken a more indirect route, traveling from Indonesia to Malaysia and then departing from Kuala Lumpur, often with Malaysian identity papers, to Doha, Qatar. They then travel to Istanbul and finally go by land to Reyhanli. In December 2014, Malaysian authorities caught some two dozen Indonesians attempting to go to Syria via this latter route. In the press/media, this story spread out among the radical Muslims in Indonesia who are interested to join ISIS, and this stimulate them to make the contacts with their networking and radicals cell in the spirit of jihadist for ISIS.

In this case, as many as 16 Indonesian citizens are reported to have gone missing in Turkey while they were vacationing. The 16 missing individuals left Indonesia using a travel agency and their whereabouts remain unknown. They are suspected to have fled outside of Turkey to join the notoriously known radical group, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A number of rumors led to the speculation that these individuals have deliberately gone missing as they travelled across the border to join the notoriously known radical group ISIS. Reports said, it is a very likely possibility knowing that Turkey is located next to Iraq and Syria, the two countries where most of the radical group is resides.¹⁶

¹⁶In March 2015, The Chairman of Indonesian Intelligence Agency (BIN) Marciano Norman revealed that the Indonesian government

Many of the Indonesian workers who went to do *'umrah* to Saudi Arabia never came back and so they furthered their journey somewhere else, most likely to join ISIS. Because if they are not doing anything wrong, why are they hiding or running away from their own government who are suppose to protect them. It is possible; there is the travelling agency that is suspected to have been helping 16 people who are now on the run to somewhere unknown.

Some Muslims in Middle East supposed to finance Indonesians wanting to join ISIS to launch what the so-called the holy jihad, even though theydo not understand the real situation in Syria and Iraq.

Based on Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail's study, the Indonesian diaspora in the Middle East has been critical in assisting Indonesians seeking to fight with ISIS and the Nusra Front by providing them with logistical support and local contacts. There will be some and the concern is that these people will now have combat experience, tactical skills, weapons knowledge, deeper ideological commitment and international connections. Even if it is just a handful of people, they could provide leadership for the tiny extremist movement here

Once the jihadist arrives at the border, someone from ISIS or Jabhah al-Nusra picks them up and transports them

endeavor to gather more information regarding the 16 missing Indonesians who were last seen in Turkey. BIN thinks that the strategy of using a travel agent to travel somewhere first just to transit is not a new one but often used, especially by those who went to do *'umrah* and never returned since. The Indonesian Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey have released the names of the 16 missing Indonesians in Istanbul. Among 16, 10 originating from Surabaya, East Java, whereas the other 6 came from Surakarta, Central Java.

to safe houses on the other side. Total travel costs, including the flight to Istanbul, local transport to the border, and two days accommodation along the way, are estimated at between \$1000 and \$1500.¹⁷

Some Indonesians joining ISIS and the Nusra Front hail from radical groups, while others are independent operators, radicalized through the Internet. Jemaah Islamiyah members typically affiliate with Jabhah al-Nusra. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and Mujahidin Indonesia Timor, whose leaders have sworn bai'at (an oath of allegiance) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, send their members to ISIS.

In this case, Aman Abdurrahman supporters have been setting themselves up as ISIS recruiters and organizing mass pledge sessions in radical mosques. In connection with this action, a few armchair jihadists like Muhammad Fachry have latched onto ISIS propaganda to widen their networks through social media and through organizing public demonstrations of support for the Islamic State. However, unlike others, M. Fachry, who leads the Forum Aktifis Syariat Islam (FAKSI, Forum of Islamic Law Activists), has, and wisely perhaps, played no direct role in sending Indonesian fighters to Syria. However, the publicity machinery he has created, especially his jihadi website Al Mustaqbal, has allowed Aman Abdurrahman to become, as Indonesia watcher Sidney Jones puts it, "the most important ideological promoter of ISIS" in Indonesia despite being physically confined to prison.¹⁸

¹⁷Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again..."

¹⁸Julie Chernov Hwang and Noor Huda Ismail, "There and Back Again..."

ISIS, Notion of Takfirism and Islamic Extremism

Analysts and the authorities have warned that a lack of concerted efforts in fighting the proliferation of the radical ideology propagated by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has resulted in an unprecedented rise in the number of Indonesians leaving for the Middle East to fight for the group. In total, an estimated 514 Indonesians have gone to Syria and Iraq to fight with the ISIS, around half of whom had been living in nearby countries as students or migrant workers prior to the rise of the ISIS. Indonesia is probably the region's biggest supplier of ISIS fighters. In comparison, around 40 Malaysians, 200 Filipinos and 60 Australians have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, according to several media reports.

One should remember that, because Indonesia has the world's largest Muslim population, the country would always be at the center of recruitment, although only hundred Muslims would join ISIS. Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) director Sidney Jones noted that the number of Indonesians who went to fight in Afghanistan from 1985 to 1994 did not exceed 300.

Since the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the government has declared ISIS an illegal organization and ideology, as they are opposed to Pancasila (Indonesia's philosophical foundation). Nevertheless, unlike in Malaysia and Singapore where ISIS supporters can be charged and detained upon their departure to the combat zone, Indonesia authorities still have no legal basis to do the same. While the government has repeatedly emphasized the danger of ISIS ideology, maybe only the Indonesia's National Counter-terrorism Agency (BNPT) and the National Police have been

actively involved in prevention measures.

Prof. Mohamad Bazzi of New York University emphasize that, one of the pillars of ISIS' ideology is that it is the true - and only - defender of Sunni Muslims, who are being persecuted in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and everywhere else where ISIS has carried out attacks, either directly or through its affiliates. In its slick propaganda, ISIS emphasizes two major themes: a righteous and idyllic life for "true" Muslims in its self-declared Islamic state in parts of Syria and Iraq, and an ideology that sanctifies violence as the only means for Sunnis to achieve power. The extremist group is highly sophisticated in its use of social media to sow fear among its enemies, and to entice alienated Muslims living in the West to "immigrate" to ISIS-controlled territory.

ISIS is the global ultra-Revivalists for global terrorism and never mind that ISIS selectively uses a group of clerics and scholars from across Islam's history who advocated declaring other Muslims as infidels or apostates, and justified their killing. The majority of the world's 1.6 billion Muslims reject this notion of *takfirism*.¹⁹ However, it is central to the ideology of most of today's militant groups, who have killed far more Muslims than non-Muslims. That fact becomes obscured as long as ISIS has new opportunities to portray itself as the defender of Muslims.²⁰

In Indonesian Muslims perception, genealogy of the ISIS emergence, as a political movement, wrapped in clothes of Jihad by religious doctrines, in which the Islamic thinkers categorized them as the global ultra-Revivalists for global

¹⁹Mohamad Bazzi, "Trumpeting Islamophobia helps ISIS," *The Straits Times*, December 12, 2015.

²⁰Mohamad Bazzi, "Trumpeting Islamophobia..."

terrorism. Their deployment and activities in Indonesia would be to watch out from day to day because they danger the cohesiveness of its people. Their doctrine and religious understanding are certainly very dangerous for the continuity of tradition and culture of Indonesian Muslims, especially among the nahdliyin (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU) and Muhammadiyah moderate Muslims.

When the ISIS and radical Muslims movement is not forbidden, of course, there will be potential course for political upheaval that led to the horizontal conflicts among communities of Indonesia. As world leaders call for Muslims to take the lead in the ideological battle against a growing and increasingly violent offshoot of their own religion, analysts say NU/Muhammadiyah's campaign is a welcome antidote to Islamic extremism.

The campaign by NU and Muhammadiyah for an open-minded, pluralistic Islam also comes at a time when Islam is at war with itself over central theological questions about how the faith defined in the modern era. In a way, it should not be surprising that this message comes from Indonesia, the home of Islam Nusantara, widely seen as one of the most progressive Islamic movements in the world. The movement - its name is Indonesian for East Indies Islam - dates back more than 500 years, and promotes a spiritual interpretation of Islam that stresses non-violence, inclusiveness and acceptance of other religions. Such liberalism poses strongly a counter-argument to ISIS.

Regarding to prevent ISIS so it can not expand the reach beyond the digital realm, what the government should have been doing since two decades ago is to come up with a massive and effective campaign against radical Islamic

teaching, intensively involving the country's two largest Muslim organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, as well as the conservative Indonesian Council of Ulama and many popular Muslim clerics.

ISIS ideas and activities can pose a serious problem in the political, religious, and social activities in the country. Almost certainly, the main supporter of the idea of ISIS caliphate state is a radical resident or a small group who has been troubling the people of Indonesia.

More than that, it is very important to accept Pancasila as the state ideology, while Islam remains guarded as a creed. We do not need to bang the state basic and religion creed. Because, the precept of Pancasila which contains the deity is a form of the practice of Islamic law.

Caliphate is clearly irrelevant to the Muslims of Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic organizations have formed the Committee Caliphate following elimination of "caliphate" in Turkey in 1924 by the secular Turks; they intend to defend and demand that the "caliphate" in Turkey revived.

To respond this phenomenon, in the past, it was "the grand old man" Haji Agus Salim, a well-known Muslim intelligentsia, who once stated that the committee along with Indonesian caliphate is irrelevant. According to him, what is called a "caliphate" in Turkey is a despotic and corrupt empire that need not be defended, especially by Indonesian Muslims. After Caliphate Committee, the issue of caliphate was almost entirely absent in the discourse of Indonesian Islam, except articulated by Darul Islam movement led by SM Kartosuwirjo, a leader of DI (Daulah Islamiyah) who initiated Indonesian Islamic State (NII) in 1940's. Kartosuwirjo was sentenced to death under Soekarno adminis-

tration in 1063.

In addition, Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah almost never talk about the caliphate. Instead, they receive and develop concepts and praxis Indonesian nation-state. The NU and Muhammadiyah realize that the caliphate utopianism lies in the fact that Muslims in the region have adopted various nation-states based on the reality of a nation with a tradition of distinctive society, culture and religion, geographical area, and different historical experiences.

Therefore, the "unification" in all regions of the Muslim world under a single political authority of Islamic Caliphate style is clearly and merely empty slogan.²¹ The vast majority of mainstream Muslims in Indonesia is generally incorporated in NU, Muhammadiyah and so forth in across the country and nation clearly rejected ISIS, which is considered as a global terrorist organization by the claim "caliphatism" which proved to be full of violence and brutality.

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INDONESIAN TERRORIST, ISIS, AND GLOBALIZATION OF TERROR: A PERSPECTIVE

AFTER the fall of Soeharto's New Order, Indonesian transformation into a democratic country was followed by various security problems, especially terrorist attacks that shocked the public suddenly. Terrorists' actions and bomb blasts in several cities, together with other forms of social unrest and violent demonstrations occurred throughout the archipelago. As it is known, the history of homegrown radical Islamic groups dates back to the late 1940s, when Kartosuwiryo led the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) movement, a radical group that led to the formation of the al-Qaeda affiliated Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) in 1993, a group responsible for the deadly 2002 Bali bombings. In October 2002, the US has made JI as an organization of international terrorists. It happened after the UN Security Council added JI as a terrorist group, so that all countries that are members UN organizations are required to freeze the assets of, and deny access to funds of JI.

In UN Resolution 1390/2002 JI has been blamed as a terrorist organization international along with 25 other terrorist organizations. JI is considered as an arm of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. JI is based in Indonesia is believed to have links with other terrorist organizations active in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines (Vaughn, 2005:23).

Jl as a terrorist network is the largest in Southeast Asia. And it has a network of southern Thailand region to the Australian territory. The terrorist group is increasingly considered to be a serious threat to security regionally in the Southeast Asian region and even internationally, because the brain of perpetrators of acts of terrorism in Southeast Asia is a member of Jl. One of Jl member, Mas Selamat Kasturi who masterminded the plan to crash the plane into Changi Airport, could be handled . He was arrested in Malaysia and handed over to Singapore. This news is accessible via tail action that occurred in Indonesia culprit is the Jl group. The various action has been carried out by Jl members as the brains of various acts of terror in Indonesia between the years 2000-2005 such as the Christmas bombings in 2000, 81 bombs and 29 explosions in Jakarta in 2001, the first Bali bombing in 2002, Bom Marriot 2003, Australian Embassy bombing in 2004 and the Bali II 2005 (ICG, 2003: 5).

Various acts of terrorism that occurred until year 2009 in Indonesia were also not out of the share of the participation of members of Jl as the brains behind the terror attacks. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a form of development of the Darul Islam (DI) which is a growing movement of radical Islam in Indonesia in the year 1940s, a movement that wants the exercise to the Islamic Sharia in lieu of the Dutch government law. DI movement is located in West Java, Aceh and Sulawesi. And the third movement DI rebellion has been defeated by the Army National Indonesia (ICG, 2003: 14).

Saeful Mujani, a political scientist of State Islamic University of Jakarta, argued that there is an inter-connectivity between external influence from Middle East

who has brought Pan-Islamism, Muslim Brotherhood, and global caliphate and Muslims in Indonesia. Those ideas are established in contemporary Islamic organization like Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansarut Tauhid, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and many others (Gunaratna, 2002; Mujani, 2007; Djelantik, 2006).

Islamic transnational movement has great influence to idea for organizing Islamic movement in Indonesia. Furthermore, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, a well-known scholar and ulama of Muhammadiyah organization in Indonesia, even mentioned that Wahhabism plays a significant role and in fact becomes a role model in creating and converting Muslims in Indonesia into terrorists (Wahid, 2011: 74). Since JI's charismatic leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was arrested in August 2010, experts believe that younger JI members separated from the group when senior members decided to lie low, as they believed that Indonesia was no longer a land for jihad. But the facts say otherwise.

In the perspective of social movement theory, the phenomenon of terrorism can not be regarded merely ideological issues, but also issues of sociological imbalances. Such imbalance manifests in the form of social deprivation, economic inequality and political repression. Ideology is only a mass-mobilizing factor to win the sympathy and minds of the people experiencing this sociological imbalance. Therefore, the ideology of terrorism is actually nothing more than a domino effect from the rise of the sociological imbalances.

In almost the same formulation, Olivier Roy (2004:16) uses the term "social dislocation" as a factor causing the emergence of ideological radicalism and terrorism. He said

that the sociological distance between radical groups and other communities contributed to the creation of cognitive disparity and a multitude of misunderstandings between the two that led to violent conflicts. This means that the phenomena of radicalism and terrorism are not always about ideology but can also be rooted in social, political and economic issues (Hilmy, 2016).

In the context of terrorism in Indonesia, precisely the socioeconomic deprivation and political marginalization has encouraged the Islamists to act radically and extremely as they do not see the path of peace as a solution to the problem. Sociological imbalances in turn creates what is called the M Hafez Mohammed and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004: 65) is an “opportunity structure“ for the appearance of an actors or institutions to establish an ideological opposition and resistance to mobilize the masses (Hilmy, 2016). Both refer to the presence of the alliance, state repression, political instability and the strength or weakness of state institutions. Analysis of the structure of opportunity finally talk about the broader context of how the actors can use the opportunities and threats to mobilize the masses.

In the context of Indonesian terrorism, the rise of jihadists is inseparable from the presence of these opportunity structures. Just to name a few, Imam Samudera, Azhari, Noordin Mohd Top, Santoso, and Maman Abdurrahman are terrorists whose names became known through the presence of opportunity structures. They used their intelligence to frame a narration of terrorist resistance to persuade grassroots victims of sociological imbalance (Hilmy, 2016). The death of all of terrorist frontmen such as Santoso, Azhari, Noordin Mohd Top, Imam Samudera etc

proved even inspire other individuals, especially the radical Muslims, to lead a terrorist group. Therefore, it obviously will not be able to break the ideological reproduction of terrorism from the original source.

Many operations to eliminate terrorists may be held, but the chain of ideological terrorism will never break up if the government ignores the sociological imbalances above. As a result, the emergence of new terrorist and other figures just a matter of time.

To a certain extent the collective memory of people still remember the occurrence of various bomb attacks by terrorists. Even, the Indonesian public was especially shocked by 13 bombs that exploded almost simultaneously in several cities in Indonesia on Christmas Eve, 25 December 2000. These attacks were part of a high-scale terrorist attack by Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) .The attack involved a series of coordinated bombings of churches in Jakarta and eight other cities which killed 18 people and injured many others.

In the following year (2001), 81 bombs exploded, 29 explosions happened in Jakarta. The most significant one in terms of number of victims and international coverage was the first Bali bomb blast on 12 Oct 2002. Ali Imron is the designer and maker of bombs in cafes of Paddy's Pub and the Sari Club in Kuta, Legian, Bali on October 22, 2002. The first Bali bombing has been into mourning for the whole world because about 202 people, including 164 foreign tourists were killed pathetically in the incident. Ali Imron from behind prison reminded us, only 10 of the 400 alumni of Afghanistan who commit acts of terrorism involving Santoso in their action and it's been shocking the world.

What if hundreds of others doing the same abominations? It was horrible (Interview with Ali Imron in Jakarta, July 20-30, 2016).

The tragedy was repeated in the following year when a suicide bomber exploded the lobby of the J.W Marriott hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, in front of the Australian Embassy in 2004, and the second Bali bomb on 1 October 2005 (Djelantik, 2006).

After three years of relative quiet of bomb attacks, suddenly in Jakarta on July 17, 2009, two powerful explosions occurred at the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton, Jakarta. The explosion occurred almost simultaneously at around 7:50 pm. The Suicide bombings killed at least nine people and injured more than 50 others, either Indonesian or foreign nationals.

Later in January 2010, there was a terrorist shooting of civilians in Aceh and CIMB Niaga Bank robbery in September 2010. Then, there is blasting of bomb in Cirebon, April 15, 2011. The explosion of a suicide bombing was also occurred in the Police Mosque Cirebon when the Friday Praying was went on, that killed the perpetrator and injured 25 others. Then, terrorist bombing in Gading Serpong happened, in April 22, 2011. The terrorists made a plan to target the Christ Church Cathedral in Serpong, South Tangerang, Banten and they placed the bomb in a gas pipeline, but the police can handled and put down this terrorist action (Antara, 21 Juli 2009).

Then, there was a bomb explosion in Solo, September 25, 2011. The explosion of a suicide bombing in the church of GBIS Kepunton, Solo, Central Java happened after the church service and the congregation out of the church. One

suicide bombers were killed and 28 others injured.

There was another bomb blast in Solo, August 19, 2012. The grenade exploded in Pospam Gladak, Solo, Central Java. Then, in Poso, terrorists attack the Police with bombing in June 9, 2013 with the target of police personnel who were apples morning. The bomb exploded in front of the mosque Mapolres Poso, Central Sulawesi. one officer wounded seriously, while a suicide bomber killed on the spot. And in January 2016, terrorist bombings and crossfire occurred in Jakarta. The explosion and firefight around Plaza Sarinah, Jalan MH Thamrin, Central Jakarta, in which 8 persons killed, two of them are perpetrators of the attack (Metrotvnews, 17 Januari 2016).

On July 5, 2016, suicide bomb exploded in the courtyard of Investigation Police Headquarters Kota Surakarta, Central Java, one offender was killed and one police officer were injured. All of the above terrorist actions were proof and a sign that terrorism is still rampant in the country under reform era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo.

In addition to facing the problem of terrorism, the post-Suharto era has also been marked by the proliferation of Islamic movements that run the gamut from violent to peaceful, from 'democratic' to antidemocratic. Among new Islamic movements that use violence to achieve their goals are the Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defenders' Front or FPI), and Laskar Jihad (the Jihad Troops), to mention a few notorious groups. Although Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council) and Mujahiddin Indonesia Timur (Mujahiddin of East Indonesia-MIT) described itself as a non-violent organisation, the group does

not repudiate the use of force. Hizbut Tahrir (the Party of Liberation) is a non-violent organisation, but it strongly opposes the notion of democracy and that of the nation-state (Zada, 2002; Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004; Hasan, 2002).

Bali Bomb: Emergence of Terror

In fact, the emergence of the issue of terrorism as a serious problem occurred after the first Bali bomb blast in 2002, an event that shocked the community and the country amid weakening the power of the government address social problems in Indonesia. In the early 2000s, a range of jihadist groups operated across the Indonesian archipelago. These were not initially considered a major security concern by the government, as Indonesia prioritized rebuilding its economy after the Asian Financial Crisis and consolidating its democracy after overcoming a 32-year-long dictatorship. Additionally, most of these groups confined their violence to the islands of Maluku and Sulawesi, where communal conflicts had broken out between Muslims and Christians (Zammit and Iqbal, 2015: 4).

Bali bomb blasts marked the emergence of large-scale terrorism in Indonesia. According to Andrew Zammit and Muhammad Iqbal, following the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia confronted a seemingly unmanageable terrorist problem. Over the next decade, however, the country became widely viewed as a counter-terrorism success story as the threat from al-Qaeda-linked or -inspired jihadist groups declined dramatically. Unfortunately, the transnational pull of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS), risk undermining Indonesia's counter-terrorism successes (Zammit and Iqbal,

2015: 6).

In this regard, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) director Sidney Jones also said that various radical media outlets disseminated IS propaganda by re-making videos or audio statements in Indonesian and spreading the links through the internet every day, making effective use of Indonesia as the fourth leading Facebook user in the world with over 84 percent of users active Twitter users by 2014 (Sapiie, 2015). In this regard, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a radical Muslim group that aspires to establish the Islamic State, and they establish transnational networks that have a common interest in the global arena.

In reality, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), had a close relationship with al-Qaeda, dating back to the 1980s foreign fighter mobilization against the Soviets in Afghanistan. JI's co-founders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir were hesitant to follow Osama bin Laden's 1998 call for attacks on Western military and civilian targets, but one faction of JI chose to join al-Qaeda's global war (Zammit and Iqbal, 2015: 6).

This faction was led by Riduan Isamuddin alias. Hambali, who had a close operational relationship with 9/11 architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Hambali's JI faction bombed churches across Indonesia, unsuccessfully attempted to attack the U.S. Embassy in Singapore and in October 2002, bombed tourist venues in Bali, killing 202 people.

In this connection, Noordin Mohammad Top, one of the Bali bombers, stepped in to Hambali's role and continued attacking Western-associated targets in Indonesia. His faction bombed the Jakarta Marriot Hotel in September

2003, the Australian Embassy in September 2004 and Bali tourist venues again in October 2005 (Kompas, August 9, 2003). In this regard, each bombing led to further arrests by Detachment 88, a new counter-terrorism unit within the Indonesian National Police. In response to the crackdown, JI's leadership distanced itself from Noordin's breakaway faction and eschewed mass-casualty attacks on foreign targets. Instead, they sought a secure base in Poso, a Sulawesi town recovering from recent communal conflict. JI's Poso network focused on killing Christians and government officials, and in 2005, the JI shocked the nation by beheading three Christian schoolgirls (*Jakarta Post*, April 26, 2013).

The battle between security forces and terrorists often happens in the field. The Network of JI terrorists in Southeast Asia and the Middle East are relatively strong. So that the military help the police to combat terrorism in Indonesia. In 2007, Detachment 88 killed and arrested many members of the network, prompting JI to cease violence and focus on gradually rebuilding itself.

By fast motion operation of police and military in tackling JI terrorism , JI gradually can be trimmed and attenuated. JI was further weakened in 2008, when their former leader Abu Bakar Bashir created a new organization, Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), taking many JI members with him. Noordin's network, also weakened by counter-terrorism efforts, failed to launch another major attack until July 2009, when it bombed Jakarta's Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels. Detachment 88 killed Noordin in raids after the attack, and his network did not recover (The Jakarta Post, August 8, 2009). Although the police operation to

combat terrorism without ceasing, but the cells and terrorist networks continue to grow. One of the terrorist leaders were wanted by the police is Santoso.

Potrait of Santoso as a Terrorist

After being chased, attacked and surrounded by about 3,000 police and military forces in the forest area of Poso, Central Sulawesi, finally Santoso (Abu Wardah), as a fugitive terrorist be terminated. In our opinion, this is *“the struggle for the real”* (to borrow a Clifford Geertz’s metaphor) by the Police/Army of Indonesia to address challenges Santoso group who feel mighty and powerful in the Poso jungle.

Observers of terrorism estimate that Santoso group has networking with radical groups that spread in Indonesia and the Philippines, and have sympathizers in various parts of Southeast Asia. In a report from the International Crisis Group in 2012, titled “How Indonesian Extremists Regroup“, it was disclosed that JI affiliates in Poso were based in Tanah Runtuh, while elements of KOMPAK were based in Kayamanya. After the Malino peace declaration in 2001, Santoso was also active in the Tanah Runtuh group (*Kompas*, Juli 20, 2016).

In terms of his criminal record, Santoso’s name was later detected when he was involved in the robbery of a truck transporting cigarette products from a well-known company in August 2004. The action was deemed *fa’i* (robbery to finance terror acts), which was considered a form of war.

However, according to information from a member of the Tanah Runtuh group, Mua’rifin, the dossier of terror

convict Abullah Sunata in 2011, the fa'i was an initiative from Santoso himself, not a command from the askari military unit of the Poso branch of JI at that time (*Kompas*, Juli 20, 2016). Not many know that even well behaved, Santoso indeed a radical Islamist, and the action may reflect the early skills of Santoso in carrying out terror acts. This talent was also later responded to by figures in other terror groups, which later led him to occupy more prestigious positions in the terrorist network in Indonesia. This development later led to Santoso being considered quite dangerous by the authorities and he became a major fugitive.

After the events of a major police crackdown in Tanah Runtuh on January 22, 2007, the activities of the violent network in Poso were paralyzed. However, the situation took place over a short time. After the establishment of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) in Java in 2008, the remnants of terror groups in Poso reconsolidated (*Kompas*, Juli 20, 2016). Around the same time, after serving a three-year sentence, Santoso in 2009 started his struggle to make Poso a land of jihad.

Around the end of 2009, two former JI members went to Poso to talk with Santoso about the possibility of opening JAT branches there. At the same time, the idea of opening a military training camp in Jantho, Aceh, was also being considered by JAT, although it was later stopped by the authorities in February 2010. During 2009, Santoso formed a small group that intensively discussed various Islamic teachings. Then, in 2010, the group started to conduct military training in Tamanjeka hamlet, Poso (*Kompas*, Juli 20, 2016). The group, which consisted of only about 10 people,

increasingly conducted military training after Daeng Koro, alias Sabar Subagyo, joined in 2012. At that time, Daeng Koro had fled from Mindanao, the Philippines.

In January 2011, the JAT branch in Poso was established with Yasin as its amir (leader) and Santoso was appointed as the commander of the military wing. From then, Santoso's degree and rank also rose and were increasingly taken into account (*Kompas*, Juli 20, 2016). The side effects of the crackdown on the camp in Aceh were an effort to make Poso a military training ground. Santoso held military trainings three times, in January, March and May 2011. He also sought weapons and ammunition through networks in Java.

Mujahidin of East Indonesia (MIT) led Santoso (Abu Wardah), he believes has been affiliated with ISIS. Remember that an Indonesian citizen named Abu Muhammad al Indonesi are also the Santoso's network, has appeared in a video to invite hundreds other citizens to join ISIS and has recently happened repeatedly departure to Syrian citizen allegedly linked to ISIS.

Again, back to Santoso as the subject matter, in which he has been terminated with all of his radical adventures, then the society and state must remain vigilant and anticipatory. In 2010, Santoso actually followed a deradicalization program provided by the government. One of the projects undertaken by Santoso in the deradicalization program was the cleaning of water pipes in Palu.

Santoso employed a number of his followers in the deradicalization project. However, instead of changing his way of thinking or deradicalizing him, the project became a way for Santoso to consolidate with his colleagues to launch

new violent acts (*Kompas*, Juli 20, 2016). Santoso is one of the terrorists kingpin that had been targeted in the de-radicalization program, but it is proved that he is even more rampant and with a global network of owned, it appears that he was increasingly confident until his death.

Santoso group along with his tissues and cells are already affiliated with ISIS, and that means terrorism in Indonesia has integrated itself with the world-class, global terrorism. Therefore, surveillance in the area where there is a terrorist, should be tightened to restrict their movements. The image of Santoso as ex the government guided de-radicalization which proved even became an important figure in the national and global terror networks, should be a important lesson for the country.

Deradicalisation should not just be a “project“, because the impact can be fatal and become a boomerang for the government and society. Vigilance, introspective and alertness of the state (and society) will be needed to scrape and tackle terrorism after the killing of Santoso. Counter-attack from the Group of Santoso should be anticipated, and very likely “the new Santoso, the other Santoso“ would be popping back here and there. That is the challenge for our society and state in the road ahead, related to transnationalization of terrorism and globalization of terror complicating the matters in the political- economic sector, security and law under reform era.

Santoso and ISIS

Santoso group has joined ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) and build a power base in Poso to struggle against what the so-called “thaghut regime” (evil regime) in their

perception and opinion. ISIS born as a result of the failure of Iraqi leaders, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in building an inclusive political system in Iraq. It has given ways to grow militants across Iraq, including the Sunnis, in turn, gave birth to ISIS. Sunni militants protested the economic and political marginalization by the ruling Shi'ite. Supports given by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to the hardline oppositions in Syria also contributed to the birth of ISIS. Of course, the presence of ISIS which originated from the Sunni has shocked the Muslim World, including Indonesia. Some call it as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Clinton, 2014: 6; Kuncahyono, 2014: 8).

There is also a call Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which specifically has a different coverage area. The term includes the Sham or the Levant region between the Mediterranean Sea and the Euphrates River means that the country coverage includes Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. The term Syria is confined to the state of modern Syria that is currently in conflict.

The genealogy of this radical religious organization can be traced to the Salafi Jihadist movement who have been fighting in Iraq and Syria that are on a mission to the formation of *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic State). ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), according to Zana Khasraw Gulmohamad of the University of Sheffield, stems from the birth of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2003. The initial declaration of the *Daulah Islamiyah* organization that conducted the insurgents in Iraq group is established by al-Zarqawi in 2004 who eventually reveals himself as part of al Qaeda (sahrasad and Chaidar, 2016: 14).

After Az-Zarqawi was killed in battle against the army of the United States in mid-2006, AQI was established by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi from Jordan, who in 2006 was murdered by the United

States. He was replaced by Abu Ayyoub al-Masri, Egyptian origin, who supports the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) or *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq*.

Helm of *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq* switched to Abu Hamza al-Mohajir until April 19, 2010. He was killed in an attack by American troops. The leadership then fell into the hand of Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi for about a year. Then, that helm was transferred to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After standing ISI, Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi known as Abu Hamed Dawood Mohammed II or Khalil al-Zawri (Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai and Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi) makes Baquba as his headquarters. Al-Baghdadi, the Iraqi people, replaced al-Masri, killed by American troops and Iraqis.

Under the control of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq* organization increasingly expanded its influence until April 9, 2013 when appearing a voice recording associated with the voice of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The tape was stated, Jabhah Nushra (Victory Front) in Syria is a continuation *Daulah Islamiyah* of Iraq organization. The tape also described that the name Jabhah Nushrah and *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq* be removed, and later proclaimed *Daulah Islamiyah fil Iraq wa ash-Sham*, that is written by media as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as his successor, while Raqqa city located in Syria, which borders with Turkey, as its capital.

In 2012, al-Baghdadi sent his men to form a branch of al Qaeda Syria, named Jabhat al-Nusra. The group aims to get rid of President Bashar al-Assad and establish a Sunni Islamic state led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, a Salafist-oriented leader. According to the Australian National Security, they received funding and support from AQI and ISI. However, they subject to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al Qaeda.

Al-Baghdadi who wants to be a single leader, in 8 April 2003 through a decree stating that AQI and Jabhat al-Nusra turned into ISIS/ISIL. However, Jabhah al-Nusra rejected it. Dispute between the ISIS and Jabhah al-Nusra prolonged and failed to be mediated by Ayman al-Zawahiri that ultimately claimed that Al-Qaeda cut off ties with ISIS because ISIS has its own conception and position; not subject to the Al Qaeda and Ayman Center (Clinton, 2014: 6; Kuncayono, 2014: 8).

According to German radio, Deutsche Welle (DW), ISIS takes money at the Central Bank of Mosul, some 500 billion Iraqi dinars, or about 429 million dollars plus a certain amount of gold. "With that much money, they used to pay 60,000 fighters," said Eliot Higgins, a resident scholar of the UK. Currently, ISIS has estimated about 10,000 armed members from different parts of the world: Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Australia, and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.

According to the Director of the Center for Research on the Arab World at the University of Mainz, Germany, Gunter Meyer, "The most important financial source of ISIS is the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates," especially from the rich people in

the country. The motivation of initial assistance they provide, according to Meyer, is to support the ISIS to face the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. This support is encouraged “hatred” sectarian: three-quarters of the Syrian population is Sunni Muslim, but most of the ruling elite are the Alawite minority, which is often called the part of the Shia Muslims.

BBC stated that ISIS received financial support from donors in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. It happened when they were still called Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). However, after the breakup of AQI with its central leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and proclaimed ISIS, according to CNN and The New York Times, they rely on the financial resources of criminal acts, such as kidnapping, extortion, and robbery.

Syrian conflict is initially localized, such as demonstrations to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad, then evolved into an international conflict, involving thousands of combatants from dozens of countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Chechnya, Turkey, America, England, France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Santoso, alias Abu Wardah, is an example of a man who was initially radicalized conventionally before the era of radicalization through the internet and social media, which has now become a trend. It was said to be conventional because the radicalization occurred through personal approaches and meetings as well as direct physical forging by elements of terror groups, which are neatly structured. The introduction of Santoso to violent networks in the country started many years before the era of the Islamic State (IS) movement. Communal religious conflict in

Poso, Central Sulawesi, became the initial channel for Santoso's actualization, which later raised his profile in the circle of violent groups (Sidney Jones: 2011: 20).

The popularity of Santoso seemed to reach its peak in 2014, when he, together with a group he led, the East Indonesia Mujahidin, pledged or declared an oath of loyalty to IS and distributed a voice recording of the oath via YouTube. He also claimed to be an element of IS in Indonesia (*Kompas*, Juli 20, 2016). Santoso's parents came from Central Java, and migrated to Tambarana, North Poso Pesisir, Central Sulawesi. Around 1999, Santoso learned martial arts from a graduate of Al Mukmin Ngruki Islamic boarding school in Sukoharjo, Central Java. "It is strongly believed that this was when he got an introduction to the [terror] network," said global extremism observer Noor Huda Ismail, who is also a graduate of Al Mukmin Ngruki.

In this regard, actors and designers of the Bali bombings, Ali Imron, told the authors that after the murder of Santoso, the future of terrorism could be more desperated and awful, will not easily be killed, let alone embryos of ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) in Indonesia has been growing with its global network, where the paradigm of ISIS is that the Muslims who disagree with them as the unbelievers, deserve to be killed, while they are ready to attack the government of a state at any time (Zammit and Iqbal, 2015: 3).

There are competing estimates of how many Indonesians are involved with jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. One of the most widely- used estimates is that up to 500 have joined the conflict, including fighters, but also their wives and families Around 40 have reportedly been killed.

Given Indonesia's Muslim population is an estimated 209 million, 500 people does not represent a dramatically large level of involvement in Syria and Iraq (The Strategist, July 17, 2015).

Mujahidin shares the same vision as IS established an Islamic caliphate in 2013 in Iraq then expanded into Syria. However, there was still romanticism among the group's members about establishing their own caliphate in Poso as it was the location where they had previously been trained by al-Qaeda and the place where Santoso ran an extremist training camp.

Terrorism in Indonesia: a Tip of an Iceberg?

In today's era of globalization of terrorism, Santoso Group is just the tip of the iceberg of the real-actual and potential strength of terrorism in Indonesia, that interlaced and connected with global networking, which they have imagined solidarity among globalized Islam radicalists, - to borrow Asef Bayat's perspective, a Middle East expert and Islam Politics from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Every terrorist attack anywhere and wherever, in Belgium, France, the US, Turkey, Middle East and so on, tend to trigger resonance, stimulate appetite and motivate terrorist groups in Indonesia to act, in response amid the globalization of terrorism itself.

The spread of the ideology of radical Islamism, according to Oliver Roy, continued to seep due to injustice, corruption, oppression and socio-economic disparities are increasing sharply tapered. The situation is compounded by, consciously or unconsciously by leaders, elites and the state apparatus, the intrusion of friction or even ideological-

religious-political conflicts from the level of middle class to the lower class. All too often we see on the television screen how terrorist groups shootout with the police, or the FPI (Front of Islam Defender) and other paramilitary uslims who clashed with officers, and many more such cases.

We have to admit, after the passage of the New Order era, Indonesian reformation era past dozen years, entered a phase of friction and clash of ideology that is relatively sharp. Religious ideology, often accompanied by violence and other forms of emotional expression, change into an ideology of radical opposition that is strong enough, even with a relatively small number of supporters. In many cases, they are sporadic, brutal and frightening . The ideology of Islam in Indonesia at this period appears in its hardest and roughest form: terrorism.

From the confessions of terrorism suspects of the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings, Imam Samudra, for example, states “... *Fighting the US and its allies is the command of Allah and His Messenger, either directly or indirectly*” and that, clearly an expression of religious emotion. Imam even expressed his attitude to the firm and simple: “... *avenge injustice and tyranny of the US and its allies against Muslims with the intention to stop his injustice.* ”

There is a value that works and dictate their minds. Ali Ghufron for example, stated that the bombing was “*act of devotion to God*” Thus, it is possible Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Amrozi and his group felt a *delusion of grandeur*, a feeling that they hold or represent or get edicts and become part of the elements of greatness believes himself to carry out a special mission from the God.

The terrorists always felt themselves to be “God’s warriors” fighting to Allah (battle for God, to borrow the poetic language of Karen Armstrong) who are called to act in the name of God and religion, to “hand of God” on earth to “realize” wrath in the form of resistance: the bombings and other terrorist acts.

In fact, the Imam Samudera, bombing was carried out the orders of God in the *Quran surah An-Nisaa* verse 74-76. This is clearly erroneous interpretation, even misguided. As a result of the interpretation and expression of religious emotion that delusive, then tragedy ensued and a large amount of speculation arose in the midst of the public.

Chain of Terrors and the Reign of Speculations

The attacks of Santoso group and tragedy of terrorist bomb attacks in Bali, Makassar, Jakarta, Ambon, Poso and other places in Indonesia, have led to a series of speculations of the apologists to the *a priori*. The first speculation is about who the perpetrators of terror attacks were very well planned and carried out by people who have advanced the technical knowledge. The culprit is arbitrarily identified as anti-US/Western, anti-Israel, anti-democratic, anti-capitalist economic strength, and global anti-military.

The second is speculation about the motives of the terrorists in carrying out acts of excessive destruction of places where the strength of the economic, political, and military of the West is located.

The third speculation is about what the goals that will be aimed towards the US/West and Israel. The culprit is allegedly identified as Islamic fundamentalists who today became the mortal enemy of the United States (US)/West,

group of Osama bin Laden who used to hide in Afghanistan.

Osama bin Laden in February 1998 had issued a fatwa against the Jews and the Christians and became a role model for almost all suspected terrorists. In addition to bin Laden, the world community assumes that the culprit is a radical Salafi or the scripturalists and Islamic fundamentalists who have doctrinal relationship with ISIS or Al Qaeda network or its ramifications and fractions thereof.

Because the United States is present everywhere, anywhere in the world, including in Indonesia, as it is known, the terrorists and the Islam scripturalists/ fundamentalist in Indonesia was very characteristic anti-US, anti-Israel, anti-democratic, anti-capitalist, and anti-global military. Their motive, as far as can be analyzed from the character of US foreign policy over the years, is the attitude of hatred toward the US/West—according to them—perception secular, anti-Islamic and too possessive and over-protective of Israel. While speculation about his next target, is the usual response of the loss of a sense of security and fear of the US/Western people requiring an immediate answer to what might happen.

This speculation is reasonable once formed because of this incident was so sudden, massive enough and synchronously with tremendous power destroyed. Speculation is also reasonable because it has caused enormous anger of the people and leaders of the US/West who are comfortable living in modernity, secularism and economic prosperity suddenly have to face an embarrassing nightmare. The US/West People are not the first time the face of the terrorist attacks. For the Islam fundamentalists and radicalist—which lay better known by the term 'the terrorist'—against the

US/West is to carrying out personal liability, a global jihad against the Jews and the Christians.

Thus, the US / West also has put Muslim terrorists as enemies since 1979 (which led to the name "Ayatollah Khomeini" as the name for the enemy perceived it) at the time of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and culminated in the events of the gulf crisis of the 1990s (which appears the name "Saddam Hussein" as an enemy). With the killing or the arrest of the suspects of terrorism in Indonesia and in some Southeast Asian countries and even in America and Europe, increasingly shows us that the terrorist organization's network is very extensive, aligning globally and mundially (Mydans, 2001).

Although morally and international diplomacy terrorists attacked the "war discourse" are pushing them as "the coward", "extremists, the savages", "the inhuman", "people are happy at the expense of others", and "the mental illness", but the terrorists are constantly emerging in the political map of Indonesia and the world until now to deliver messages that are very difficult to interpret (*The Economist*, February 15, 1992:45-46).

Because the so hidden enemy of this one, it has given to the rising impression of mystery and the psychological fear itself. For the people of the US / West, terrorism is a ghost (Specter) others who have faced the US/West after phantom of communism gone, a form of ideological enemy, as well as the new spiritual enemy ever remind magnified by Samuel Huntington (1996: 67) in *the Clash of Civilization*. Douglas E. Streusand (1992: 121) even dared to mention "that Specter is Islam", which was later identified by the public in layman AS / West as "green peril", the dangerous Green (Hadar,

1992: 77).

And, with the events of the attack on the WTC and Pentagon 11.09.2001, the name of Osama bin Laden emerged as an “enemy“ to restore the trust of the public AS/West against his government in dealing with terrorism from Muslims. For us, in the context of Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world, the problem of terrorism raises many dilemmas: between keeping the feelings of Muslims and law enforcement, the rule of law, which must be enforced.

Moreover, there is a fact that the attack of Santoso group and other brutal terrorist attacks has taken place, so the state enemy must be defined to then take the next steps before executing the terrorists as “criminals“, although they continue to hide behind the religious symbols and reasons. Terrorism is a crime against humanity, that is an extraordinary crime that must be solved by Indonesian state and society.

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INDONESIAN PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY UNDER CHALLENGE: A SOCIAL REFLECTION

IN the recent years, violence against religious minorities often happens in Indonesia. The violence and intolerance against minorities in Tanjungbalai, North Sumatra in August 2016, and Ahmadiyyah, Banten in February 2011, to mention a few examples, has become the collective memory for the religious minorities in Indonesia.

Violence and intolerance in Tanjungbalai, North Sumatera occurred when an angry Muslim mob burned down and damaged 12 Buddhist temples in Tanjung Balai, Saturday (30/07/2016). According to local authorities the mob was mobilized after an Indonesian woman of Chinese descent complained about the loud volume of the calls to prayer and Koranic recitals at the mosque that is situated in front of her house. One day later, seven people were detained by Indonesian police on suspicion of attacking the temples.¹

In connection with similar event, several years ago the attack on Ahmadiyyah community in Cikeusik launched by a thousand residents of the village of Cikeusik to the congregation of the Ahmadiyyah in the village Umbulan, Cikeusik, Pandeglang, Banten, on Sunday, February 6, 2011. As a result of this attack, three people were killed, while two

¹Indonesia Investment, "Religious Violence in Indonesia," report, <http://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/todays-headlines/religious-violence-indonesia-buddhist-temples-tanjung-balai-damaged/item7056>

cars, one motorcycle, and one house destroyed and engulfed in mass batty, amok.²

Unfortunately, while the leaders of the country's largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the two pillars of civil society, explicitly and unequivocally condemn the use of violence against Ahmadis, there has been a good deal of support for their forced disbanding.³

Actually, Islamic puritanism in Indonesia is getting more and more stronger. At least that what noted American anthropologist Clifford Geertz says in his book, *After the Facts: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist (1995)*, which concludes Geertz's four-decade research on Islamic Puritanism. Compared to the era of 1960s, this Islamic ideology in Indonesia seems now to have become more visible in favor of the country's political gain. ⁴

Such strong growth of Islamic Puritanism in Indonesia, as he furthered, is playing an important role of the spread of Islamic radical ideology.

In correspondence with Greetz's decade studies, Bahtiar Effendy of Muhammadiyah - the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia - said that the influence of Islamic radicalization in Indonesia is becoming more visible owing to the country's political and economic instability, where the majority of Muslims still live in the poverty line.

² See, *Media Indonesia* report, February 5, 2011 and *Kompas* report, February 6, 2011.

³ Jacqueline Hicks, "Heresy and Authority: Understanding the turn against Ahmadiyah in Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 22(3), KITLV, January 12, 2013

⁴ Clifford Geertz, *After the Facts: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

Effendy believes that should the political and economy condition in Indonesia had been greatly improved, the influence of Islamic Puritanism or radicalism would have been dwindled.

In the eyes of Muslim puritans, on the other hand, Islam is the only way of life and therefore establishing *khilafah* (Islamic state) with the implementation of *sharia* (Islamic law) must be pursued regardless of the impact on the rights of other non-Muslim living in the state.

To most Indonesians living in today's melting pot society, *sharia* is undoubtedly not what they want.

But the polling conducted by Indonesian Survey Institution (LSI) in October 2006 shows a concern that radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism are still prevalent in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim population nation.

Based on 1,092 respondents from across Indonesia, with a 3 percent margin of error, "16.1 percent of respondents tolerate with the ideology of Jemaah Islamiyah, an organization accused of being the cell of al-Qaeda terrorist organization, and nine percent agree with the use of violent attacks like the 2002 Bali bombing as long as the attacks are aimed at defending Islam," LSI head Saiful Mujani remarked.

The survey showed 16.1 percent of the respondents support Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), the country's hardcore Islamic organization, and are sympathetic to the organization's leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who is also the alleged spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah.

While 17.4 percent of the respondents tolerate with the ideology of Jemaah Islamiyah, an organization accused of being the cell of al-Qaeda terrorist organization. And 7.2

percent agree with the idea of Hizbur Tahrir Indonesia , hardliner Islamic group fervently campaigning for the establishment of *sharia* in Indonesia .

The latter is having an international gathering this August 12 as a means of getting support from international Muslim communities for the establishment of *khilafah*. In general, the majority of Indonesian Muslims do not agree with the use of tactics in terms of *jihad* (holy war).

Speaking of the percentage, we can see that the number is low. In relation to the country's population, nevertheless, the figure is significant for a movement with a special agenda.

Having 10 percent of 200 million of Indonesian Muslims supporting the Islamic radical movement is potential to jeopardize the Indonesian sovereignty.

Here, we are talking about at least ten million can be the target of Islamic fundamentalist indoctrination. And with the country's tough transition, low economy and lack of education, any radical Islamic groups can easily recruit more followers despite a number of terrorist arrests in Indonesia.

Pluralism is a Problem?

When we were in elementary school, our teachers and parents so often told us that Indonesia is multiethnic, multicultural and multireligious people. Under Pancasila (Five Principle), its state ideology, the Indonesian people can be live in harmony, and they are tolerant each other. For us, this story has been so nice dream at that time.⁵

But in 2007, during a two days workshop on Islam and

⁵ Al Chaidar, Blake Respini and Herdi Sahrasad, *From Shariaism to Terrorism, Islam in Indonesia Post-Authoritarian* (Jakarta: CSS-UI, 2015).

Pluralism in Puncak. West Java, organized by Pusat Studi Islam & Kenegaraan (Centre for Islam and State Studies) University of Paramadina, some young intellectuals of Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) dan Paramadina recognized vehemently that pluralism is still under serious challenge in Indonesia. Many conservative ulamas have condemned pluralism and spread out their puritanism by using the Islamic institutions and mosques, included the institutions and mosques owned by the Muhammadiyah and NU for their dissemination of religious conservatism.

Zuhairi Mizrawi and Khamami Zada, the two young intellectuals of NU, Yudi Latif (University of Paramadina) and the three young intellectuals of Muhammadiyah namely Zakiuddin Baidhowy, Hilal Basya, and Ahmad Fuad Fanani (JIMM-Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah or Networking of Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual) also worried that pluralism would be pushed aside by the conservative Islamic scholars and ulamas in Indonesia, included in Muhammadiyah and NU themselves. Muhammadiyah and NU, the two Islamic bastions for pluralism and tolerance, have been facing strong pressure from of puritant Islamists and fundamentalists who advocate "transnational Islam" for the ummah.

Why pluralism still a problem in this country, meanwhile since the birthday of this country in August 17-1945, it was coloured by a plural society?

To some extent, most of the people here have not yet understood basically about significance and meaning of pluralism. So that the side effect of the misunderstanding, sociologically, sparks up social conflicts and issues of identity in the name of God, religion or other primordialism.

As far as we observe, some Islamic organizations in Indonesia, such as Muhammadiyah, Al Irsyad and Persatuan Islam (Persis) have not had favourable responses toward pluralism. Even, many Islamic analysts and scholars said, it seem that Muhammadiyah tend to be conservative in recently, compared with era of Ahmad Syafii Maarif leadership in the past. This point of view and perception is not without logical reasoning.

There are many facts and evidences that Muhammadiyah as a reformist Islamic organization during the last century has been shifting its paradigm orientation from critical position to be puritan one. Today, Muhammadiyah, actually, has not accepted and practiced pluralism in its real praxis. Meanwhile, the founding father of Muhammadiyah, KH Ahmad Dahlan, is a true pluralist, and he is very intensively dialogue with the priest, clergyman, Chinese, and scholars of other religions. Dahlan is an accomodationist, open-minded, inclusive and enlightenment figure of Muhammadiyah at his time. Even Dahlan is never reluctant to take the other religious values as long as it will be useful and meaningful for the enrichment of ummah and for interest of universal humanity. Since the early years, Dahlan is a historic figure to reform Islam from within.

However, nowadays Muhammadiyah has been changing. In its historical journey, recently Muhammadiyah has not been a modern Islamic organization that bring spirit of reform (tajdid). Muhammadiyah also has not have shares in solving of societal problems that is busier and dominant with the civil discourses such as liberalism, pluralism and secularism. On the contrary, Muhammadiyah tend to empower puritanism and to make it everlasting with rethoric and

slogans back to Quran and Sunnah (*al-ruju' ila al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah*) without adequately critical attitude. So that, it is difficult to say Muhammadiyah now is modern religious and social movement as supposed by many peoples in general.

Be aware for this stagnation of thinking, most of the young intellectuals in Muhammadiyah, especially in the circle of Networking of Young Intellectuals Muhammadiyah (JIMM) has resisted and revolted the establishment in the Muhammadiyah organization with arguing that the spirit of new reform should be implemented as *raison d'etre* to continue religious reform. JIMM has also revolted to the Association of Tarjih Decision (Himpunan Putusan Tarjih-HPT) because it has been considered as an "anti-critical holy book". JIMM has viewed HPT stipulation is out of Muhammadiyah school of thought. However, the young intellectuals' efforts to improve and empower Muhammadiyah reform has not get favourable response from the elites of the modernist-claiming Islamic organization.

In the last developments, the different view and perception between the old guards and the young intellectuals of Muhammadiyah not only happened ciclously in the war of discourse, but it has extended and escalated to internal violence with the dismissal of a promising, bright and young lecturer at Muhammadiyah University of Gresik (UMG) after the lecturer published an article in a regional newspaper (December 2006) explaining that the Ummah Islam are allowed to give congratulation of Mary Christmas for the Christian community. Muhammadiyah has also fired M Dawam Rahardjo (a prominent Muslim intellectual) from the organization. In the meantime, Muhammadiyah support

strongly the decision of MUI (Indonesia Ulama Council) and Religious Affairs Department to forbid the Eden community and Ahmadiyah as well as their activities. This is a bad turn in religious-social politics in Muhammadiyah as a well-known modernist Muslim institution.

By this facts, many Muslim themselves are worry and anxious that Muhammadiyah would be a conservative movement and become new bastion of conservatism and puritanism. Regarding the emergence of the young intellectuals in JIMM, actually, Muhammadiyah has still a prospect for the future as a modernist Islamic movement that opened toward the changing related to pluralism, locally and globally. Muhammadiyah should be aware, in our opinion, that in the near future, the pivotal problem in Indonesia is how to manage pluralism by democratic means. The late John Bresnan (*The Managing Indonesia, 1993*), formerly professor at Columbia University, has remind the state and society in Indonesia that managing pluralism coercively and repressively like as under the New Order is no longer relevant and proper to this country because its social and political landscape has been changed profoundly.⁶

Therefore, Muhammadiyah as a religious-civil society should continue its socio-religious reform in line with the time of reformation if the organization does not want to be kept away and neglected by the young Muslim intellectuals. Muhammadiyah should be aware that today, many Islamic organizations such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) and other Salafy movements who has changed

⁶ See, John Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia, The Modern Political Economy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

religious texts from otoritative to become otoritarian, borrowing Khaled M Abou El Fadl's perspective, has used and disseminated doctrines motivating and encouraging the Islamic radicalists and fundamentalists to speed up terrorism and other violent attacks.

If Muhammadiyah doesn't want to fall into particularism and puritanism, it must change the way of thinking from subjectively to objectively so that Muhammadiyah can do objectivication of religious thinking. Indeed, this objectivication, according to Kuntowijoyo, included externalization of religious thinking from Islamic faith to passing over other faith as a natural something. By this way of objectivication, Muhammadiyah would be tolerant, open minded, and pluralist Islamic organization that will be responsive the future challenge and problem. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah would be the bastion of religious civil-society for human rights, pluralism and democracy in Indonesia.

Religion Ideology and *Khilafah* (Islamic state)

In relation to the above descriptions, in search of a solution to many complex problems of pluralism, and social imbalances in the archipelago, many Indonesians are in the peak of getting tired with the government's less effort towards combating poverty and social imbalance. Not to mention other issues like injustice, tyranny, corruption, lack of education and significant number of human rights violations. It is quite understood that the prolonged transition in Indonesia has not only given birth but also led to more loud voices of Islamic parties, calling for establishing *Khilafah* (Islamic state) as a way of building a better moral

and prosperous nation.

Sounds like a promise, but for the pluralistic country like Indonesia this is not at all a good idea. *Khilafah* means combining Islam and politics in governance, and applying it in the archipelago having high diversities in religions, ethnics, cultures and economic disparity; *Khilafah* can be very dangerous.

Nonetheless, some Islamic parties and organizations have been inspired by transnational Middle East version of Islam. Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) — still remains as one of big political factions in the government — is a good example of an Islamic political party that follows the teaching of *Ikhwatul Muslimin* (Muslim brotherhood) of Egypt .

Having motivated by the al-Qaeda, a notorious terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden, Jemaah Islamiyah has been modeled by the style of al- Qaeda's Islamic Arabism. In addition, both Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia also take that Islamic Arabism as their teaching direction. The Islamic Arabism also seems to have been the cloak of Islamic teaching in many *pesantren* (Islamic boarding), though not all, students at the *pesantren* are potential to breeding radicals.

And with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's having International *Khilafah* Conference in Jakarta this month, it is no more than an evidence that the teaching of religions in developing countries like Indonesia can be potential tool to reach a political gain by building practical relationship between individuals and groups. It is a transformation of religious political system, also known as *religio-political system*.

This is also what Clifford Geertz claimed to be "religions mindedness," a process of how the religion ideology comes into existence.

In this context, the religion ideology has potential power to ignite fanaticism and radicalization that unquestionably can erupt violence and destruction. Any religion in this position will have two functions; building better integrity among its followers while creating conflict and violation.

The tragedy of Bali bombs, Australian Embassy bomb in Jakarta and other brutal acts done by anarchists like those from Jamaah Islamiyah, Islamic Defender Front (FPI) etc — where they use violence and destructive acts to close down businesses that they think is not in accordance of *sharia* like bar and cafe since they sell alcoholic beverages — are examples where fundamentalists have shown intolerant exclusiveness and belligerent sense of supremacy in facing minority communities.

While such brutality to some people is no less than a destruction by anarchists, many perceives that the stark terror attitude is a pure motivation by a number of Islamic extremist groups having their hidden agenda.

Facing this worrisome development in a pluralistic country, which the country itself indeed still struggle with many internal affairs, we really think that all Islamic groups should stop using violence in dealing with any contention or disagreement. They should not monopolize the truth of what they believe to indoctrinate others.

The debate *khilafah* is of a great relevance today, particularly with Hizbut Tahir had organized an international conference to be held on August 12, 2007. The

conference had definitely focused on building an Islamic state and thousands of members of the Islamic organization Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) participated at that time.

However, whether an Islamic state is relevant to the Indonesia 's pluralistic communities should be taken in wise consensus. So far, presence of Hizb Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) becomes a problem and a challenge for the people of Indonesia.

The Decline of State Power Post The New Order⁷

From the above explanations, the apparently rise in religious violence, primordialism, sectarianism and racial violence that threatens pluralism and democracy in Indonesia, can not be separated from the socio-economic conditions which is full of inequality and injustice.

Actually, Indonesia state and society beyond Soeharto's New Order is like a lame giant in Southeast Asia, in which its power is declining toward a failed state. In this situation of crisis, Indonesia needs a leader who has sense of crisis, sense of urgency and sense of direction and a genuine leader never thinks of himself/herself. Even, if needed, the leader must commit class-suicide and merged to be part of the oppressed to struggle together to overcome the multi crisis that has not abated the people until now. Here, the Islamic leaders who understand problems, has future visions and is rich in imagination to overcome problems, is considerably

⁷ Herdi Sahrasad, "Indonesian State and Society post New Order, " a paper for a limited discussion on Islam, State and Society in Indonesia Post Soeharto organized by activists of HMI (Islamic Student Association), PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia), and Pimpinan Pusat GPII (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia) Menteng Raya Jakarta, in December 2004.

yearned for by the people, who have been oppressed and hurt but cannot express their sorrow feelings.

In Indonesia, nowadays, the crisis of leadership occupies the central nervous system of all the multi dimensional crises in Indonesia. The crisis of leadership occupies the central nervous system when almost all initiatives of the public and existing social systems have been made impotent by the autocratic regime of the New Order in the past, the atmosphere of which still dominates even up to this transition period. The Muslim community such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) communities and soon, can not avoid this bad reality, even they have been part of the ongoing problem. The radical Muslims even have been frustrated, disillusioned and radicalised.

The emergence of national figures, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Wiranto, Amien Rais, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla, is a transitional, political phenomenon, that is hoped by the ummah to be the problem solver and solidarity maker. But the history of post Soeharto era so often evidenced on the contrary.

In this context, the Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid had stated the importance of having visionary leaders with revolutionary ideas, from among the the leaders, to solve the prolonged multi dimensional crisis of post Soeharto Order.

Concerning the 2004 presidential elections, the emergence of Yudhoyono-Kalla and then 2014 presidential elections with the rise of Jokowi Widodo (Jokowi) is the new hope for the people by the elections, it is a logic consequence

of the leadership crisis after the authoritarian Soeharto regime which has become the focus of psychological rivalry of politicians, private middle class, civilians, military and students, movements and NGOs. This is the breakdown of the New Order style of the former social political system that did not permit the reproduction of a new, fresh, creative and innovative leadership.”

Currently, after the periode of Yusdhoyono and two years of Joko Widodo, we have seen that corruption, collusion and mismanagement in government and bureaucracy still embedded and escalated. Two years of Jokowi Widodo administration is disappointed by the civil society, almost all public nerves are concentrated on the problem of seeking ideal leaders, as a solution to pull out the roots of national, regional and local leadership crises.

In this case, the Islamic people (*the ummah*) are one of sources of the national, regional and local leadership. However, the people can also become the source of mass anger, should the existing leaders fail to carry out their messages. For that reason, the national leaders must take care about people and become alert in order not to be stale. There are indications that our current leaders would become increasingly stale. In fact, the Islamic community admits, the Indonesian people are tired of seeking the national leaders who are able to help Indonesia solve the crises.

It is now more than 15 years of reform that was launched by student's movement since the downfall of Soeharto in the reform wave of May 1998. And three Presidents (BJ Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri) had handled the reform with achievements that disappointed the people. "Only God would know

knows the duration of the leadership of the Gotong Royong Cabinet,” said Hamzah Haz, the formerly Vice President once. That was an indication that the Mega-Hamzah duet was shadowed by fear and failures in implementing the message of reform from the students and people perspective. That is to say, if we want to be honest and gentlemen. Anyway, the Mega-Hamzah duet has not been able to give a light at the end of the dark tunnel. And how about Yudhoyono-Kalla? History tend to repeated itself.

History witnesses: Indonesia is continuously hit and rolled by the prolonging economic crises, also in the current era of transition of Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Mega-Hamzah, Yudhoyono and Jokowi. Even the multi dimensional crises involving the social, political, legal and security sectors have increased and further deteriorated the situation. All of them stem from the crisis of credibility and morality as well as rationality. This situation creates anxiety and annoyance among the ummmah.

According to Muslim intellectuals perspective, if the Indonesian people want to quickly solve the crises and re-embark on the nation and character building, the emergence of the national leaders, who are legitimate and credible with strong leadership, visionary insight and ”genuine, authentic” nationalist spirit, not who are ”hypocrites, pretenders, relativists or fake”, becomes a must. The people are still waiting for the national leaders with such criteria and parameter, to solve problems and issues,

A long period of Soeharto era had elapsed when the recruitment of leaders had taken place in the horse trading market with the model of top elite dropping, when the money politics was as if ”the god” who decided the fate of

someone whether he becomes a winner or loser, when eventually the people got only "a cat in the bag", when leaders carried the name of the people, while as a matter of fact, it was only to serve the power interest of a political party. Leaders claimed that they knew the people, but the people never knew the leaders.⁸

The Wise and Strong Leader Post The New Order

All of us know that it is not an easy task to create or seek the ideal leaders and most of Indonesian people is still paternalistic, tradisionalistic and confused to the situation

It is mandating that we must have strong, visionary and legitimate leaders, as *conditio sine qua non*, because at present Indonesia is in the zone of danger or the red zone of a weak nation and character building that would lead to a failed state.

Indonesia will be saved and protected from becoming a failed nation, if it has strong leadership and visionary leadership as well as commitments to assist Indonesia in the areas of economy and social reconstruction, particularly in the efforts to uphold the law.

Robert I. Rotberg⁹ stated that Indonesia would face a

⁸ "Our leaders in this period of transition are not as good as the generation of Soekarno- Hatta-Sjahrir, who had strong commitments, with also strong leadership weight and quality. The complexity of problems faced by the Habibie, Gus Dur and Mega-Hamzah genre could not be solved by themselves, because as leaders in the era of transition, they were not creative and did not have initiatives," interview with an Islamic intellectual Muslim Abdurrahman, and Hariman Siregar, former figure of Malari at the In-Demo, Lautze, Jakarta, in mid June 2004.

⁹ Robert I. Rotberg the Director of Conflict Program of John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in a seminar conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in

hardship in several years in the future and needs a weighty and strong leadership to avoid a "failed state" and disintegration.

The serious problems faced by the Indonesian people at present are weak economy, Aceh and Papua separatist movements, as well as social conflicts. If the conflicts in Maluku and Poso are not immediately handled and disarmament is not conducted, the writer fears conflicts with ethnic, religion or language background will develop in other regions without clear causes. Here it is necessary to have government reinforcement based on law, decentralisation without disintegration and the strengthening of political values in a national way. Indonesia has the benefit of national strong sentiment, but has potential source to create political or economic instability. For that reason, it is necessary to have a strong and visionary leadership.

Although Rotberg admits that he does not study Indonesia in a special way, so that he cannot give an evaluation on the leadership of Megawati Soekarnoputri or mention someone who can save Indonesia from failure, his views are relevant to the present transitional situation.¹⁰

There are four categories of nation building, namely strong, weak, failure and downfall. The phenomenon of country failure is not a new thing in the world. After the

Jakarta (*Kompas*, March 28, 2002). See, Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

¹⁰ "It is still necessary to keep maintaining the freedom of press, because it is a very important factor to prevent a country from undergoing failures," said Rotberg who also holds a post in the World Peace Foundation.

downfall of Russia, of 192 countries who were in the transition of democracy many were weak and facing dangers of failures, failed and many of them did fail in 1990 and several of them had fallen. Since that period considerable conflicts took place in countries killing at least nine million people and four million people become refugees in their own countries.

This became a threat for the world order. Under present circumstances, the world can no longer take the distance from the togetherness of weak countries or failed countries. The failure of a country does not only affect the security situation and peace of the relevant country, but also the neighbouring countries and the world order as a whole. For that reason, it is imperative for international organisations to prevent a country from becoming weak and failing. The weakness or failure of a nation-state originate in physical and geographical factors, historical factor resulting from the errors in the colonial period or foreign policies or other errors. However, the major factor of failure of a country is further caused by human factor. The wrong and damaging decisions of leaders considerably contribute to failures of a country. Borrowing the discourse of Rotberg, the indicators of a strong country are among others high levels of security and freedom, environmental protection for becoming economic growth, prosperous and peaceful, all of them are made possible by a strong leadership and supported by the people.

On the other hand, failed countries tend to face prolonged conflicts, not safe, communal violence, and the state violence is very high, hostility due to religion, ethnic and language, terrors, roads or other physical infrastructures

are left decaying. Among the failed countries, namely Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Afghanistan. Those countries do not have authorities within the boundaries of countries and the authority of the country moves to the hands of war commanders in chief. As if the people lived without government, without security, without physical infrastructures for the people. There are about 42 countries in the world at present that are in weak condition leading to failures or downfall, among others, in the former territories of Soviet, Balkan, Africa, Latin America and Asia.

Threat Against Democracy Post The New Order?

Recently, the Indonesian people, especially the Muslim community, who are now undergoing the process of democracy transition, are really about the situation of "multidimensional crisis", because now they were exactly on the crossroad of safety or road of destruction. If Indonesian society cannot pass this process of transition well,¹¹ the threat we face is not only the process of disintegration of people (separation of a certain region from the territory of the Republic of Indonesia), but it is more fearful that there are the possibilities of social disintegration process or the destruction of social bond in the society. If the social bond is destroyed, social distrust will be created (a climate of mutual distrust) among social groups, so that one group in the public will be jealous of another group, hostile to each other or even kill each other. In this situation, mass brawls under

¹¹ Imam B. Prasodjo, "the End of Indonesia?" in Jakoeb Utama, *Indonesia 2001, Kehilangan Pamor* (Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2002). Imam is a lecturer of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia.

the Thomas Hobbes style, war of all against all, is no longer only in the imagination.

Let's the writer to remind you that in Indonesia under President Megawati 2002-2004 and Yudhoyono 2004-2014, horizontal conflicts and power rivalry among political elite, both in the legislative and Executive institutions have dragged the people and country life to turmoil, tensions, and prolonged crises. In the past, the duet of Abdurrahman Wahid-Megawati Soekarnoputri, the duet of Megawati-Hamzah Haz and Yudhoyono who are expected to be able to solve problems, tend to turns out to bring the national decline, not only political decline but also social economic decline. The political assets is destroyed into splinters due to interest conflicts of the elite, who give the impression that they do not know themselves and are irrational, the economic capital melts due to the irregularities and the incapability of decision makers, members of the cabinet and national leadership to manage the economy, while the social capitals totally eroded due to the crisis of credibility of the public *vis-a-vis* national leaders.

Meanwhile, James Van Zorge in the past noted that under President Megawati, Hamzah Haz has taken an insubordination step towards President by visiting Laskar Jihad Jafar Umar Thalib in the detention room, Jakarta as a political indication of Islamic ideology and sectarianism.¹²

Indonesia, which is currently being hit by multi crises, needs national leaders, who are voluntary and committed to sacrifice in the spirit of Jihad (under Islamic conviction) or martyrdom (under Christian faith), to arouse the spirit, activism and intellectualism along with all people's resour-

¹²Van Zorge Report, May 20, 2002

ces to save total reform which, in truth, is to save the people and the country.

In the past, leaders of the old generation, namely Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati, Amien Rais, Akbar Tanjung, Hamzah Haz, Yudhoyono-Kalla, Yudhoyono-Boediono and Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla turn out to have ignored the historical opportunity to implement the reform visions which have been staked by millions of people, students and young generations with blood and tears. This old generation turns out to have been weak, full of intrigues, mutually fought each other and full of conflict of interest resulting in the seizure of power and money by empowering "Constitutionalism" as a legal-formal weapon to maintain or topple power.

In fact, power and money are very strikingly demonstrated to the people in the form of luxurious official cars, which are far from the reality of people's life who undergo economic deprivation, marginal-ization and regimentation resulting from the disintegration and conflicts among the elite. The conflicts of the elite are tiresome and use up all resources, which should have been used by the grass-root people.

Students even accuse intellectuals and politicians, who engage in conflicts and power scramble, of having conducted moral and political betrayal. Wahid- Megawati-Hamzah, Amien and Akbar are the elites, who purposely drag horizontal conflicts deeper by relying on their charisma and their influence on the grass-root people who socially and culturally are being politic-ized and ideology-ized, which are not productive and creative, due to the low level of education, absence of employment opportunity or poor

social life.

Problem Solving and Solidarity Building Post The New Order

The leadership style of the Soeharto New Order, which was centralistic, closed and authoritarian, had placed the society in a social deadlock. This social freezing finally collided with economic development, which rapidly changed the material basis of the society and collided with the liberalization that changed the mindset, state of mind and mentality of the public. The social change had moved very rapidly.

The crisis of leadership occupied the central nervous system of the multi dimensional crises in the economic, social, cultural and certainly political areas. The old system of leadership reproduction could not create public sphere for society to create quality leader. Will leaders emerge again of the calibre of Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and the other Founding Fathers?

So far, Yudhoyono-Budiono, Amien Rais, Megawati, Gus Dur and Jokowi- Kalla are facing global economic uncertainty. In public sphere, there have emerged crowd leaders from seminar rooms, on newspapers, magazines and television programs, which do not have anything to do with the grass-root people. The irony is that the critical among the people is regarded as a threat against the existence of leaders of this model. These "teledemocracy and media- cracy" leaders have persuaded the people after the downfall of Soeharto with reformation slogans, empty of meanings. For that reason, the reforms in the eras of Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati, Yudhoyono are now tend to be

ended. Obviously, *the ummah (Muslims)* cannot let this situation to go on. The ummah *Muslims) do not want failures after failures to beset the people, who have already collapsed.

The question, perhaps, is why after the Soeharto New Order it has been very difficult for us to find leaders who had the calibre of statesmen? We can find the answer in a simple way in the strong personalization of power and personification of politics in the transition era, which is the extension of shadow of the New Order, in which Soeharto as Father of Nation is still dominating. In the era of Soeharto regime, anyone who opposed him was regarded to have opposed to the ideology of Pancasila and law. "So, said Yap Thiam Hien, who is against Bapak (Father) is against the law and Pancasila, the sole ideology". In relation to the system and recruitment of leaders, Soeharto made the final decision. Even in deciding himself to be President, "Soeharto was elected by persons whom Soeharto had to elect Soeharto". Such things may not reoccur in the reform today.

The Soeharto era as a period had elapsed. But, mentally, the style of the former number one strong man has kept surviving in the arena of succession, although in variable dimensions. The domination of political parties in determining the legislative members, for instance, caused the party representative who claimed to be the people's representative was totally unknown to the people. Indeed, this effect is the risk of the option of a general election system so far, which is the proportional system. Like the presidential election system using the system of "party-cracy", in which the party elite make the decisions, as they practise "horse trade" for, of course, the interest of the party.

A party oligarchy that has proven to be unshakeable yet.

Whatever the rationalization, the leadership reproduction system of this political party oligarchy model denies the very rapid flow of social development, in which at present a new middle class and educated class have grown in a large scale. Also in this era of transition, there has emerged a layer of sophisticated Indonesian society, which is cleverer and critical, both due to education and free flow of information, and as a consequence of their intense active relationship with the big current of globalisation have become the motor of democratisation.

For this kind of society has elapsed the very long period when the recruitment of leaders took place in the horse trade market in an upper-elite dropping model, when money politics acted as if it were the "God" who decides "the fate" of someone whether he will be a winner or a loser, when the people finally shared merely "a cat in the bag", when leaders spoke about democracy; while in fact it's a Party-crazy., when the authorities of parliament and executives admitted knowing the people while the people did not know them, claiming to be pro dialogs and anti violence, but tended to monologue as well as fond of provoking very unruly radicals.

When the time comes for leaders to undergo the public selection process from the bottom, called by inner conscience and not material gain, to bring the people out of the prolonged crises. This nation opens the widest "vacancy" for strong candidate leaders, visionary and legitimate, because at present Indonesia is in the red danger zone, as a nation state Almost all requirements have been met to move into a nation-statehood that totally fails and break into splinters.

We need alternative leaders, who have a tradition in discursive handling of conflicts, habits of solving problems through sharing, bargaining and win-win solution. In addition, the strengthening of compliance with the rules of the game, the willingness to simply accept a win-defeat situation as well as honesty to take on public accountability. Certainly, as the main basis, it is necessary to be engulfing the power analysis and the power of responsiveness, oriented to problem solving, not to complicate problem, as well as clarity of ideas and adaptive capability toward ever-changing development.

Although this nation has been hit right-left, front and back, and up and down in a very dark cave, this nation has not seen a light at the end of the tunnel. One by one candle of hope withers, although they have not been completely snuffed. The change from one President to another, for instance, has only created a remnant of hope, not a substantial change. Every time the moment of succession comes, the hope develops and the irony is that it always ends up with totally empty wrapping.

The Indonesian leaders in the era of transition are not as good as the generation of Soekarno-Hatta-Sjahrir-Natsir, who proved to have strong commitment and quality of leadership. The multi crises in various walks of life due to the Soeharto leadership style had further deteriorated under the genre of Habibie, Gus Dur, especially Megawati, Yudhoyono and Jokowi who had poor creative and innovative ideas.

Meanwhile, millions of refugees and thousands of others are killed or made invalids in horizontal conflicts in Ambon, Maluku, Aceh, Irian Jaya, Sampit, Poso, Mataram,

West Kalimantan, Cikeusik, Tolikara Papua, Tanjungbalai North Sumatera and other regions, indicating that the present state and government do not have the capacity to overcome multi crisis in Indonesia and are threatened with disintegration.

The conflicts of interest among the national elites, which spread to lower class, become horizontal conflicts, have caused the people to lose the country and on the other hand, they have caused the country to lose its people. There is a discontinuation, outward and inward, between the country and its people, who are continuously oppressed by the prolonged economic, social and political crises.

The above mentioned bitter and painful facts remind someone of the views of Toynbee and Duane Elgin regarding the public which reaches the level of downfall, in which, according to both western scientists, is a public the function and role of the institutions of which are not understood any more and increasingly uncontrollable. The social consensus and common objective vanish. Political and social relations are in chaos. With the downfall of social consensus, various social interests compete each other to gain domination. The bureaucracy, who govern the people who are degrading cannot handle the problems any longer, which have become increasingly complicated, with loss of legitimacy, and the absence of common objective, the creativity, vitality and the strong determination of the apparatus, vanish quickly in the downfall spiral into the confusion and chaos of bureaucracy.

The situation can no longer be acceptable and maintained. The need for fundamental change is urgent. Here, the *ummah* under the Yudhoyono-Kalla government

has been challenged seriously to bring the profound change. Change for better, for social justice and social democracy.

Toward A Consolidated Democracy ?

In Indonesia post the New Order, the emergence of Yudhoyono in 2004-2014 and the Jokowi in 2014-current, for instance, as the democratic leaders are supported by the *ummah*, the muslim society with high expectation for a better new Indonesia. Their success or failure would be a political lesson by the *ummah* in the next presidential elections.

Universally, the measure of success of a transparency toward democracy is stated to be the establishment of a *consolidated democracy* that has the characteristics of stable attitude, behavior and constitutionalism.¹³

According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, in "*Problem of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*" it is stated there are five arena of consolidated democracy, namely a civil society marked by the freedom of communication and assembly; political society marked by general, free, and inclusive general election, rule of law, which highly respects constitutionalism, state apparatus in which the norms of a legal-rational bureaucracy are alive, and economy society that is characterized by the establishment of a healthy market institution.¹⁴

Observing the character and description of such a consolidated democracy, we would agree that it is life in such a society that we want to develop in our country in the

¹³ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Konsolidasi Demokrasi," *paper*, Menko Polsoskam, 2002.

¹⁴ Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996)

coming century.¹⁵ Indeed, the challenge is big. But, if we realize how costly the price that must be paid by the Indonesian people due to our negligence to establish a genuine life of democracy in the past, although our stability and economy properly grew, we now must position the task of establishing a consolidated democracy as the main national agenda in the future.

We are probably interested in how criteria for success as a nation developed by Wicker-Miurin¹⁶ and their team. By observing and evaluating the progress of the European countries and their readiness to face the future, a ranking is made for each country in the region. Of course we would want to include our country in the ranking system of progress and readiness of a nation using such a model. But what we should observe are the idea and approach in measuring the criteria for success.

There are four (4) measures established, namely sustainability, fairness and individual freedom and harmony and readiness for the future. The sustainability of a nation is measured from the economic growth, environmental maintenance and public health. The fairness and individual freedom are reflected in employment in the education work, life expectancy rate and income and the like, which basically indicate that each citizen has an equal opportunity to grow and develop the measure of success on fairness and individual freedom very important for us to be concerned about jointly, because the gap in this country is very big, both social gap, economic gap, and intellectual gap. It is necessary to evaluate the public harmony because a

¹⁵ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Konsolidasi Demokrasi,"...

¹⁶ *Newsweek* report, special edition of December 1999 - February 2000.

peaceful, harmonious and orderly society is the longing of every human being. Such a society has the capacity to resolve conflicts, such as riot, crime and especially anarchic actions. Recognizing the very plural condition of the Indonesian society, full of sources of conflicts and seeing our experience, especially of the past several years, we must be successful in institutionalizing the management of conflicts in the future. Not by using the repressive and top down model and approach, but an institutionalized mechanism, in which the society has the awareness and facility to solve social problems.¹⁷

Certainly, this big effort must be accompanied by an increasingly stable culture and law enforcement. The enforcement of law in fair, consistent and sincere ways will be able to prevent chronic social disorders. The fourth criterion, if we borrow the model developed by the Wicker - Miurin team, is readiness for the future. The emphasis on this fourth criterion is the mastery of technology. Therefore, the ownership and control of telecommunication, the Internet, research and development and other similar institutions are absolutely needed by a modern country. In the spirit of critical reflection at the end of this century and while we are readying to enter the new century, the criteria of readiness and success I have earlier explained should be used to measure our life, our own selves.

Where is the Indonesian people standing at present? What tasks and work should we together do in the next year and future decades? In short, Yudhoyono said during his presidential campaign, he sincerely wants to develop a

¹⁷ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Konsolidasi Demokrasi,"...

better New Indonesia.¹⁸

Anomaly and Abnormality of Our Democracy Post The New Order

How to answer the above questions, and how to make a better Indonesia, prior to the presidential elections in 2014, there are people questions: Can the legislative elections in 2014 lead to lawmakers with better quality compared with the 2009 election? From some discussions in different cities and regions, the writer gets that the answer is skeptical, even pessimistic. Instead of producing a quality member of parliament, it is almost certainly the politicians resulted in the parliamentary election of 2014 will be more pragmatic and prone to corruption. Why is that?

Today political corruption is rampant and it is inseparable from the high political cost. Politics is increasingly transactional and leads our society to the brink of criminal democracy. It should be highlighted that the political fund is very expensive and the investment should be returned when a person occupies a public office in the parliament or the executive. Imagine, for a prospective member of the House of Representatives, a candidate must spend a minimum of Rp1 billion, a figure that in the eyes of the common people, is very large. As for the presidential elections, according to former Vice President M. Jusuf Kalla, now it needed funds worth millions of US dollars.

Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW, 2009) reveals that the regular salary and benefits of parliamentary member received, is not sufficient to restore the investment so that

¹⁸ "Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla Visi dan Misi Kandidat Presiden," Pamphlet campaign of Indonesia presidential election 2004.

corruption is the only option or way to raise capital as well as investment returns to defend the next period title.

Even, winning the election becomes more expensive when the political parties and legislative candidates and the organization do not have a network that reaches down to the grass roots. The absence of political infrastructure is then compensated by the politician to purchase the advertising in the mass media, charitable acts, money politics and hiring professionals staff for self-imaging, in which the cost becomes more and more expensive.

In this regard, the lack of political infrastructure also leads to political parties and candidates could not garner donations from members or supporters that rely on big donors, especially businessmen or well-to-do financiers (capitalists). This leads to political parties and politicians becoming less self-sufficient, and prone to corruption as a political price to be paid in groups or alone.

In this case, businessmen or well-to-do financiers (capitalists) are a major contributor to this, and then they will ask for compensation from the government projects that encourage political corruption. While, the lack of political infrastructure also pose problems of political representation.

The analysts then saw, a situation is increasingly crisis because politicians who have no ties with constituents tend to blind-deaf to the voice of the public and continue to spend the budget for traveling abroad or build another wasteful project despite a widespread public rejection and distrust.

If we check out, the majority of the politicians involved in corruption tends to work to protect themselves from the law. They want to get power not because they want to serve the people, but to look for money, privilege and enjoyment

of power.

This conditions would undermine the political system which we aspire. If political parties as a upstream of political system is dirty and not trustworthy, then the product will not be clean, such as the legislative and executive authorities, policies, supervision, budgets, and legislation. The process will only take us to criminal democracy at the expense of the interests of the people. Political parties only think the short term and narrow, for example piling purse and coffers after winning the 2014 election, while the programs for the people surely forgotten.

In such situations, the ideal function of political parties will fail, unfulfilled. As a result, political parties would be difficult and tough to fight for public aspirations . It is too hard to establish substansial democracy, develop political ethics, or makes laws in favor of the people. The next result, public confidence in the political parties, democracy, and politics increasingly fallen sharply.

And now there are the growing symptoms that corrupt politicians in general do corruption to recover and restore the economic capital that they used in politics. This is related to the high costs that must be borne in criminal democracy today. As a result, transactional democracy, even criminal democracy increasingly inevitable.

What I have described above is parallel with the perspective of Larry Diamond (2004) who described the situation "move in the other direction that is not clear" in many new democracies in Asia (including Indonesia) and Latin America, which ultimately resulted in the insecurity and corruption. Actually, it is more difficult and complex situation because of the failure of civil society to maintain,

consolidate, giving vitality and meaning to democracy itself. Larry Diamond can not deny that the transition towards what he describes as a move towards "something else" with symptoms of anomalies and abnormalities.¹⁹

Say, "the abnormality of transition", which is characterized by weak governance, plutocratic regime, oligarchism, corruption, violence, identity conflict, and money politics that damage to law enforcement, and political instability.

Various cases of corruption by politicians in parliament (Hambalang, Centurygate, imported beef, Wisma Atletes, and so on), sectarian violence against the Ahmadiyah and Shia, the difficulty of building a church /house of worship and so on, are a reflection of the "tip of the iceberg" from the depth current of transactional democracy, even criminal democracy in Indonesia, a symptom of anomalies and abnormalities that worries us.

A new Indonesia that stemmed from national commitment and ideals, from the message of the constitution, and people's awareness and aspirations, which keep developing from one period to the next, is very significant.

Did Joko Widodo (after the Yudhoyono failure) keep his commitment and promise to the *ummah*, the Indonesian people to build a better new Indonesia ? The history has witnessed that under Jokowi, corruption is very rampant and violence toward religious minorities, such as in Tanjungbalai, was occurred, whilst marginalization of the peasant and underdog such as in Bima (NTB), Kalimantan and Mesuji-Lampung, are very hard. Jokowi regime, such as Yudhoyono Regime, is potentially failed or very weak, so

¹⁹ Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, "The Quality of Democracy: An Overview," *Journal of Democracy* 15(4), October 2004, p. 20-31

that the people disappointed, even part of them frustrated vehemently, and as if Indonesia is going to nowhere under President Jokowi.

Really, Indonesian state and society under liberal democracy are still facing uncertainty in the near future because the weakness of law enforcement and legal certainty, also the weakness of the national leadership under the tyranny of capital and oligarchs. Jokowi government must work extra hard and smart to deal with global uncertainty, and in fact, if it is necessary, Jokowi cabinet must work 24 hours/day.

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MARITIME TERRORISM NETWORK: THREAT AND SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA

MINDANAO and Sulawesi in recent years have become world's attention because of the emergence of terrorist organizations such as Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. Their existence is said to have eliminated the role of more moderate and nationalist group of freedom fighter such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Abu Sayyaf group consists of Islamic militias that base around the Southern Philippines' archipelago, including Jolo, Basilan, and Mindanao. To get world attention, the Abu Sayyaf group from its inception until now is known to often kidnap and ask for ransom.¹

The power of the Abu Sayyaf is highly calculated by the Philippines military and countries in Southeast Asia. Initially, their main funding support was Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, one of Osama bin Laden's siblings. At first, Abu Sayyaf was affiliated with Al Qaeda but has now joined the

¹ The name "Abu Sayyaf" comes from the name of Professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf which is the name of the Mujahideen fighter in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Abu Sayyaf Group was founded by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a former member of the National Moro Liberation Front in the early 1990s in Basilian that now becomes their main basis. Abu Sayyaf itself is derived from Arabic, Abu means holder and Sayyaf means sword. So, Abu Sayyaf means a group of swordsmen. The members of the Abu Sayyaf have commonly practiced military training at the Mujahideen training camp in Afghanistan.

Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) since 2013. Khadafi Janjalani was named the leader of this group by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and in March 2016 they took hostages to 10 Indonesian sailors who were fishing in Philippines waters (Frank and Hookway 2001).

Abu Sayyaf has expanded its network to Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. This group is responsible for bombings, killings, kidnappings, and extortions in an effort to establish a Muslim state in the West of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and to create a conducive atmosphere for the creation of a big Pan-Islamic based country in the Malay Peninsula—Indonesia and Malaysia—in Southeast Asia (Hidayat and Gaus 2005). Khadafi Janjalani, brother of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, later became the leader of the Abu Sayyaf. The main goal is still the same that is establishing an Islamic State. After Abdurajak Janjalani's group was divided into different factions, its activities were further colored by robbery and kidnapping rather than political struggle. This was proven in 2000, this group has kidnapped 53 people including priests, several teachers, and students. To redeem the hostages, Abu Sayyaf demanded ransom and two hostages reportedly beheaded (Hefner 2003). The Abu Sayyaf has published a number of lists of demands that is the establishment of an independent Moro State, the release of several terrorists who have been detained abroad, prohibition of fishing boats operating in the Sulu Sea, protection for Filipinos in Sabah Malaysia and ransoms of around 1 million US dollars for one hostage.

Until the end of 2001, the Abu Sayyaf group still carried two US citizens and one Filipino nurse in Basilan Island as the result of kidnapping seven months ago. This

was known when the group offered negotiation to release them in the City of Zamboanga in April 2002. In June 2002, a hostage, US citizen, Martin Burnham, died during an attack by the Philippines forces against the Abu Sayyaf basis. While his wife, Gracia Burnham, could be saved. Meanwhile, a Filipino nurse, Ediborah Yap, was killed during a rescue operation by the Philippines military. In June 2002, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped foreign nationals including four Indonesian citizens. They were the ship crews of SM88 that was carrying coal from Indonesia to Cebu Island in the Central Philippines. The assault was carried out in the Jolo Island offshore and the four were then taken to the land of Jolo Island. Two days later, one Indonesian crew member Ferdinand Joel was rescued.

Then in March 2003, one Indonesian crew, Zulkifli, succeeded to save himself and reported that another Indonesian crew member, Muntu Jacobus Winowatan, was died. He was shot in a Philippine military rescue operation in February 2003. The last Indonesian hostage, Lerrech, has successfully escaped from Abu Sayyaf detention on April 11, 2003. In March 2016, the Abu Sayyaf group again kidnapped 10 Indonesian citizens who were Brahma Ship's crews that loaded coal belonging to a mining company from Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan.

The Abu Sayyaf is the name of an Islamic-based military terrorist and separatist group based around the Southern Philippine Islands, especially in the Jolo, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Mindanao regions. This group is often referred to as a terrorist group because of the concept of their struggle with hard-line Islamic ideology or radical Islam. This group has a chairman or leader named as

Khadaffi Janjalani.

The study of the prospect of the security in Sulawesi and Sulu seas of the Southern Philippine briefly provides an overview of the socio-economic conditions of community groups in Mindanao that support the operations of the Abu Sayyaf factions and the map of relations between the Abu Sayyaf factions and the local elites in Southern Philippines. Besides, it also provides an overview related to the reasons why the community groups and local elites give support to these armed groups.

This study regards that finding the root of the problems of the Philippines Moro People is the most important thing to do and find a solution for their problems. Unfortunately, Moro Muslim relation with the Manila Government in many cases means confrontation and demands for their independence. The Filipinos Muslim, the Moro Nation, believe that they must fight for their life and security guarantees, live according to the values they believe in and have the power to determine their fate. We, the Indonesian people who are predominantly Muslim, hope that the struggle will reach its culmination and the peace could be realized in this very dynamic region in culture, trade, politics, and sciences.

That men and women used to shed their own blood and the blood of others seemed to be a reality of the modern world that is difficult to overcome. We try to understand such conflicts by identifying their backgrounds but this is the most difficult puzzle to solve all kinds of armed ethnonationalism. Why are they inspired to fight and die for the nation? This study investigates the meaning and motivation of such struggle, the Muslim separatist

movement in the Philippines. This study traces the development of Muslim nationalist identity in the Philippines, the origin of Muslim rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, and the mobilization of support of the people for separatist movements in both armed and unarmed phases. This study is not a report from the “front line” or the description of the center of the political command of the Muslim nationalist movement in the Philippines. This ethnography portrays the views of the poor urban Muslim community, many of whom seek refuge with armed rebellions.

Mindanao, Community, and Conflict

Mindanao is the second largest island in the Philippines and one of the three main island groups along with Luzon and Visayas. Unlike the northern part of the Philippines that culturally inherited Western—Spain and America—culture, the southern region contrarily inherited Islamic culture. Mindanao, located in the southern part of the Philippines, is a historic residential area for the majority of Muslims or Moro tribes and other ethnic groups such as Maranao and Tausug. The warfare for independence has been pursued by various Muslim factions for five centuries against the rulers. Spanish, American, Japanese and Filipino forces have not yet succeeded in reducing the will of those who want to secede from the Philippines, which is predominantly Catholic. Now, the majority of the Mindanao population is Catholic due to the pattern of unfair land ownership and a large number of migrants to the region. This triggered the poor and marginalized Mindanao Muslims and separatist movements who have struggled for


hundreds of years.

For the last few years, Mindanao has been under surveillance because of the emergence of Islamic terrorist organizations and their existence is related to the conflict in the Middle East. Mindanao is considered the basis of the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah whose emergence has reduced the role of more moderate and nationalistic groups of freedom fighters such as the MIF. Moro conflict is a revolt that is taking place on the Island of Mindanao, Philippines. In 1969, political tensions and an open battle took place between the Philippine Government and Moro Muslim rebel groups. The Moro Rebellion led to the Jabidah massacre, which killed 60 Muslim Filipino commanders due to a planned operation to reclaim the eastern part of the

Malaysian state of Sabah (Abuza 2014). In response, a professor of Philippine University, Nur Misuari, founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an armed rebel group that intends to establish an independent Mindanao. In the following years, MNLF was divided into several different groups which included the MILF that wanted to establish an Islamic state in the Philippines.

The Moro Rebellion has its roots in the long history of the Bangsamoro rebellion against foreign rulers, started from the American annexation of the Philippines in 1899. Since then, the Moro rebellion has turned against the Philippine government. The number of victims of the conflict varied, however, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program estimated that around 6,015 people were killed in an armed conflict between the Philippine Government and the ASG, BIFM, MILF and MNLF factions from 1989 to 2012 (Clamor 2002).

Figure 1
Typology of terrorisms



Terrorist typically avoid direct confrontation with military forces and are organized more like criminal gangs—secretive and smaller in number—and rarely chose to directly confront military forces. Terrorist also ordinarily do not seek to directly control and administer territory.

The Moro Conflict in the Philippines is a conflict that has been happening since the colonial to the independence period and even said to continue until the 21st century. But, in this study, it would be limited up to the 20th century. Moro conflict in the Philippines is varied. It means that this conflict did not only occur among two parties but various parties. It is said that this conflict began during the colonial period including Spanish imperialism, American, and after independence even with the Philippine government itself. After that, the Moro people fought with the immigrants and with Christian groups. Started from Spanish colonization in the 17th century, Spain came to bring new socio-political conditions. Spain occupied the North Philippines, by spreading Christianity. But when Spain would seize the Southern Philippines in which the Muslims were the majority, they failed. The resistances in the Southern Philippines were carried out by Sultan Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan

to whom the Spaniards called Moro² (Wiharyanto 2011).

According to Spanish, the Islamic Sultanate represented a backward society, barbarian, rude, and uncivilized. For years, Spain which was one of the superpower countries along with the Portuguese did not succeed in seizing Mindanao. The efforts of the Spanish government to control Mindanao within 200 years did not succeed whether in the context of economics, politics, or the spread of religion as a whole. Only a few regions in the northern part of the Mindanao archipelago have been successfully controlled i.e. in Davao del Norte and Zamboanga del Norte. Various resistances were carried out by the Moro group and the battle against Spain was called the Moro War (Surwardono 2013).

The battle against Spain strengthened the relationship between the Sulu and Maguindanao Sultanates which was initially less harmonious as they had the same goal in fighting against the Spanish government. As the United States came in the Philippines in 1898, the Southern Filipinos did not want to help the leaders of the North Philippines and Spain to face America and the Philippines finally fell to America. It was marked by the Paris Agreement on December 10, 1898. During this time the Southern Philippines was successfully controlled by the Americans because they managed to persuade the datu to stand with them. In contrast to Spain, the US government did not directly show their imperialist attitude but concealed it with a mission in education and development.

The cohesiveness of coalition between the Sulu and Maguin- danao Sultanates in responding to the possibility of

² Because their skin was black like Muslims in North Africa.

US penetration in Mindanao made the US government preferred to manage and control Mindanao through cultural, social and economic manners like through modernization policy (Surwardono 2013, 41). Modernization here means that America was trying to improve Moro's standard of living, but they did not get a positive response. America's efforts to lift the left behind villages of the Southern Filipinos were considered an act of aggression against the Moro people.

On the other hand, America also did not advocate Christian-Islamic hostility. In fact, America continued to grow the seeds of hostility because they brought thousands of Christian immigrants to Islamic regions. In their official policy, the United States let the Moro people practice their religious life and their ritual habits remained uninterrupted. The Southern Philippines was opposed to modernization so when the system of modern government was introduced, only the North Philippines could accept it. The people in the Southern Philippines still used the traditional system of datu. America treated well the datu who recognized their sovereignty and suppressed those who did not.

As a result, those who held government positions were the North Filipinos, while the Moro people were increasingly left behind in the government. The Moro people were also excluded from the discussion of their independence. When the 1926

Balcon Bill constitution was issued, the United States supported the choice of the Philippines elites who wished to combine the Islamic Sultanate in Mindanao into the Philippines territories (Goda 1999). This made the relationship between the Islamic Sultanate and the United States

unfavorable. The enactment also urged the Islamic sultanate of Mindanao to propose petition to the United States in order not to be included into Philippines territory. Surwardono (2013, 56) stated that this step was carried out in 3 stages i.e. the Sulu community petition, dated June 9, 1921. Then proceed with a petition which is often known as the Zamboanga Declaration, dated February 1, 1924. And the last petition was resubmitted on March 18, 1935, known as the Dansalam Declaration—by 120 Moro datu, mainly from Lanano—that stated the separation from the Commonwealth government and chose to be under the protection of the United States until the Moro community could establish their own government.

Despite the petition was issued during World War II, the United States was able to invite the Moro people to fight together with the North Filipinos. They carried out guerrilla warfare against Japan. At that time they all did not care about their respective backgrounds. Wrapped in the spirit of patriotism, they created a strong sense of nationalism. The profits gained from investment in the Philippines were not many. The government's costs could not be fully covered by local tax revenues while the costs were increasing due to additional military defense costs. In short, the Philippines economically really did not give benefit to the United States.

The Philippines gained independence from the United States in 1946. But the independence did not change anything and had no meaning for the Moro people. They continued to gain various forms of discrimination and marginalization such as poverty, difficulty in obtaining employment, and low level of education. Even discrimination has frequently led to military violence (Bastin and

Twitchett 1970).

The Philippines government continued to include the Mindanao region into the Philippine administrative territory and did not respond to the petitions submitted by the Moro people. The Manuel Quezon government did not care about the demands of Moro people in Mindanao and even put Mindanao as one of the important assets to solve the problems in Luzon and Visayas such as land problem and extractive and agrarian investments. Such policy was taken because Mindanao is an area that has very wide land availability and natural resources potential for large investments (Rood 2005).

Because there was no response from the government, Datu Utdog Matalam felt disappointed and then established MIM (Moro Independence Movement) that strived for the independence of Moro. In addition to the existence of MIM, the birth of the MNLF led by Nur Misuari also succeeded in gaining the support from the International World including the OIC and MILF. The Moro armed groups increased their attacks on military units in the Philippines so that many government soldiers become the victims. As a result, many troops from headquarter were sent to the South Philippines. In October 1972, a greater rebellion exploded. The rebel armies took over government radio transmitters in Mindanao. The attack was prepared in more detail, proving that the target was well chosen and the time for the attack was also determined through careful planning.

The MNFL movement realized that if there is no foreign funding, then they will not be able to survive against the government army. To get foreign funds, MNLF established branches in various Islamic countries and carried out

propaganda that showed the suppression of the Philippine government against the Moro people (Wiharyanto 2011). Libya was the first country to provide unlimited assistance by which the Moro people equipped themselves with the up-to-date weapons. Libya not only provided financial support but also weapons. The militant cadres of MNLF were also sent out of the country to undergo military training with assistance from the elites of the Mindanao Sultanate who were disappointed with the Marcos government policy. The first group delivered was MNLF combatants or better known as the Top 90 and included MNLF chairman, Nur Misuari, embarked from Pangkor Island near Penang Island in Malaysia through the Libyan facility (Surwardono 2013). In addition to Libya and Malaysia in the 1980s, Syria was also involved in training Moro militants. But, the Philippines government also asked for help from foreign parties to face Moro rebels. The Philippine government requested weapons assistance to the United States and to other European countries. The Moro resistance was increasingly strong and persistent in struggling against the Philippine government after getting some assistance. Therefore in 1973, armed resistance increased. And finally, Marcos realized that the war would last so long and cost a lot. Besides, there were many victims. After getting realized, Marcos chose a political alternative to solve the Moro problem.

This conflict occurred between Moro and Non-Moro groups in Mindanao. This conflict began when Non-Moro groups or migrants took over Moro's lands in Mindanao. In 1918, the Moro population in Mindanao reached 80% and Non-Moro population was around 20%. The Moro

community inhabited 18 regions of 20 regions in Mindanao. And in 1970, the Moro population in Mindanao remained 20% only and occupied 13 regions in Mindanao while the Non-Moro population became 80% by occupying 18 regions (Surwardono 2013, 45). From this statement, it can be concluded that between 1918 and 1970 there was a drastic change in the number of Non-Moro and Moro residents in Mindanao. And those who occupied 18 regions in 1970 were Christian of Mindanao. The changes of the map of land ownership have led to the distribution of the work of the Mindanao people, the Moro people who previously owned the land turned into the workers who worked for the land of the Christian community.

The conflict of land then developed into a conflict with a primordial character. Government policies that moved the Viyasa ethnic group and formed a civilian force took over the land and defended the land taken. Land acquisition often used violence even a murder. Because of the existence of these civilian forces, it resulted in various tragedies in the early 1970s where 40,000 Moro residents were killed by armed civilians. The group was called the Ilaga group that carried out massacres against the Muslim community. Whereas the Maros government tended to neglect it, so that the conflict that was initially the land conflict turned into a religious conflict in Mindanao (Kiefer 1972).

But, the Mindanao people also did not remain silent, some of the Moro elites with their civilian group called Baracuda fought against the Ilaga group and the central government. The Baracuda group used religion to thrill the spirit of the Moro people in order to persistent to defend their land and dignity. The group also internationalized this

conflict to the Islamic world so that Islamic communities around the world provided assistance to Islam in Mindanao for the sake of religion.

Some efforts to end the incessant conflict in Mindanao in the southern Philippines have been conducted whether by involving domestic and foreign interference. Some of the settlement efforts that have been carried out among others were conflict resolution initiated by the OIC in 1973 by forming a 4-state commission. The four members were Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia to investigate the cases of violence by the Philippine government against Moro. But it increased to 6 countries after Indonesia and Bangladesh joined as the members. The result of the Tripoli Agreement was that the acknowledgment of the Mindanao autonomous region legally that included 13 regions such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboangan del Zur, Zamboangan del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Palawan, and all cities and villages in the region. The agreement also regulated the autonomous region to establish sharia courts, schools, administrative systems, economic and financial systems, regional security, representative bodies, and executive councils. Matters concerning foreign political policies and national defense remained the responsibility of the Central government and created a body called the Moro autonomous government (ARMM).

Towards the 1990s, the power of the central Philippine government was disrupted, this made Moro Muslim factions again mobilized the power to take advantage of the moment to declare the formation of an Independent Moro State. MNLF that during the Tripoli Agreement felt being

capitalized by Marcos policy, chose to continue the armed struggle for the establishment of an independent state. To anticipate the mobilization in Mindanao, Aquino asked that the negotiations must be held again and finally agreed by Nur Misuari, the leader of the MNLF. Then, three people were sent to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to negotiate in the 1987 Accord of Jeddah. Aquino was willing to negotiate in the matters of economic, political, social, and cultural issues except for the discussion on the issue of freedom of Moro. The outcome of the negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine Government was the improvement of the status of the previous autonomous region into an expanded autonomous region.

The peace process in Southern Mindanao continued to take place after the replacement of President Aquino's regime with a more proactive one, Fidel Ramos. As time goes by, the militant groups such as the Abu Sayyaf continued to carry out terror and attacks in Mindanao, including kidnapping with ransom. Although violence continued, President Ramos would continue to realize the peace in Southern Mindanao.

On September 2, 1996, the Final Peace Agreement was formally agreed upon witnessed by Indonesia's foreign minister, Ali Alatas and the General Secretary of the OIC in Jakarta. By producing 81 points of agreement, the point was to increase the status of the expanded autonomous region to be a special economic region. The people of Mindanao carried out general election and won by Nur Misuari with 90% of the votes (Surwardono 2013).

Conflict and poverty are two things we can never separate. The incessant conflict caused various impacts both

in terms of economy and education. The conflict that happened created a condition where the level of security was very low, this affected the economic system of Moro which was experiencing disruption especially in terms of low investment. Many Moro children could not go to school as their schools were being used as refugees. Damaged infrastructure and houses must be abandoned due to this conflict. The cost of rebuilding Mindanao after the conflict required a large amount of money.

Table 1.1
Pirate attacks by region, 1999-2001

Year	International Water		Territorial Water		Harbors	
2003	102	24%	88	21%	232	55%
2002	49	13%	72	19%	262	68%
2001	79	21%	125	34%	166	45%
2000	136	29%	224	48%	111	23%
1999	38	12%	201	68%	70	23%

Sources: Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia, Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, Singapore, ISEAS.

Moro conflict in Mindanao, Southern Philippines was a long-drawn conflict that has not been resolved yet. Efforts made for the peace process continued to be carried out but the demand for independence was also incessantly echoed by the Moro separatist group to establish an independent state that is free from Philippine government intervention. This conflict heated up as religious issues were brought to this conflict. This conflict will never end if the Muslim minority in the Philippines continues to get political pressure from the central government. They just demanded

for independence.

In the Philippines, the conflict occurred because of the competition of the Muslim and Christian mission after the 13th century. State discrimination against Muslim minority groups even became more pronounced when they called themselves as Moro, meaning that it is identical to the Islamic group that once occupied Spain. This is why the conflict continued to happen. Religion and ethnic identity even occupied an important part of the conflict. The rebellion by Muslim Minority groups in Mindanao, Southern Philippines, was much influenced by unfair treatment in economic and political life, even though there was a religious factor behind it. The Southern Philippines is an area that never stops experiencing conflict. This is the area where the majority of its population is Muslim. The conflict that occurred in this area was due to competition among religions apart from factors such as politics, social and culture. The most crucial factor is related to religion.

The conflict in the Philippines began with colonization carried out by the Arabs and later by Christians where these two religions until now are still competing for the attention of the indigenous people. Islamic Arabs shifted to the South of the Philippines when Christians occupied the North. According to the Muslims, the root of the separatist movement in the Philippines was because the culture and religion of the Southern Philippines that was basically Muslim were different from those of the North that was basically Christian. The Northern was colonized while the Southern was not. It means that the Southern which was originally dominated by the Muslims has been disturbed by the presence of the Christians in this area.

The conflict that occurred in the Philippines began to occur since the arrival of Spanish Christians and succeeded in occupying the Northern Philippines or Luzon islands in 1565. Since then, the Spaniards wanted to establish the Philippines as a colony and convert the population into Christianity. A resistance was initiated by the indigenous Muslim but won by Spain in 1673. After Spain came to rule then America and Japan came successively to conquer until the Philippines proclaimed itself as an independent State on July 4, 1946. During Marcus's reign, the conflict initially occurred as a result of murder at Corregidor. The Filipino Muslim volunteers, trained in guerrilla tactics by an official force, were killed on the order of the army commander. They refused to be sent to Sabah to carry out military infiltration.

Because of the incident, the Moro Muslim Liberation Front (MNLF) was established. MNLF was a movement that was very influential in fighting for the freedom of Moro Muslims. The other two groups are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the most recent one is the Abu Sayyaf which was formed in 1989 (T. Abdullah 2002). These three groups had the same goal of wanting to establish an Islamic theocracy in Southern Philippines and economic development in their territory. This paper will just discuss the movement of the Abu Sayyaf Group, where this movement has created fear in the Southern Philippines because their actions have led to acts of terrorism.

The Philippines is part of Southeast Asia. The majority of the population is Roman Catholic. About 4,392,872 or 5% inhabitants of the population are Muslim. They are called Muslims Filipinos or also called the Moro Nation. The Moro's region includes Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and

Palawan. They are often referred to as the Southern Philippines. This area covers 23 Provinces with an area of 96,438 km², approximately 33% of the Philippines.

The Moro people, *bangsa Moro*, consist of 13 ethnic groups i.e. Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausuq (Sulu, Suluk, Zolo), Samal, Yakan, Sangil, Bajao, Kalibogan, Jama Mapun, Iranun, Pala- wanon, Kalagan, and Molbog. Meanwhile, the Tausuq tribe is a combination of several tribes i.e. the tribe of Buranun, Taguima- ha, Baklaya, Dampuan, and Banjar. The Baklaya tribe is believed to be a migrant tribe from Sulawesi, Indonesia. Maybe they are the Bugis from South Sulawesi. The Banjar tribe came from Borneo, Kalimantan, Indonesia. Meanwhile, the tribe of Dabilitas is believed coming from Champa, Indochina, that migrated to the Philippines and throughout Southeast Asia.

The Moro or Bangsamoro, in the writing of the Mindanao people in the Southern Philippines, is the name for a nation consisting of various tribes and clans who live in Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan. The Southern Philippines is said to be the traditional residence of the Moro people. This traditional residence means a form of social order that is still original, not yet mixed with foreign culture, and not even mixed with Islamic culture. The area includes Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi, Sanga-Sanga, Bato-Bato, Zamboanga, the areas close to Brunei, East Malaysia, East Kalimantan, and eastern Indonesia.

Broadly speaking, Islam got into the Philippines starting from the 11 to the 14th century. During 14 to the 15th century, Islam was ruling that is in the form of sultanate government. Islam theoretically started entering the Southern Philippines with various versions such as through

a trader. Another version said through a wanderer who acted as a trader. To name a few, Mashaika arrived on the Island of Sulu. It is assumed that he came from the Malay. He was the first person to bring and spread Islam in the Philippines. Then, there was Muhammad Kabungsuwan, coming to the Maguindanao tribe in the Tinundan region and Sharif Awliya who came to Mindanao. He is from Johor. The spread of Islam in Mindanao was continued by his son-in-law named Sharif Maraja. According to him, Islam spread to the Davao region, Lanao Lake and Bukidnon. The other name was Karim Al Makhdum, a Sufi who is also an Islamic jurist that came to Sulu. But, the story of this scholar was mixed with odd folklore. Sharif Abubakar, originally from South Yamen, Hadramaut, continued the reign of the Sulu Sultanate, which was the first Islamic ruler in the Philippines. He first landed in Palembang and Brunei. Then he married the daughter of King Bwansa, the king of Sulu who was a Muslim. He then replaced his father-in-law's position as a king. Since then, Islamic law was applied, but by considering to local customs that were not in contrary with Islam. From this sultanate, Islam finally spread throughout the Philippines (Azra 2003).

The power of Islam at that time was held by three sultanates i.e. Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan. But then the Maguindanao and Buayan Sultanates were united by Sultan Kudarat to become the Maguindanao sultanate. Filipino Muslims are Sunni. At the beginning of the 1970s, many world Islamic leaders visited the Philippines. There were also many Filipinos who studied in Islamic cultural centers. After their return, they spread Islam, established Islamic schools, mosques, places to teach the basic teachings of Islam

and the Qur'an. Until now it is well known as a good educational institution named Jamiatul Al Islamiyah Philippines in the city of Marawi.

Even though various conflicts occurred, the spread of Islam was even more intense especially by the Sulu tribe when the Portuguese were able to control Malacca in 1511, a city that was very busy with trading activities. They formed small groups of various barangays, scattered to Kalimantan, Mindanao in the north, and to the Buranun tribe in the hinterland. Since then, a closer relationship was established with other Islamic sultanates in the archipelago or Nusantara and Malaya. This relationship was established considering that the arrival of Portuguese and other western imperialists were not just trading and seeking trade commodities, but they also wanted to dominate the territory and spread religion (Phelan 1993).

Amidst the 16th century, Islam began to root in the Philippines. It even reached the island of Luzon. In Manila itself, a small Islamic empire has been established in Tondo. During the 15 to the 16th century, Islam was introduced through official royal lines. It was the king of Baguinda who first allowed the propagation of Islam to his territory. The arrival of Portuguese to Southeast Asia was the beginning of a conflict among indigenous people, especially Moro Muslims, and after the Portuguese was able to conquer Malacca. The first white man to enter the Philippines was Ferdinand Magellans in 1512. He was a Spanish. He was killed by a local tribe in a battle.

There are three major Moro Muslim tribes, i.e. the Sulu (Tausuq), Maranao, and Maguindanao tribes. There is one more tribe that is the Banguingui tribe which is the smallest

Muslim tribe. But the first three tribes above are the Muslim groups that were often used by the Portuguese to achieve their goals. Datu Uttu from the Tausuq tribe provided a boat for the Portuguese invaders to destroy other Islamic Tausuq tribes. Similarly, when Marcos came to power, he tried to continue to break the resistance of the Tausuq tribe.

During the US occupation, several Muslim groups signed a peace agreement, while others continued to struggle. The tenacious resistance was carried out by Datu Ali, in 1903, who was famous for his brave fighting, but broken, destroyed, even he was killed due to the betrayal of Datu Plang. The next Western imperialist that came to Phillippines was Spain. They declared war with the Moro people. It was at this time that there were divisions among the datu, fighting over power and influence. They started to provoke one another that led to an inter-tribal war. This situation benefited the colonialists and it was used to conquer the Moro people. Their long journey from Spain to Southeast Asia was blessed by Philip II, the Spanish king at that time. "I give you permission to make the Moro Muslim become slaves to you. But I forbid you to enslave other than Moro Muslim," that was the letter of the king of Spain to Conquistador Miguel Lopez Legaspi who acted as the head of troops landing on the Island of Cebu, in 1565. Under his leadership, the Islamic da'wah was ceased with 300 years of war.

Spain's hatred against Islam is rooted in history. Islam controlled them for about 4 centuries. Therefore their hatred of Islam was addressed to the Moro people. Various massacres, murders, and harassments were carried out by the Spaniards. The doctrine of Islamic teachings is deceitful,

not true, and it is a law of Satan was firmly attached to the head of these invaders. That was also what the Spanish Governor, Bishop Salazar, and his accomplice said: “Islam is like a fire that spreads like an epidemic”. Or “The Muslims are robbers, lanun in the ocean”, said Pio Pie, a Jesuit priest.

The Spaniards were only able to conquer the Moro people with the power of weapons, but not in the matters of faith. When they used steamships in the 1800s, the Moros were powerless against this imperialist. The datu and small kings were forced to pay tribute if they did not want their ships to be destroyed, or their commodities destroyed, or their villages burned. Even Francisco Ducos, a Spanish priest, led his own army for 7 years against the Muslims.

By the 19th century, other colonialists—England, France, Netherlands—began to arrive in Southeast Asia. Their presence made Spain worried. Large-scale conquests began to take place against the Moro people, especially against the Tausuq tribe who were indeed skilled at fighting in the sea. It was the Spanish warlord, General Arolas, who appointed himself as the Sulu sultan, in the midst of ongoing resistance by the Tausuq, Sulu, tribe. The incessant resistance from Bangsamoro is known as Juramentado. Then United States came to the Philippines. There was a war between these two colonizing nations, the United States versus Spain. The Spanish were defeated and in 1899 were forced to leave the Philippines. It does not mean that the condition of Moro Muslims was better with the change of the invaders. Various massacres, repressions, intimidations, harassments, and other hardships occurred during the US’s occupation over the Philippine.

In 1946, the Philippines were liberated by the US. However, a minority of Moro Muslims, a term for migrant residents, or a population with small and specific quantities, or a population of people who were forced to join a larger group, was still not immediately independent. They ought to continue to struggle to bring up their identity (*Kompas* 2002). But the independence achieved by the Philippines had negative and positive aspects. In the mid 20th century, Muslim relations with the Islamic worlds were carried out through the Muslim communities of Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia-Riau Indonesia, Malay tribe; Thailand, Pattani, and Brunei Darussalam. But after being released from the US, Moro Muslim relations could be directly linked to Islamic centers in the Middle East. Especially after the Islands of Mindanao and Sulu became part of the Republic of the Philippines. The influence of Egyptian and Pakistani reformists began to enter the Philippines such as Muhammad Abduh, Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Sayyid Quthub, Abul A'la Maududi, and other Muslim thinkers.

Salamat Hashim, a founder of the MILF, was influenced by the reformist movement of Sayyid Quthub and Abul A'la Maududi. In the beginning, the MILF tried to change the fate of Moro Muslims in peaceful ways. But finally, armed resistance was taken by them. It inspired to the emergence of the MNLF which fought through armed resistance. The relationship was very beneficial for Moro Muslims. In the 1970s, when there was a massacre carried out by the Manila government, Libya immediately reacted and brought the problem of Filipino Muslims to the OIC forum, Organization of Islamic Conference.

MNLF resistance eased after Manila in 1975 tried to negotiate MNLF demands. One year later, an agreement was realized, known as the Tripoli Agreement that bound the MNLF to receive limited autonomy. Manila only provided autonomy in the fields of education and court, not in the field of defense and security/military and foreign policy that was still managed by the Manila government. The autonomy was given to 13 provinces i.e. Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur and Del Norte, North-South Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat Authority, Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, and Palawan (MICD 2005).

Except for armed resistance, Moro Muslims also fought peacefully under UN supervision. This peaceful struggle is very unique. In 1999, the Moro People's Consultative Assembly was held for the first time that was carried out in a large meeting and attended by more than one million Moro Muslims. The meeting resulted in an agreement to establish an independent government of the Moro people. This large meeting took place many times, between 1999-2001. That happened in Cotabato City and Davao City on October 23, 1999, Marawi City on October 24, 1999, and in Basilan on December 7, 1999. There was also another big meeting in 2001 which was attended by 2.5 million people. Basically, these large mass meetings wanted self-government, while rejecting limited autonomy from the result of the Tripoli Agreement. Ferdinand Marcos once tried to break Tripoli's agreement in a subtle way that was by trying to move the Christian population to the 13 provinces. After the number of Christian residents in those 13 Moro Muslim provinces was quite many, a referendum was held to give the right for special autonomy.

The hypothesis based on the BPPK preliminary study suggests several points, as follows: (1) the Mindanao region, especially the islands in the Sulu Sea, has a very high poverty rate of more than 50%. (2) Abu Sayyaf factions survived because of support from local community groups, where the support was successfully defended by the Abu Sayyaf group because they provided economic trickle downs from their kidnapping ransom. Hence, there was a mutualistic symbiosis between the Abu Sayyaf factions and the community groups and local elites that got an advantage that also served as the basis for the support and protection of the group. (3) Thus, a study needs to be carried out to be able to properly understand the socio-political and economic conditions in the Mindanao region for the purpose of formulating a strategic recommendation to bring a dignified settlement to the security issues in the seas of Sulu and Sulawesi. (4) So far, there have been joint efforts between the authorities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, especially from the aspect of security cooperation to overcome the threat of shipping in the Sulu Sea. However, a new breakthrough is still needed to strengthen the impacts of trilateral cooperation.

Maritime Terrorism and Piracy

Sulu is a province in the Philippines. Its capital city is Jolo. This province is located in the Muslim Autonomous Region of Mindanao. The province has an area of 1,600 km² with a population of 849,670 people and 134,868 residences. The province has a population density of 531 people per km². The Sulawesi Sea is an ancient oceanic pool that was formed 42 million years ago. The boundary between the

Sulawesi Sea and Sulu is at Sibutu-Basilan Fault. Strong ocean streams, deep ocean trenches, and high mountains of the sea along with volcanic islands result in complex oceanographic features.

Figure 2



Source: The Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2017

The Sulawesi Sea attracted international attention due to pirate activities that not only plundered small fishermen but also giant container ships. The pirates have weapons, high-tech equipment such as radar and GPS navigation devices, and highspeed motorboat. The Sulawesi Sea is an important transportation route for trade, a popular place for ocean floor diving, and luxurious ocean cruises.

Basilan is an archipelagic province located in the western part of Mindanao in the waters of the Sulawesi Sea, Moro Bay, and Sulu Sea between Zamboanga City and Sulu. Its areas are about 1,379 km² including its surrounding islands. The city is divided into one city and six municipalities. It had 332,579 populations in 2000 of which 32% were Yakan, 25% were Tausug, 15% were Chavacano, 13% were Sama, 11% were Cebuano, and 4% belonged to other ethnic groups. The population was predominantly Muslim, 51%. This was one of the most depressed provinces in the country. Its socio-economic conditions have been compounded by the presence of groups of armed extremists and lawless elements, especially the Abu Sayyaf that has gained international fame for kidnapping.

Lanao del Norte is in North of Mindanao, bordered to the North by Iligan Bay and Misamis Oriental, to the East by Bukidnon, to the West by Panguil Bay and Zamboanga del Sur, and to the South by Lanao del Sur and Bay of Illana. Its land area is 427,845 ha with a population of 758,123. It consists of Iligan City and 22 municipalities. At that time a province was separated from Lanao del Sur on May 22, 1959, under Republic Act 2228, and Iligan City became its capital. The population is predominantly Christian.

Sulu and Mindanao Sea surround the archipelago in the West and North and the Sulawesi Sea in the East. More than 157 islands form this province. The islands have a total land area of 167,930 ha. It has 18 municipalities, ten of which are on land and eight are municipal islands. The capital is Jolo. The provincial population based on the 2000 census consisted of 619,668 inhabitants. The main ethnic groups are Tausug, Samal, and Badjaos.

Tawi-Tawi Island was part of Sulu until September 11, 1973, when the Province was created through Presidential Decree No. 302. Tawi-Tawi is located in the Southwestern tip of the Philippines and bridges the international border with Sabah, East Malaysia. Its combined land area is 342,656.10 ha. It is bordered by the Sulu Sea in the North and West and Celebes Sea in the South and East. Of the 307 islands, 88 are characterized by extensive coral reefs. It consists of 10 municipal islands. The population of the province is 322,317, of which the majority is Samal and the Tausugs. It is the largest Province in Western Mindanao. It is located at the Northwest end of the Zamboanga Peninsula Region and consists of two cities i.e. Dipolog and Dapitan, and 25 municipalities. Its government office is in Dipolog City.

With approximately 400 km of irregular coastline facing the Sulu Sea, the Province is bordered by Misamis Occidental in the North, Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga Sibugay in the East, and Zamboanga City in the South. The population is mostly Christian. Zamboanga del Sur is located in the Southern part of Zamboanga Peninsula that forms the Western part of Mindanao. It is bordered in the North by Zamboanga del Norte, to the East and Northeast by Misamis Occidental and Lanao del Norte and Panguil Bay, to the South by Moro Bay, and to the Southwest by Zamboanga Sibugay. The province consists of Pagadian City, Zamboanga City, and 26 municipalities. The land area reaches 4,735 sq km and has a population of 836,147. Zamboanga Sibugay was established through the laws of the Republic Act 8973 in February 2001 and consisted of 16 municipalities.

The government is located in Ipil, about 134 km from Dipolog City. The land area is 360,775 ha and the total population is 497,239. The province is bordered to the North by Zamboanga del Norte, to the South by Dumanquilas and Sibugay Bays, to the East by Zamboanga del Sur, to the West by Zamboanga City and three other cities in Zamboanga del Norte. Its main inhabitants are Catholic, Protestant, and Islam. Ethnic groups found in this province are Tausug, Maranao, Maguindanao, Subanen, Samal, and Yakan.

Conclusion

Southeast Asia has spectacularly become the bright spotlight of world maritime terrorism, because of very high piracy incidents and the growing threat of terrorism. Southeast Asia is the region most vulnerable to piracy, accounted for about 50 percent of all worldwide attacks. This situation is getting worse due to the existence of terrorist groups—originally indigenous people—with strong maritime traditions. The nexus between piracy and terrorism makes maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia a regional security concern. Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah are the terrorist groups in Southern Philippines, Southeast Asia that has been engaging for a long time in maritime terrorism. Of this group, the Abu Sayyaf is the most well-known yet not much understood (Banlaoi 2007).

One terrorist group that has developed the ability to conduct maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia is the Abu Sayyaf. Initially, it was called the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF). The Abu Sayyaf was organized in the Philippines as an underground Muslim militant group in the early 1990s by Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, who was

recognized as the overall “amir.” Janjalani established the ASG in a global context and as the rise of regional Islam. Janjalani has developed close friendships with Osama Bin Laden and Ramzi Yousef in the early 1980s while he was in Peshawar, Pakistan (I. Abdullah 1982). Yousef was the mastermind of the “Bojinka plot” to bomb eleven American jetliners and to kill Pope Johannes Paul II during a visit to Manila in 1995. Through Janjalani, Yousef was able to establish an al-Qaeda terrorist cell in the Philippines. In 1984, Janjalani returned to Basilan and became a diligent preacher.

Janjalani delivered at least eight sermons radically which is based on the concept of *jihad fi sabilillah* that is to be a martyr for the purpose of Islam. He called both Muslims, even mullahs, and non-Muslims to have a superficial knowledge of the Quran and Hadith. He has strongly condemned the Philippines constitution as guidance for Filipino society and affirms the Quran “as the only proper guide for human life as it is revealed by God who cannot do wrong and who knows everything”. He regarded Filipino Muslims as victims of oppression, injustice, and lack of development that is why urging them to fight and die for Islam and get a heaven as their reward.

The struggle of the Abu Sayyaf Group, like other Muslim radical groups in the Philippines, is firmly rooted in socio-cultural, political, economic and historical factors that can be traced to the 14th century. At that time, the merchants and Muslim teachers from Indonesia and other neighboring countries reached the Pagan Island of the Philippines, spreading Islam in Mindanao and Luzon. In 1521, the islands were colonized by Magellan of Spain and the new

invaders prevented further spread of Islam. The Muslims fought against Spain, America, and Japanese colonization for almost four hundred years. When the Philippines became independent in 1946, they continued to fight what they called as “Imperialist of Manila.” Filipino Muslims, therefore, has fostered a sense of separatism as long as the existence of Islam in the Philippine archipelago.

Janjalani recruited new followers from Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga City, and General Santos City. Most of them were the former members of the MNLF or the MILF who were not satisfied with the movement of the group. During the formative period, the Abu Sayyaf Group lacked lots of funds to advance their program. The Abu Sayyaf requested foreign funds, using the name Al Harakatul al-Islamiyya. Abu Sayyaf was also involved in a kidnapping to raise funds. One of the main victims was Ricardo Tong, an owner of shipbuilding yard, who was released on January 17, 1994 after paying five million pesos. ASG also carried out various exploitation activities to obtain funds.

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CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN ACEH: REVIEW OF THE REJECTION OF THE SYIAH IN ACEH

THIS study departs from the phenomenal development of the Syiah school of thought in Aceh which is relatively phenomenal. This phenomenon is enlivened by the emergence of Syiah communities and crowded references to Syiahs in various places.¹ Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution imposed by Imam Khomeini has become a historical momentum for the spread of Ahlul Bayt teachings around the world, including Indonesia.² The success of Imam Khomeini to overthrow Syah Reza Fahlevi's monarchy which was the main alliance of the United States in the Middle East has made the Indonesian nation stunned. The youth and students with high enthusiasm studied the books written by Iranian revolutionary scholars, such as Murtadha Muthahhari and Ali Shariati.³ Since that time there was a big wave of Indonesian people entering the school of Ahlul

¹ Mircea Eliade, *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Simon and Schuler Macmillan, 1995), Vol. VII, p. 316.

²Taufik Abdullah (ed.), *Ensiklopedi Tematis Dunia Islam* (Jakarta: PT Ichtar Baru Van Hoeve, 2002), p. 343.

³ Ajid Thohir, *Perkembangan Peradaban di Kawasan Dunia Islam Melacak Akar-Akar Sejarah, Sosial, Politik, dan Budaya Ummat Islam* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers. 2009), p. 166.

Bayt. The rise of enthusiasm to the Ahlulbait School of Indonesia, as the largest and most influential Muslim country in Southeast Asia, certainly influenced the development of Ahlul Bayt teachings in Malaysia and the Southeast Asia region.

A number of political events in the era of cold war and repression of the New Order regime against the movement of Islamic movements in Indonesia and Iran's foreign policy in the early days of the formation of the Iran Islamic Republic more or less influence the up and down chart of growth Ahlul Bayt teachings in Indonesia are dominated by political influence and religious thinking rather than other aspects.

In the long span of time, not surprisingly, the romanticism and accidental euphoria that do not stand on the worldview's worldview are also decisively diminished.^{4 5} At the end of the first century of Hijri, in Aceh there was also a Syiah school.⁶ Hasbi Amiruddin reinforces this opinion which explains that in 800 AD Muslim groups from Persia (also Arabs) ran at Bandar Pereulak, East Aceh. Similarly, Yusny Saby and Zainuddin reported that around the 14th century AD in Pasai there have been scholars from Persia who carried out the Islamization process of al-Qadhi Amir Sayyid al-Syirazi and Faqih Tajuddin al-Isfahani. Even according to Ibn Battuta (1377 AD) when visiting Pasai for 15 days he met the two scholars and visited the palace of

⁴ Lihat Ann K.S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford: University Press, 1981), p. 36-38.

⁵M. Mahmud Ayoub, *The Crisis of Muslim History Religion and Politics in Early Islam* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2003).

⁶Muhammad Husain Haekal, *Sejarah Hidup Muhammad* (Jakarta: PT. Pustaka Litera Antar Nusa, 2008), p. 58.

Sultan Malik al-Zahir.⁷

According to Ali Hasjmy,⁸ Two major Islamic sects, Syiah and Ahlussunnah, fought for power throughout the Aceh kingdom especially during the Peureulak Islamic Empire (East Aceh) which was established in 840 AD.⁹ Along with this rise, the iconic prominent profile of Ali Shariati and Murtadha Muthahhri was dimmed because of the relevance and contextuality of discourse to the necessary demands. In turn, there is a selection process that may be quantitatively less optimistic. It turns out the next few years, lethargy is also still visible and stagnation becomes an inevitable reality. Surely, there is no ivory not cracked because only artificial tusks survive. As a result, there is a polarization that sometimes culminates in conflicts that are often regarded as ordinary events due to miscommunication.¹⁰

According to Jalaluddin Rakhmat (Indonesian Syiah figure and Chairman of Ahlul Bayt Jama'ah Association of Indonesia), the Syiah's development in Indonesia has four phases (periodization). The first phase, Syiah has entered Indonesia since the beginning of the entry of Islam in

⁷Hasbi Amiruddin, *Ulama Dayah: Pengawal Agama Masyarakat Aceh* (Lhokseumawe: Nadiya Foundation, 2003), p. 33; Yusny Saby, "Islam and Social Change: The Role The Ulama In Acehnese Society," *Dissertation*, Temple University, 1995, p. 51, and; Zainuddin Rahman, "Ilmu Sejarah, Sosial dan Politik," in Taufik Abdullah (ed.), *Ensiklopedi Tematis Islam* (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru Van Haeve, 2002), Vol.7, p. 279.

⁸Ali Hasjmy, *Syiah dan Ahlussunnah Saling Merebut Kekuasaan dalam Kerajaan Aceh Darussalam* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1983).

⁹Sehat Ihsan Shadiqin. "Islam dalam Masyarakat Kosmopolit: Relevankah Syariat Islam Aceh untuk Masyarakat Modern?" *Kontekstualita* 25(1), 2010.

¹⁰ M. Quraish Shihab, *Sunnah-Syiah Bergandengan Tangan! Mungkinkah? Kajian Atas Konsep Ajaran dan Pemikiran* (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2007), p. 66.

Indonesia through the early Islamic propagators, through the Persians who live in Gujarat. Syiah first came to Aceh. The first sultan of the Samudera Pasai sultanate located in Aceh. Marah Silu, embracing Syiah Islam by using the title Malikul Saleh. But then in the time of Sultan Iskandar Tsani, power was held by Sunni scholars (Sunnis). At that time the Syiah were hiding, not appearing until the second wave of Syiah influx came into Indonesia after the Islamic revolution in Iran.¹¹ It takes a serious research and verification to make sure. Now the Ahlulbait school in Indonesia and Southeast Asia has entered the third period politically. The challenge of the challenge is increasingly complex, because whatever happens at any point in the world, especially in the Middle East, will have an impact on the existence and future and projection of the development of this doctrine in Indonesia.¹² The tragedy of September 11, 2001, the American invasion of Iraq, the rise of Ahmadinejad as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah's rise to Israeli aggressors are part of a phenomenon of major phenomena affecting the position and growth of Ahlul Bayt teachings in Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general.

In addition to addressing the challenges of external and global challenges above, the communities of Ahlul bait in Indonesia is facing a bunch of regional challenges and a number of internal problems, especially in communications with communities that adhere to the mazhab of Ahlus-sunnah, the Government and even among other Syiah

¹¹Abubakar Aceh, *Aliran Syiah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Islamic Research Institute, 1977).

¹²Azyumardi Azra. "Syiah di Indonesia: Antara Mitos dan Realitas," *Ulumul Qur'an* 6(4), 1995.

communities and individuals.

Syiahism is one of the sects in Islam which believes that the most entitled to be the Imam of the Muslims after the death of Prophet Muhammad, is the family of the Prophet (ahlul bait). In this case, Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib (the Prophet's uncle) and Ali bin Abi Talib (the cousin and the son-in-law of the Prophet) along with his descendants. When re-traced its history, then the birth of sect in Islam can be classified into two streams. *First*, the political school, and the *second*, the theological school.¹³ Mazhabs or schools whose backgrounds are founded and motivated by *khilafah* or *imamah* issues, grouped as political schools, such as Syiah and Khawarij.¹⁴ Whereas the school whose background is motivated by the problem of belief, grouped as a school of theology, such as Mu'tazilah, Ash'ariyah, Maturidiyah. These two last-mentioned sects, hereinafter known as the Sunni school.

In the Syiah mazhab, *imamah* is a very important issue that requires them to make it the sixth pillar of Islam. The Syiah emphasized the role of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, equivalent to the emphasis on the oneness of God and the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad. Similarly after the death of Ali, the leadership of the Muslims turned to his children and grandchildren, and this seems to be God's ordinance. In the matter of imamah, Syiah Zaidiah holds that a new person can be appointed as a priest if it meets five criteria; Widespread

¹³ Ira M. Lapidus, *Sejarah Sosial Umat Islam* (Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, 2003), p. 177.

¹⁴D.S. Margoliouth, D. Litt., *Umayyah and 'Abbasids Being The Fourth Part of Jurji Zaydan's of Islamic Civilization* (London: Kitab Bhavan New Delhi, 1978), p. 39.

knowledge of religion, zahid (life only by worship), jihad in the way of Allah with arms, and brave. It is said that the Zaidiah sect recognizes the validity of the khilafah or imamate of Abu Bakr as-Siddiq and Umar ibn Khattab.

For Shiite Muslims the most important issue is not law or mysticism but loyalty to the Ali caliph. In the seventh and eighth centuries AD, the issue led to a political movement in the form of resistance to the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphate. The loyalty of these Syiah Muslims repeatedly attempted to seize the Caliphate. Yet history records that their long and arduous struggle to seize the Caliphate has proved to be fruitless, and it is politically true that these Syiah Muslims experience the oppression of the Umayyad Caliphate and the Abbasid Caliphate. In the Middle Ages, however, the map of the Islamic world was almost dominated by the Syiah especially during the Fatimid period. The Safavid dynasty gave Iran a kind of "national state" with a new identity, the Syiah school according to G.H. Jansen is the foundation for the development of Modern Iranian Nationalism (1501-1722).¹⁵

Post-Islamic Revolution of Iran, Syiah schools spread throughout the world, not only in Western countries like the United States, but also to Indonesia. The development of the Syiah school in Indonesia on the one hand is a treasure in Islam. On the other hand, however, there will be a "surprise" in both the ideological, political and cultural fields. Ideologically and politically, the Syiah concept of Imamah gained various reactions from Sunni Islam who constitute the majority in Indonesia. This reaction travels

¹⁵Cyril Glasse, *Ensiklopedi Islam*, translated into Indonesian by Ghufuran Mas'adi (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2002), p. 16.

along the continuum line along which two extreme poles. The total rejection of Syiah views and thoughts as reflected by the attitude of Sunni scholars is very apparent, especially with the MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council) decision which among other things prohibits the implementation of Syiah schools in this country.¹⁶

For the Sunni, political justice lies in recognizing the rightful ruler through *ijma'* (community consensus).¹⁷ For Syiah, justice lies in perpetuating a legitimate succession line.¹⁸ For the sunni, theoretically, the legitimacy of a ruler is limited by the need for *shura'* (consultation or consultation).¹⁹ Nevertheless, the moderate Sunni scholars continue to acknowledge the side of Syiah teachings especially regarding the figure and role of exemplary clerical leadership. They acknowledge that Iran is very fortunate to have a leadership figure such as Ayatollah Khomeini, who inherited the value of high spirituality, especially in opposing injustice, tyranny and injustice.²⁰

It can be simply stated that, today there are two main groups among Muslims, Sunnis and Syiah who have historically experienced significant developments in the Islamic world map. Yet with regard to such history, it appears that Sunni's population is more dominantly than Syiah in balance. It is comprehended that since the death of

¹⁶Sahilun A. Nasir, *Pemikiran Kalam (Teologi Islam) Sejarah, Ajaran, dan Perkembangan* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2010), p. 197-198.

¹⁷Abubakar Aceh, *Syi'ah Rationalisme dalam Islam* (Solo: Ramadlani, 1984), p. 13.

¹⁸Taib Thahir, *Ilmu Kalam* (Jakarta: Widjaya, 1986), p. 95.

¹⁹Harun Nasution, *Teologi Islam Aliran-Aliran Sejarah Analisa Perbandingan* (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 1986), p. 8.

²⁰John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Encyclopedia of The Modern Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press 1995), p. 54.

the Holy Prophet, it turns out that Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali, occupying the position of the Caliph who legitimately understood Sunni has become a religious doctrine. Similarly, to the later caliphs of the Umayyads, the Abbasids, to the development of the three great empires in history, Sunnis remained dominant. Its development is very rapid in Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Sudan, and the dominance is going on until now.

Previous Researches on Ahlul Bayt

Researches on the history of Syiah in Indonesia and especially in Aceh has been done by Hilmy Bakar Almascaty (2013) and Fakhriati (2014) and Rabbani (2013) also Duhri (2016). Previously, a similar study also concerns the history that comes first in reference to the history of Syiah and its spaces investigated by Thabathaba'i and Husayn (1989), Azmi (1989), Abdul Hadi (2002), and T. Iskandar (2011). Kajian Almascaty lebih melihat peradaban Persia dan pengaruhnya ke adat-istiadat di Aceh.²¹ ²² Similarly, Wan Hussein Azmi concluded that in the 10th century AD migration of the most Persians to the archipelago Leran, Gresik, Siak (Siak Inderapura, Riau), and to Pasai from Jawani at the time of Jawani al-Qurdi , (913 AD) that later developed the Jawi alphabets.²³

²¹John L. Esposito, *The Oxford...*, p. 55.

²²Hilmy Bakar Almascaty, "Relasi Persia dan Nusantara Pada Awal Islamisasi: Sebuah Kajian Awal Pengaruh Persia dalam Politik Aceh," *Media Syari'ah* 15(1), January-June, 2013.

²³Wan Hussen Azmi, "Islam di Aceh: Masuk dan Berkembangnya pada Abad ke 16," in Ali Hasjmy, *Sejarah Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Indonesia* (Bandung: al-Ma'arif, 1989), p. 175.

Meanwhile, Fakhriati is much more in the research on *Hikayat Hasan dan Husain* and *Hikayat Nur Muhammad* which is very colossal in Aceh history references which shows the strong influence of Syiah in Aceh since the first century of Hijriyah.²⁴ It is interesting to see many customs of Aceh which are actually Syiah customs that are socially politically institutionalized into the life of the Acehnese people. So far the studies on Aceh's customs have been limited to the esoteric side of it, yet see how the cultural roots are historic in the life of the people of Aceh comprehensively. Fakhriati's findings are reinforced by T. Iskandar that in the Acehnese society the Persian (Syiah) influence is quite thick in celebration of 10 Muharram (*asyura* porridge or *kanji asyura*). The month of Muharram is known by the people of Aceh as *bulen apui* (fire month) or *bulen asan usen*. Meanwhile, according to Abdul Hadi in the other literary fields of both saga above, also known *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafyah*, *Hikayat Amir Hamzah*, *Hikayat Iskandar Zulkarnain*, *Syair Burung Pingai* (by Hamzah Fanzuri) Strongly influenced by the work *Mantiq al-Thair* (The work of Farir al-Din al-Attar, the Persian poet, d. 1230 AD).²⁵ As Bukhari al-Jauhari through his book *Taj al-Salatin* is an adaptation of a work in Persian. It also shows that the Syiah influence is quite strong in the literature.²⁶

²⁴Fakhriati. "Pengaruh Syiah Dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Aceh: Refleksi atas Naskah Hikayat Hasan Husain dan Nur Muhammad," *Jurnal Analisis* 11(2), 2014, p. 421-446.

²⁵Abdul Hadi, "Sastra Islam di Tanah Melayu," in Taufik Abdullah (ed.), *Ensiklopedi Tematis Islam: Pemikiran dan Peradaban* (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 2002).

²⁶Kun Zahrn Istanti, "Pengaruh Persia dalam Sastra Melayu Klasik," *Humaniora*, No. 6, October-November, 1997.

Rabbani's cultural studies also show how great the influence of Syiah in the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia.²⁷ ²⁸ The Thabathaba'i and Husayn studies also show that Syiah is a historic reality in Islam in Indonesia and Aceh in particular.

The study of Muslim internal conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites has been done by Shihab (2007) and answers the most basic theological question of the possibility of peaceful co-existence on one earth and in particular the Indonesian state. Quraish Shihab discusses the concept of Syiah teachings and ideas fundamentally related to the real-political conditions in Indonesia.²⁹ Despite the many occurrences of syncretization between Sunni and Shiite schools in Indonesia,³⁰ But the Syiah development has been phenomenal since 1979.³¹

Muslih (1994) explains that Shiism may be accepted as part of mainstream Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia and Southeast Asia in general. However, in its later development it shows that the Syiah are still regarded as distinctively separate religious schools separate from the mainstream of Islam in Southeast Asia. The Syiah transmission in Indonesia shows how hard the clash of discourses is in the intellectual

²⁷ Mohammad Ali Rabbani. "Mediasi India Dalam Perpindahan dan Penyebaran Kultur dan Peradaban Persia: Islamisasi di Asia Tenggara," *Media Syari'ah* 15(1), January-June, 2013.

²⁸ See, Muhammad Husayn Thabathaba'i, *Islam Syiah: Asal-Usul dan Perkembangannya* (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1989).

²⁹ See, M. Quraish Shihab, *Sunnah-Syiah Bergandengan Tangan, Mungkinkah?: Kajian atas Konsep Ajaran dan Pemikiran*, (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2007).

³⁰ Sirajuddin, D. A. R. dan Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima. "Yang disini, Syiah Gado-Gado, Pak," *Panji Masyarakat*, Vol. 513, 1986, p. 20.

³¹Fuad Mohd Fachruddin, *Syiah: Suatu Pengamatan Kritis* (Jakarta: CV Pedoman Ilmu Jaya, 1990).

and social levels of this religious movement. From a series of studies that have been done by various scholars, there is very little research on the Syiah realm especially concerning the discourse of millenarianism.³² The Mahdiism movement, or the Messianic movement, of the Syiah is still very little studied in the research literature in Indonesia. This research will try to explore the millenarian aspects of the Syiah movement in Aceh. While Duhri review about Sirajuddin Abbas book as guidance of *dayah* (traditional islamic *pesantren* in Aceh). He critically analyzed the book *I'tiqad Ahlussunnah Wal-Jamaah* which has a very high position among traditional Islamic movements in Aceh. In fact, this book is a general guide in seeking justification for anarchist acts that occur between modernist and traditional Islamic groups.³³

The Influence of Ahlul Bayt in Achenese Religious Traditions

History records as affirmed by Abubakar Aceh that the first Islamic empire in Southeast Asia is in Pereulak (East Aceh now), the first sultanate was a Syiah adherent of Sultan Alaidin Sayyid Maulana Abdul Aziz Syah (1161-1186 AD) geneology continued to Prophet Muhammad SAW , namely Sayyid Abdul Aziz bin Ali bin Mukhtabar al-baqir bin Ali Muhammad Zainal Abidin bin Husayn al-shahid bin Fati-mah of the Prophet Muhammad *Shalallau alahi wasallam*.³⁴

³²Fathoni Muslih, *Faham Mahdi Syi'ah dan Ahmadiyah dalam Perspektif* (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 1994), p. 59-69.

³³Saifuddin Duhri, "The Text of Conservatism: The Role of Abbas' Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama 'ah in Underpinning Acehnese Current Religious Violence," *Studia Islamika* 23(1), 2016, p. 29-54.

³⁴Abubakar Aceh, *Aliran Syiah...*, p. 33, and Abubakar Aceh, *Syi'ah*

Then to the kingdom of Samudra Pasai reported by Ibn Battuta during a visit to the area in meet with two great scholars from Persia namely al-Qadhi Amir Sayyid al-Syirazi and Faqih Tajuddin al-Isfahani (Saby, 1995: 51). There is also the tomb of Na'ina Hisamuddin bin Na'ina Amin (1225 AD) around the relic written sya'ir poet Persia Sa'di (1292 AD).

The arrival of Islam to Aceh, known leader named Shir, such as Shir Poli, Shir Nuwi or Shir Duli. In the old Aceh saga, the title of Shir is often called Shah. For example, Shir Nuwi read Shah Nuwi, Shir Poli read Syahir Poli and so on. This Syahir word is more or less equivalent to the word Ampon Tuwanku in Malay tradition in Malaysia. The etymology of the word *shir*, originated from a noble family in the Persian region, and beyond. So the daughter of the Persian King who after his land was captured by Umar Ibnul-Khatib, was taken captive and brought to Medina, originally named Shir Banu. After being released by Ali bin Abi Thaleb, Shir Banu married Ali's son Husen. While two other Shir Banu sisters became Abubakar's son-in-law and son-in-law Umar Ibnul Khattab. Later the name of the son-in-law of Ali turned into Shahna Banu, and in the recitation of Hikayat Hasan Husen, the name was called Shari Banon, who became the wife of Sayyidina Husen bin Ali. Husen martyred killed by Yazid bin Muawiyah in Karbala on 10 Muharram. Shir Banu or Syari Banon widow while raising his son Ali Zainal Abidin, who is often called Imam as-Sajad, for always like to prostrate (to pray, *shalat*).³⁵

Rationalisme..., p. 24. See also, Ali Hasjmy, *Sejarah Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: al-Ma'arif, 1993), p. 155-157.

³⁵Hasballah M. Saad, "Syiah Aceh," *Serambi Indonesia*, February 22,

Shari Banon in *Hikayat Hasan Husen* described many times because she was accompanying her husband with great loyalty, down to the last tent at Karbala, escorting Husen to martyrdom. Banon with his beloved son Ali Zainal Abidin, who is still very young, witnessed the tragedy that became the black history of Muslims, because the blood of the Apostle's incarnation spilled on the earth of Kufa by the hand of the man who was in the name of himself the Caliph of the Muslims. This Karbala event, in Aceh commemorated with *khanduri Asyura* from generation to generation. Sometimes it is accompanied by reading the Hasan Husen saga, and the Acehnese women prepare snacks as *khanduri keupangulee* (festive for a great day). Often also, the listeners of this saga shed tears when the story to the massacre of the Prophet's son's grandson.³⁶

Similarly, within the *Hikayat Muhammad Nafiah*, (Muham-mad Hanafiah, in Arabic) Which narrates the role of the younger brother of Hasen bin Ali from another mother, who demanded defending over the martyrs of Husen in Karbala, is clearly illustrated how Yazid's followers were "disbelieved" by the chronicler. When Muhammad Nafiah wanted to execute another pregnant woman who was still alive, while the others had been killed, the sound of the sky fell.

*Sep ka wahe Muhammad Naftah, bek le tapoh kaphe ulul Bah
tinggai keu btjeh, agar uroe dudoe mangat na asoe neuraka*

[Enough is Muhammad Nafiah, do not be killed again the
pregnant infidel/ for him reproduce again for the contents
of them later].

2009.

³⁶Hasballah M. Saad, "Syiah Aceh"...

Because Muhammad Nafiah wanted to ignore the order to stop the massacre, then suddenly he and his horse were caught by supernatural powers. Then he was caged with his horse in a rock cave.

Muhammad Nafiah lam guha bate/ Sinan meu teentee dua ngen guda

[Muhammad Nafiah in stone cave/Hived there altogether with his horse].³⁷

In another part, it is narrated that one day, when Muhammad Nafiah was a child, Ali bin Abi Thaleb took home to his son Madinah and sat seated chatting with the Rasulullah and his two other brothers, Hasan and Husen. Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) seated Hasan and Husen in the lap on the left, while Muhammad Nafiah sat on the right thigh of the Messenger of Allah. When Fatimah, her mother Hasan and Husen crossed her face, seeing that Ali's son who was not from the womb of Fatimah had a place to the right of the Messenger of Allah, while his son Hasan and Husen sat on the Prophet's left thigh.

Islamic traditions or rituals that developed in the archipelago are undeniably the result of the adoption and adaptation of the civilizations of various nations that had been in contact for centuries. The aforementioned facts so that Abubakar Atjeh and T. Iskandar acknowledge that the strong influence of Syiah in Acehnese tradition still appears in religious traditions. The celebration of Ashura (10 Muharram) Syiah style that marks the death of Sayyidina Husein the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. In Karbala is still celebrated. In Persia and South India, an important

³⁷Hasballah M. Saad, "Syiah Aceh"...

day in Islamic history is celebrated splendidly. In Aceh this festive daya is known as *Acura* or *Asan-Usen* (Hasan dan Husein) and the month of Muharram called as *Bulen Asan-Usen*, Believed as *bulen apui* (the month of fire). Prohibitions arise in society, such as not marrying, building houses and so on. At 10th of Muharram, Acehnese people celebrate by making *Kanji Acura* which consists of rice, coconut milk, sugar, and pieces that are small pieces like pomegranates are then eaten together.³⁸

Similarly, the names of sultans used in Aceh, many wear titles "syah" in Persian means ruler, "syah alam" means the ruler of universe. The name can be found in the names of Ali Mughayatsyah, Riayatsyah, and Keumalatsyah. Similarly, Jalaluddin Rakhmat said that the Syiah (Persian) tradition is very influential in the Sunni majority of Indonesia. This religious tradition has become an integral part of religious social life with no falsehood. According to Jalaluddin Rakhmat this religious tradition is mostly done by the community of Nahdlatul Ulama which is famous to hold the tradition. Even Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) often says NU people are Syiah in culture. For example, every Friday night the *Nahdliyyin* (the traditional NU) recite *salawat diba'* which constitute Imam of 12 in Syiah Imamiyah sect.³⁹ In addition, the Syiah influence can also be witnessed on the headstone of Sultan Malikussaleh (w 1297 AD). This gravestone tombstone features a crown shape with leaf and flower motifs arranged at its apex so as to form the crown of

³⁸Teuku Iskandar, "Aceh sebagai Wadah Literatur Melayu Islam," in R. Michael Feener, et.al, (eds.), *Memetakan Masa Lalu Aceh* (Jakarta: KITL, Jakarta, 2011), p. 39.

³⁹Jalaluddin Rakhmat, *Catatan Kang Jalal: Visi Media, Pendidikan dan Politik* (Bandung: Rosda Karya, 1997), p. 434.

the roof top. This sculpture style on the tombstone resembles Persian rugs.⁴⁰ Then the most interesting according to Ibrahim Alfian is on his headstone written words of wisdom that comes from Ali bin Abi Talib kw. Which was copied back by Moqueete on support by Ronkel as follow:

Sesungguhnya dunia ini
Dunia ini tiadalah kekal
Sesungguhnya dunia ini ibarat sarang
Yang ditenun oleh laba-laba
Memadailah buat engkau dunia ini
Hai orang yang mencari makan
Dan umur hanyalah singkat sahaja
Semuanya akan menuju kematian.⁴¹

[Surely this world
This world is not eternal
Surely this world is like a den
Woven by the spider
Be the world for you
O people who are looking for food
And age is just short
All will go to death.]

Wisdom words contained on the headstone can then be found in *Kitab Diwan al-Iman Ali* Published by Beirut, Lebanon. 150 years later the same words were found on the headstone of Sultan Mansur Shah bin Muzaffar Shah in Malacca (1477 AD) and Sultan Abdul Jamil in Pahang (d.1511 AD).⁴²

⁴⁰Kautsar Azhari Noer, "Arsitektur," in Taufik Abdullah (ed.), *Ensiklopedi Tematis Islam* (Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 2002), p. 337.

⁴¹Teuku Ibrahim Alfian, *Wajah Aceh dalam Lintasan Sejarah* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Universitas Press, 2005), p. 19.

⁴²Teuku Ibrahim Alfian, *Wajah Aceh...*, p. 60.

The many number of Persian scholars who broadcast Islam in Aceh, especially in Pasai and Peureulak in the 12th century according to Slamet Muljana was due to the support of the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt, a Syiah dynasty.⁴³ Therefore, it is almost certain that two Persian clerics, al-Shirazi and al-Isfahani were then heads of women, Naina in Pasai was part of the migrating Javanese community. As Fatima's grave in Leran, East Java is also part of the Lor family of Persia.

The spirit of loving ahlul bait, the family of the Prophet of Allah appeared in Aceh in the form of dance dance. Among the famous is the Saman Dance of Aceh. Variety of motion, song lyrics and *ratoh* filled with symbols of Karbala. "*Tumbok Tumbok Droe*" (hitting his own chest) Performed by the Saman Aceh players (also in seudati) as a symbol of Karbala's regrets. All of Saman's dance movements were inspired by sorrow, regret, and lamentation over the martyrs of Sayyidina Husen, who was trapped by the deceitfulness of the Kufa population who supported Yazid bin Mu'awiyah.⁴⁴ In addition there is a tradition in South Aceh called *dabuih* (in Jamee language, South Aceh) *daboih* (in Acehnese) Which is linked to the tragedy of Karbala mourning the death of Imam Husen, which is the influence of the Syiah tradition that comes from Persia.⁴⁵

In addition, according to research conducted by Taqiuddin Muhammad on the cultural traces of the gravestone sites in Samudra pasai, it can be concluded that

⁴³Slamet Muljana, *Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara Islam di Nusantara*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2009), p. 155.

⁴⁴ Hasballah M. Saad, "Syiah Aceh"...

⁴⁵ Yusny Saby, "Jejak Parsi di Nusantara: Interplay Antara Agama dan Budaya," *Media Syariah* 15(1), January-June, 2013, p. 21-30.

the Syiah influence is strong enough that there has been a Shiite community or at least a cleric originating from Persia in the 13th century CE. The tombstone site is; (1) Ibnu Khaddijah (w. 696 H/1297 M) located in Kecamatan Ulim, Samudra Aceh Utara; *khaddijah* in Persian means *Syaikh* or teacher (2) The tombstone of Nur Khatun Umar (w. 805 H/1403 M), seorang perempuan makamnya berada di Kuta Krueng, Samudra Aceh Utara, khatun means lady or mistress; (3) The tombstone of Na'ina Husamuddin bin Na'ina Amin (w. 823 H/1420 M) located in Gampong Pie, Samudra, Aceh Utara. The word of *Na'ina* also from Persian; (4) The tombstone of Ash-Sadrul Ajal Khawwajah Muhammad bin Sulaiman (w. 845 H/1442 M), *Ash-Sadrul Ajal* in Persian language also means an influential figure; (5) The tombstone of Khawwajah Tajuddin bin Ibrahim (w. 857 H/1453 M), the word Khawwajah usually used in tarikat Naqsyabandiyah means teacher; (6) The tombstone of Mir Hasan (w. 910 H/1505 M), *mir* in Persian means prince (amir), those three tombstones found in Kuta Krueng, Samudra, Aceh Utara.⁴⁶

Moreover, in the practice of the Aceh community some of the most frequently used prayers and spells judged by Fakhriati are influenced by Syiahs. The prayer is;

Ya Allah, neubri beu jeu oh dari rimueng nyo, nebri beu hebat tenaga lon lagee Ali.

[O God keep me away from this tiger, give me great power like Ali].⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Taqiyuddin Muhammad, "Jejak Kebudayaan Persia di Kawasan Tinggalan Sejarah Samudera Pasai," *Media Syariah* 15(1), January-June, 2013, p. 37-39.

⁴⁷ Fakhriati, *Pengaruh Syiah...*, p. 443.

The Syiah influence in the Scientific Tradition

The Islamization Process in the archipelago, the Shiites (or at least Persians) make a great contribution to the tradition of scholarship and intellectualism. The strength of Syiah influence in the context of science and scientific tradition can be seen in the world of tarekat and tasawwuf. This is possible because there is a transfer of knowledge between scholars of the archipelago who studied to the scholars of Persia, as a logical consequence of the process of migration and the spread of Islam to the archipelago. Therefore, the cleric of Persia became the bridge in understanding Islam, so it is not surprising that the ulama of Persia are well known throughout the archipelago, for example: al-Hallaj (w. 922 M), al-Attar (w. 1229), Sa'di (w. 1291 M) Umar Khayyam (w.1132 M), who were almost certain that they were of Syiah adherents.

Hamzah Fansuri as affirmed by Al-Attas and Abdul Hadi is influenced by not a few of the Persian scholars among them: al-Attar, Sa'di, al-Hallaj and Suhrawardi. These works can be seen from *Syair Burung Pingai*. It can be seen inspired from al-Attar, derived from the Simurgh bird in Persian or Funiks (phoenix) which is considered sacred, he calls it pingai birds. The doctrine of *wujudiyah* influenced by al-Hallaj beside Ibn Arabi, as Sheikh Siti Jenar was also influenced by the two figures. Bukhari al-Jauhari in *Taj al-Salatin* and Nuruddin al-Raniry in *Bustan* clearly inspired by al-Ghazali's work, *Nasihah al-Muluk*. In his work while al-Gazali also refers to many pre-Islamic Persian traditions. The book of *Syah Namah* (in Persian, means story of kings) by Abdul Qasim Manshur (al-Firdausi) (w. 936 M). The influence of the *Taj al-Salatin* Even to Java, Yasadipura I a

poet from Surakarta in the 18th century translated into the Java language with the title *Serat Tajussalatin*. This process of translation means that it has happened twice, first when al-Bukhari translates it from Persian into Malay, then Yasadipura translates it into Javanese. So it is clear that these books clearly contribute and influence Persia in the field of politics and government in some Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago.⁴⁸

In line with that, Istanti a Cultural expert from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta admitted that the influence of Syiah (at least Persians) on classical Malay literary works is quite thick. Syiah literary works for example, *Hikayat Iskandar Zulkarnaian*, *Hikayat Amir Hamzah* and *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafyah*. The saga is quite popular among the people of Aceh, Java, Sundanese, Madura and Sasak.⁴⁹ The face of Politics and Government: literary works containing regulations in government such as; *Taj al-salatin* by Bukhari al-Jauhari and *Bustan al-Salatin* karya Nuruddin al-Raniry (w. 1658 M). Van Ronkel made sure that al-Jauhari translated it from Persian in 1630, or at least used Persian sources among others, *Syi'ar al-Muluk* by Nizam al-Mulk (1508 M), *Tuhfa al-wuzara dan Kitab Asrar* by Fariruddin Attar (w.1230 M), *Tanbih al-Ghafilin* by Siraj al-Din Ali Khan (w. 1489 M).⁵⁰ Sufi-style romances; This literary work is often found in essay by famous scholars such as; Hamzah Fansuri (w. 1600

⁴⁸ Syed Naquib al-Attas, *The Mysticism of Hamzah Fansuri*, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1970), p. 14. See also, Abdul Hadi WM, *Tasawuf Tertindas: Kajian Heurmeneutik Terhadap Karya- Karya Hamzah Fansuri* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001), p. 422.

⁴⁹Kun Zahrun Istanti, "Pengaruh Persia dalam Sastra Melayu Klasik," *Humaniora*, No. VI, October-November, 1997.

⁵⁰Teuku Iskandar, *Aceh Sebagai Wadah...*, p. 52.

M) His work in the form of poetry i.e, *Syair Perahu*, *Syair Burung Pingai* and *Syair Dagang*. In the form of prose i.e.; *Syarab al-Asyikin*, *Asrar al-Arifin* and *Muntahi*. The works of Hamzah are heavily influenced by the Persian tradition, syair Burung Pingai inspired by *Mantiq al-Tayr (musyawarah burung)*, by al-Attar, a poet from Persia. He also introduced the term *sya'ir* in Malay ot called *pantun* Is a four-line poem that ends a-a-a-a. The lyrics of this model then developed and famous to date throughout the archipelago. Syamsuddin al- Sumatrani (w. 1630 M) on *Mir'atul Mukmin* and *Mir'atul Muhaqqiqin* as well as *Syair Makrifat Tujuh*. Nuruddin al-Raniry (w. 1638 M): *Shirat al-Mustaqim*, *Asrar ft Ma'rifah al-Ruh* and *Syifa al-Qulub*.⁵¹

Therefore, it is not surprising that hundreds of manuscripts of the Museum of Aceh and those in the community collect many manuscripts allegedly influenced by the Syiah school of thought; *Hikayat Hasan Husain* can be found in four manuscripts all from Pidie; *Hikayat Ureo Asyura*, only one manuscript was also found in Pidie; *Hikayat Perang Khaibar*, (depicted the greatness of Imam Ali against the enemies of Islam) there are two manuscripts from Aceh Besar. *Hikayat Nun Farisi*, there are three manuscripts, from the title can certainly come from Persia; *Hikayat Muhammad Nafiah* only one manuscript, and *Hikayat Amir Hamzah*, also a manuscript from Lamno, Aceh Jaya, and *Hikayat Nur Muhammad*.⁵

The manuscripts above are mainly, *Nur Muhammad* and *Hikayat Hasan Husain* Clearly showing his inclination to exaltation to the main figures proud and impassioned by the Syiahs. In the text of Nur Muhammad there is a description

⁵¹Abdul Hadi, *Sastra Islam...*, p. 376.

of creation through Nur Muhammad beginning with a description of 'Ali, Hasan, and Husain.⁵² The site of Ali's creation is the most important part of a bird named the Nuri, the head of the parrot, indicating that 'Ali was created in the most glorious place of the parrot, the *burung nuri*.⁵³

Rejection Against Syiah Groups

The aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami rendered Aceh as being more than 30 years imprisoned by the social-political conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the government of the Republic of Indonesia which subsequently ended peacefully by the so-called MoU in Helsinki 2005. When the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation in Aceh invites almost all nations and countries in any part of the world to contribute to assist Aceh. In addition to the international community, there are also many national and international NGOs that enter and assist Aceh. Humanitarian missions in the form of aid coming from different countries, NGOs and interfaith, cultures and languages. At the time after the tsunami quite a lot of countries came to help Aceh, whether Muslim from Middle East, or Christian, or other religions such as China and Japan. Similarly, those who have the same belief and flow as well as there are different streams like the Syiah group. The problem is that some are married to Aceh women, some are with outsiders from Java who come from Java.⁵⁴ Similarly, an Acehnese woman married a man from North Sumatra who admitted

⁵²Team of authors, *Daftar Naskah Museum Aceh*, 2009.

⁵³Fakhriati, *Pengaruh Syiah...*, p. 437.

⁵⁴Interview with Iskandar Puteh [pseudoname], in Banda Aceh, April 19, 2017.

she often took Syiah studies in North Sumatra and Aceh.⁵⁵

The presence of the Syiah community in Aceh is also explained by Kamaruzzaman Bustaman Ahmad in 2013 doing research in several areas such as North Aceh, Pidie Jaya, Bireuen there are communities conducting activities such as Shiite celebrations (ritual).⁵⁶ Although Bustaman affirmed that the presence of the community is quite difficult to be confirmed and verified considering this issue is a matter of faith or *aqidah*. Especially in the teachings of the Syiah know the existence of *taqiyah* or concealment of faith to save themselves.

Whereas the people of Aceh as adherents of Ahlus-sunnah wal Jamaah strongly rejected the presence of ahlul bayt community. The form of rejection can be seen in three things, namely; *firstly*, The fatwa of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (MPU) which asserts that the Syiah is a heretic. According to the results musyawarah decision MPU and the Provincial Government, 14 flow was considered heretical and forbidden to recruit followers. They also have to stop all activities that smell misleading. There were 14 cults banned: Millata Abrahan (origin Bireuen), Darul Arqam (Banda Aceh), the Doctrine of Faith Abidin (Sabang), Aliran Syiah (Aceh), Teachings Muhammad Ilyas bin Yusuf (Aceh), tarikat Haji Ibrahim Bonjol (Central Aceh), Jama'at Qu'ran Hadist (Aceh Utara), Qadian Ahmadiyah Teachings (Aceh). Then, pengajians Abdul Majid Abdullah (East Aceh), the Doctrine of the Faith Lubis (SUAK Lamata,

⁵⁵Interview with Hasan Lubis [pseudoname], in Banda Aceh, July, 2016.

⁵⁶Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad, "Sejarah Syiah di Aceh," in Dicky Sofyan, *Sejarah dan Budaya Syiah di Asia Tenggara* (Yogyakarta: Sekolah Pascasarjana UGM, 2013), p. 199.

District Teupah Selatan, Simeulue), tarikat Mufarridiyah (Aceh), the Doctrine Ahmad Arifin (Southeast Aceh), Doctrine Makrifatullah (Banda Aceh), and pengajians Al - Qur'an and Hadist (Simpang Ulim and Madat District, East Aceh). In addition, there are four other cults that alleged heresy or perverted from Islam. Namely, spreader or its adherents Salik Buta (in the District of Hand-Hand and Kuala Batee, Aceh Barat Daya), Doctrine Sukardi (Gampong Teungoh, District Lhoknga, Aceh Besar), believers Mubalik (Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar) and alleged heresy and blasphemy of Aqidah (District of Simeulue Timur, Kabupaten Simeuleu). It is based on a fatwa MPU No. 4 of 2007 on guidelines for the identification of a cult which contains 13 kinds of one is to believe or follow the aqidah which does not correspond to *Ahlus-Sunnah I'tiqad wal jama'ah*.⁵⁷

Secondly, qanun (local legislation) which states that the aqidah adopted by the people of Aceh is *ahlussunah wal jamaah*. Qanun Islamic Shariah Principles number 8 year 2014 explained that aqidah adopted in Aceh is aqidah of *ahlussunah wal jamaah*. Based on Al-Quran and As-Sunnah which became religious beliefs embraced by a person and became the basis of all forms of activities, attitudes, views, and grip one's life. Furthermore, in Article (11); (1) Every Moslem person in Aceh shall be obliged to be Islamic in accordance with Al-Quran and As-Sunnah in soul and behavior; (2) Aqidah Islamiyah as referred to in paragraph (1) is Aqidah Ahlussunah wal Jama'ah (Sunni); (3) Aceh Government and Regency/City Government together with

⁵⁷Fatwa of the Ulama Consultative Assembly No.4/2007, regarding to Guidelines for Identifying Deviant Flow.

the community is obliged to plant, build and strengthen *aqidah* to every Muslim since very early age; (4) The community obligation as referred to in paragraph (3) shall be in every parent / guardian of the family member.⁵⁸

Thirdly, Rejection in the form of parades and demonstrations which became known as "Parade Aswaja". In a parade of Ahlusunnah wal Jama'ah people carry posters and banners that read; "Reject Syiah in Aceh", "Wahabi, Salafi Go from Earth Aceh". In addition, the people in this parade demanded to stop all Syiah, Wahabi, Salafi and Communist activities against the Syafii school and the *aqidah Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah*. The action was led by PWNU Aceh, the Dayak Ulama Association (HUDA), the Ulama Council of Nangroe Aceh (MUNA), Rabithah Thaliban Aceh (RTA), Inshafuddin, FPI Aceh.⁵⁹ Parade convoys gathered at the tomb of Abdurrauf al-Singkil left for the Aceh Governor's office.

Conclusions

From the discourse mentioned above it can be explained that although the Islamic Kingdom of Pereulak and the Kingdom of Samudera Pasai is affected by the Ahlul Bayt school but not the majority and can be broken completely the period of Aceh Darussalam Kingdom with its character Iskandar Muda. Iskandar Muda and the sultan subsequently perpetuated the Sunni school as the majority of the schools supported by the above mentioned scholars. Nevertheless, the school does not become dominant in society, which is the majority of Sunni schools to this day.

⁵⁸Qanun No. 8/2014 regarding to principles of Islamic law.

⁵⁹Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, *Memahami Potensi Radikalisme dan Teorisme di Aceh* (Banda Aceh: Bandar Publishing, 2016), p. 123.

Aceh people as well as the Sunni Nusantara community; In the fiqh of the Shafii school, in aqidah following Ash'ari and in tasawwuf influenced by al-Gazali. This can be seen from the Qanun Meukuta Alam Manuscript as a kind of compilation of Islamic law during Iskandar Muda until the end of Aceh Darussalam Kingdom even today.⁶⁰ Its influence is not only in Aceh, but almost throughout the archipelago to the peninsular Malaysia, South Thailand, Brunei Darussalam and South Philippines. Much later, when Aceh reopened after the 2004 tsunami, not only various nations came to Aceh but various Islamic institutions and groups including Syiah. However, this is broken by the fatwa of the MPU and Qanun Syariat Islam and "Parade Aswaja" as a form of rejection of Syiahs in Aceh.

Post tsunami 2004 map of contemporary religious movement in Aceh shows strong dynamics. One of the emerging religious movement groups is the Ahlul Bayt community, in addition to HTI and Salafi. The Ahlul Bayt group that has been present as the entry of Islam into Aceh is quite influential in society in the context of religious and scientific traditions. Nevertheless, the influence of the Sunni school is inevitable of its dominance so that the community then rejects it. This form of rejection can be seen in three ways; *Firstly*, through the fatwa of the MPU which asserts that the Syiah is a heresy; *Secondly*, the Qanun of Islamic Sharia Principles of 2014 which reinforces that the aqidah adopted by the people of Aceh is ahlussunnah wal jamaah as

⁶⁰Mohammad Kalam Daud and TA. Sakti, *Qanun Meukuta Alam: Syarah Tadhkirah Tabaqat Teungku di Malek dan Komentarnya* (Banda Aceh: Syiah Kuala University Press, 2010), p. 2. Also explained about the aqidah that followed was Asy'ariyah and Maturidiyah instead of Mu'tazila let alone Syiah.

opposed to the Aqidah of Ahlul Bayt; Third, the "parade of aswaja" of community demonstrations that reject the Syiah.

In contrast to other areas in Indonesia Syiah as a religious movement in Aceh Islam has not caused blood casualties let alone life. As happened in Sampang, Madura East Java or Ahmadiyah community in Banten. This is because Shiite existence and intensity are not as strong as in other areas even they tend to blend with society. Meanwhile, the powerful Aswaja school rooted in society can not be shaken by other streams coming and entering the Veranda of Mecca.

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MORO MUSLIMS IN SOUTHERN PHILLIPINES: THE RISE OF ABU SAYYAF AND GENEALOGY OF CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MORO Muslims in Southern Philippines seemed to be destined to continue conflict and warfare with the Manila elites throughout the ages: from the colonial era to the present.¹

Academics and researchers noted that the Muslim Moro struggle to get a place and a better bargaining position in the presence of a foreign colonial powers (Spain and the United States) had failed. Even, under the post-colonial Philippines administration, their struggle have never achieved optimal outcomes.

Since the time of Spanish colonialism, in which they had come into the Philippines on March 16, 1521, the Moro resistance against Western colonialism, seemed unflagging and never ends.

¹ This paper is part of our field research in the Southern Philippines in 2017-18. The Philippines is an archipelago with 7,107 islands, with a population of around 60 million, using 87 different language dialects that reflect the number of ethnic groups and communities. Muslims in the Philippines call themselves "Moro". But this name is actually political, because in reality Moro consists of many ethno linguistic groups, for example Maranow, Maquindanau, Tausuq, Somal, Yakan, Ira Nun, Jamampun, Badjao, Kalibugan, Kalagan and Sangil.

The Spanish colonialists' made efforts with their tactics and strategy seeks to glassware to defuse Moros Muslim after they unsuccessful beat them.

Spain was able to conquer and dominate the Moros in the southern Philippines through the war. They then applied the political divide and rule (divide and conquer), and although they failed to beat Mindanao and Sulu, Spain still considers both regions part of its territory.

Then, in later developments the Spanish illegally and immorally sell the Philippines to the United States for US \$ 20 million in 1898 through the Treaty of Paris.

Likewise with the US, which though at first arrival they present themselves as a good friend and trustworthy, but unfortunately in the end of the period 1898-1902, the US has used that time to liberate the land and forests in the southern Philippines for the expansion of the capitalists. Even in the period 1903-1913 the US spent to fight the Muslim Moro resistance groups.

In sum, the Moros continued to resist foreign occupation and conflict in the Philippines was going on. After Spain rule was over because they switch power to the United States, then Japan came into the Philippines as new colonialists. Following the fall of Japanese imperialist in Asia, Philippines proclaim itself as an independent country on July 4, 1946, but, more and more, the Moros had been marginalized and excluded.

The pre-independence period was marked by the transition of power from US occupation to the Philippine government in the North. To combine Southern Philippine economy into the capitalist system, Manila imposed the land inheritance law of the US colonialist that was highly

capitalistic. In essence, the provisions of the law of this land is legalizing the confiscation of the Muslim lands (customary land and customary) by the US government and the Philippine government in the North that provide many benefits for the capitalists.²

Ideology and Political Motivation

From a structural perspective, the root causes of terrorism in the Philippines can only be fully understood in the context of the Bangsamoro problem. Soliman M. Santos gave an explanation of the Bangsamoro problem in which the Abu Sayyaf group found the root of its identity there, namely: the problem of historical and systematic marginalization, the ideological struggle of Muslim ethno-linguistic groups, collectively referred to as Moro, in their own homeland in the Mindanao islands.³

This systematic marginalization was first carried out by Spanish colonial powers in the 16th and 19th centuries, then

² Regarding further referrals for this paper see, James R. Arnold, *The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011). See also, Aijaz Ahmad, "Class and Colony in Mindanao," *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, No. 82, p.4-11; Miriam Coronel Ferrer, (ed.), *The SPCPD (Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development): A Response to the Controversy* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1997); T.M.Burley, *The Philippines: An Economic and Social Geography* (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 1973); Michael A. Costello, "The demography of Mindanao," in Mark Turner, R.J. May, and Lulu Respass Turner, (eds.), *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992).

³ Garrett Atkinson, "Abu Sayyaf: The Father of the Swordsman A review of the rise of Islamic insurgency in the southern Philippines," *American Security Project*, p. 4, retrieved from <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Abu-Sayyaf-The-Father-of-the-Swordsman.pdf>

by the United States during the first half of the 20th century, and then continued by the Philippine government which was dominated by elites oriented to Western-Christian life since holding power in Philippine independence in 1946. This independence marked the complete Filipino nationality and state but ironically also caused the loss of Moro independence and nationality because the Moro homeland was also incorporated into the Philippine territory. ⁴

The Moro Muslims are very aware that the factors of history, religion, economy, conditions socio-politics that contributed to the rejection of Muslim groups against state authority and power in the Philippines. For centuries, Moro national identity has been appointed as a unifying Muslim resistance to Christian power, and demands the existence of an autonomous Islamic state. This is one of the effects of colonial power attempts to categorize several Muslim ethnolinguistic groups in the Southern Philippines into one “Bangsamoro” identity.

When we try to try to understand the beliefs held firmly and the motivation of the Abu Sayyaf group, it is very important to understand the deep feeling of the struggle for injustice which later embodies the Moro identity.

The motivation of Abdurajak Janjalani behind the formation of the Abu Sayyaf group can be seen as an active effort to seek justice, for all Moro Muslim minorities in the southern Philippines. According to Janjalani, Jihad Fi-Sabilillah, which translates to jihadm, is the noblest form in the struggle in the way of Allah.

⁴ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah: Essays On the Abu Sayyaf Group* (Quezon City: PIPVTR, 2012), p. 22.

The main objective of the Abu Sayyaf group is to form an independent country who use Islamic sharia laws as the basis of moral authority from the laws of the country, and then the sharia law is implemented and obeyed by citizens who live in the country.

The Moro Muslim have collective memory that in the post-independence, Muslim communities are always under pressure the Phillipines ruler. In the reign of Marcos regime (1965–1986), the initial conflict occurred as a result of a killing in Corregidor. At that time, Philippine Muslim volunteers, who are trained in the tactics gerilya by an official army, was killed on the orders of the commander of the troops. This murder happened because Muslims refuse sent to Sabah to conduct military infiltration.

Moro Muslim disappointment against internal colonialism and oppression in the country, led to the birth Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MNLF) to revolt against the Manila government.

The MNLF is a very influential movement in the Muslim Moro fighting for freedom. The other two groups are like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the most recent is the Abu Sayyaf, was formed in 1989. The three movement groups have a common purpose which wants to establish an Islamic theocratic state in Mindanao, the southern Philippines and to undertake economic development by their alone in this southern region.

After the fall of Marcos from power in the Philippines in 1986 and the rise of Corazon Aquino as President, the Philippine Government's policy towards the Muslim Moro began to shift. Corazon Aquino promises to provide opportunities for their autonomy as long as there is no attempt to

secede from the Republic of the Philippines.

Then they held negotiations and discussion of the terms of autonomy for the Muslim Moro stipulated in the new constitution and ratified in early 1987. But Corazon Aquino Government efforts to encourage factions within the Muslim community Moro have greatest failure, and then Aquino could only invite Nur Misuari, the leader of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Because the MNLF could be embraced and encouraged by the Government of the Philippines to the talks in Tripoli, Libya in December 1977 which resulted in the Tripoli Agreement, since that time the Islamic countries sympathy and international support, to Moro Muslim community especially from the Islamic world to the MNLF gradually began to fade.

Although initially the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in July 1975 gave formal recognition to the MNLF, but the OIC in its development later is also visible at low tide. Even Libya as the host for the talks eventually run out of enthusiasm. And indeed in the end, the Philippine Government, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman in March 1980, issued a statement that the Tripoli Agreement as " null and void " .

The stalemate Tripoli Agreement then have a very broad impact. In March 1984, Salamat Hashim who is a former member of the Central Executive MNLF and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the MNLF founded the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), after seeing there was no longer any hope to follow the leadership of the leadership of Nur Misuari, or to reconcile with the faction of Nur Misuari .

Chronology of separation by Salamat Hashim's group is already started since December 1977, when the MNLF Central Committee took policy that demanded Nur Misuari resign from the chairmanship. Along with that, they asked Salamat Hashim replace it. The decision was supported by the Committee on Military and Civilian of the movement. They wrote a letter requesting that Nur Misuari resign.

Then they held negotiations and discussion of the terms of autonomy for the Muslim Moro stipulated in the new constitution and ratified in early 1987.

But Nur Misuari did not want to give up the leadership to Salamat Hashim. The events that led to this movement split into two, namely a group that supports Salamat Hashim, and the other group still loyal to Nur Misuari. At its peak, a group that supports Salamat Hashim in March 1984 formally established its own motion using Islam as an identity label for their struggle as well as a differentiator with a movement led by Nur Misuari.

From this time, there is deflation of MNLF force. For comparison, the MNLF until 2012 is estimated to have only about 15,000 personnel only, it is not counted with those who crossed or else give up and fall. Even worse, then Abu Sayyaf faction leader Abdul Razak Janjalani also distanced itself from the MNLF in 1993.

Though these factions were ideologically very close to the MILF, the convergence like this is possible to unify them. As is known MILF has now become the greatest military power, the strongest and most neatly within the Muslim community whose members Moro around 60,000 personnel spread across the Muslim province. Even reported that their militia force reached 120,000 people, they themselves claim

to be able to fight for more than 4000 years and has its own weapons factories among others capable of producing mortars of 60 mm, 81 mm, 45 caliber pistol RPG 2 and 90 RR.

Furthermore, the policy of Philippines move on following the rising Gen. Fidel Ramos as president in 1992, in which Ramos provides an opportunity for Nur Misuari to build hope and improve its image that destroyed before.

Unlike his predecessor, President Ramos is an expert in military strategy and qualified in the field of mass psychology. He has a program to establish the Philippines as economic tigers among neighbors. To achieve this, certainly needed stability in the southern region. For that reason, President Ramos embrace Nur Misuari, which he considers very useful as an effective shield for dealing with conflicts in South Phillipines.

So the position of the MILF is like Hamas in Palestine who actually has the broad support of the communities themselves, but with the macro conditions subjectively already strongly in favor of the Islamic Jihad. In their development, even from the Islamic world itself, then the MNLF in the Philippine and the PLO in palestina better known internationally as a symbol of the struggle of each in the respective regions.

MILF himself seated Quran and Hadith as the main source of reference. Its ideological orientation and programs are run by guidance Islamic guidance, which aims to enforce Islamic society, or more pointedly to enforce the gradual implementation of the Islamic law.

In the face of the Philippine government's policy that there was never a sign to give independence to the Muslim Moro for sovereign and apply Islamic law, MILF exhume the

Islamic concepts that govern the struggle for the enforcement of Islamic law. From here they come to the conclusion that the only way is with what is called Jihad.

The decision to implement Jihad-in the sense of armed struggle against the government of the Philippines, as well as the extent of the consistency of their armed struggle against the law of war is promoted by Al Quran and Hadith are a major source of their references, although is still a question mark.

Emergence of Abu Sayyaf

Abu Sayyaf is Arabic for *Holder (Abu) Sword (Sayyaf)* and in the context of upheaval in the southern Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf group firstly appeared in 1989 under the leadership of Abdurajak Janjalani. And he had been taking education in University of Ummul Qura in Mecca for three years. He then returned to Basilan and Zamboanga Philippines to start the preaching in 1984.

Abu Sayyaf is a radical movement, where the movement is always using violence in every action. The Movement of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines have been very disturbing Filipinos with bombings, kidnappings and execution of the hostages. Abu Sayyaf movement has led to the level of terrorism.

The Abu Sayyaf, also known as Al Harakat Al Islamiyya, is a separatist group consisting of Islamic militants based around the southern islands of the Philippines, among others Jolo, Basilan and Mindanao.

After Abdurajak Janjalani was killed by the Manila military attacks, the Khadaffi Janjalani named as the leader of this group, as mentioned by the Armed Forces of the Phi-

ippines. Khadaffi Janjalani had to fight for power with other great figures such as Abu Sabaya and Galib Andang popularly known as Commander Robot.

Abu Sayyaf is one of the smallest and separatist groups likely to be most dangerous in Mindanao. Some of its members have studied or worked in Saudi Arabia and developing a relationship with the Mujahideen when it fought and trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Abu Sayyaf is a separatist group that wants to establish an Islamic state (*khilafah*) in the southern Philippines, which is mostly populated by ethnic Muslim Moro. Abu Sayyaf members believe they must continue the struggle of the Moro people's ancestral establish an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Abu Sayyaf is considered more radical than the MNLF because often commit acts of violence such as murder, armed attacks, bombings, beheadings and executions.

Ironically, the Abu Sayyaf group became known in the world in the mid 1990s when it failed to do the two big mission, which attacked 12 commercial aircraft belonging to the United States and assassinate Pope John Paul II. Abu Sayyaf is estimated to have 2,000 supporters

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The Abu Sayyaf group launched a radical movement, where the movement always uses violence in every action. The Abu Sayyaf Movement in the Philippines has deeply

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Khadaffi Janjalani was named as the leader of this group by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Abu Sayyaf is Arabic for the Holder (Abu) of the Sword (Sayyaf). Khadaffi Janjalani also had to fight for power with other big figures such as Abu Sabaya and Galib Andang who were famous by the name of the Robot Commander.

The Abu Sayyaf is one of the smallest and most dangerous separatist groups in Mindanao. Some of its members have studied or worked in Saudi Arabia and developed relations with the Mujahideen when fighting and training in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Abu Sayyaf is a separatist group that wants to establish an Islamic state in the south of the Philippines, which is largely inhabited by ethnic Moro Muslims. Abu Sayyaf members believe they must continue the Moro ancestral struggle to form an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Abu Sayyaf was considered more radical than the MNLF because it often committed acts of violence such as murder, armed attacks, bombings, and execution of beheading.

Ironically, the Abu Sayyaf group became known worldwide in the mid-1990s when it failed to carry out its two major missions, namely attacking 12 US-owned commercial aircraft and killing Pope John Paul II. It is estimated that Abu Sayyaf has 2,000 supporters and around

200 to 500 main members come from academia.

It was reported that recently they were expanding their network to Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. The group is responsible for bombings, killings, kidnappings and extortion in an effort to establish a Muslim state in the west of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and create a conducive atmosphere for the creation of a Pan-Islami big country in the Malay Peninsula (Indonesia and Malaysia) in Southeast Asia.

In 1987 Abdurajak Janjalani visited Libya and then continued with Mujahiddin and against the Soviets for several years in Afghanistan. The Abu Sayyaf has had a relationship with an Islamic fundamentalist movement, Al-Islamic Tabligh, in 1980. The group under the leadership of Janjalani is carrying out the establishment of a state of the Islamic Theocratic State of Mindanao (MIS), and includes a religious belief that shouted intolerance with the aim of spreading Islam through Jihad and the target of all Filipino Christians.

In their search for objects, the Abu Sayyaf Group has firmly established its ideology and operational agenda that has been deeply tied to a purpose of a merging effort that forced the domination of world Islam through armed resistance. The Abu Sayyaf group is very small and is a very radical Islamic separatist group in the Southern Philippines. They use bombing, murder, kidnapping and extortion to seek the establishment of an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu region, where the southern Philippines is the highest population of Muslims are living.

Abu Sayyaf and Terrorism

Among the Moro Muslims in Mindanao, the track record of the establishment of the Abu Sayyaf group, which literally means “bearer of the sword” or “father of the sword”, cannot be separated from the figure of its founder Abdurajak Janjalani, the son of a Basilan cleric, who in the 1980s along with hundreds of other Moro militants join the Afghanistan military training camp, to join with the Afghan Mujahideen forces against the invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union.

Abdurajak Janjalani took education at the Islamic University in Saudi Arabia, graduated in 1981, then studied the law of Islamic jurisprudence at the Ummul Qura 'in Mecca for 3 years. He then returned to Basilan and Zamboanga, Philippines to start preaching in 1984..⁵

In 1987, Abdurajak Janjalani traveled to Libya and then joined the Mujahideen and fought the Soviet Union for several years in Afghanistan.

In Peswaha, Pakistan, he is expected to meet with Mujahideen funders from Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden. Abdurajak Janjalani then conducted military training in the late 1980s at a military training camp in Khost, Afghanistan, led by a military commander of the Mujahideen from the Ittihad al Islami faction, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf.

The name of the group “Abu Sayyaf” itself is estimated to be taken from the alias name Abdurajak Janjalani who chose the alias Abu Sayyaf to honor the Mujahideen military commander. Besides that Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf is also a mentor of Indonesian jihadists, Riduan Ishamuddin, known

⁵ Zachary Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf* (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p. 2.

as Hambali, the leader of Jamaah Islamiyah. Zachary Abuza (2005) stated that Abdurajak Janjalani was one of 48 people which is included in the Executive Council of the Islamic International Brigade, the core people who will form Al Qaeda's international network in the future. ⁶

In 1989, Abdurajak Janjalani recruited members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) who felt they did not get a place or were dissatisfied with Nur Misuari's leadership. These MNLF exponents, including Wahab Akbar, Amilhussin Jumaani and Abdul Ashmad, decided to join Janjalani and form the Abu Sayyaf group.

According to Abuza (2005), Philippine Intelligence at that time assumed that the purpose of forming the Abu Sayyaf group at that time was to intervene and sabotage the ongoing peace process between the Philippine government and the MNLF and then this action can reduce the credibility of MNLF leaders. Southeast Asia is considered as an area that has the potential to save the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism. The administration of George W. Bush once stated that Southeast Asia was the "second front" in the "war on terror".⁷

One of the causes of this view is the existence of a network of radical groups, Al Qaeda, which has strengthened its regional network in the Southeast Asia region since the 1990s, by spreading its transnational and anti-western ideology, represented by the existence of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) group originating from Indonesia.

⁶ Zachary Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism* p. 5

⁷ Adhe Nuansa Wibisono, "ASEAN dan Institusi Kontra Terorisme di Asia Tenggara," Essay, Study of Terrorism and International Security, University of Indonesia, 24 Desember 2013.

This group aims to establish a caliphate or Islamic state in the Southeast Asia region, covering the regions of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines. Similar to the Al Qaeda group, the JI group was also transnational and even in the late 1990s they had mantiqi (branches) operating actively in Australia.

In the Philippines, there are also several groups that are considered radical, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf group, the two groups aim to establish an independent Islamic state, especially in provinces with a majority Muslim population in South Mindanao. Due to the character of the MILF's resistance to fighting for independence in South Mindanao, the government has adopted a strong military approach against the MILF. In the 1990s, the MILF launched a series of armed attacks in the southern Philippines, which resulted in retaliation for military attacks from the Philippine army.

Operational Strategy

The Abu Sayyaf group since its inception has developed and practiced counter-offensive diversion tactics, in which secondary units attack opposing military forces to distract opponents from the main attack unit. This tactic is useful to avoid direct confrontation with the military, except in positions and circumstances that are forced and threatened.

The Abu Sayyaf movement is always in the dark, taking roads and paths that are not commonly traversed and getting support from local residents. The best evidence of the effectiveness of this technique is the fact that this tactic can keep the Abu Sayyaf group afloat against the onslaught

of the Philippine armed forces carrying out military operations in Sulu, involving around 8,000 military personnel with high-tech US military support, which began in August 2006.⁸

Although this military operation later succeeded in killing the Abu Sayyaf leader at that time namely Gaddafi Janjalani and his main military lieutenant Abu Solaiman.⁹ Because the island region and the peninsula are operational areas where the Abu Sayyaf group operates, they are extensively using speedboats and speedboats as means of public transportation, kidnapping operations, assault operations and even escape operations.

This type of water transportation model is also used in the operation of bombing passenger ships at ports and high seas. The Abu Sayyaf group also reportedly has an “urban terrorist group” consisting of 70 motorbike gangs who carried out killings and kidnappings in the city of Jolo for six months until around August 2006. This kidnapping operation is more targeting urban rich Christians than villagers and foreigners who had been the main target of the abduction of the Abu Sayyaf group.¹⁰

The acts of terrorism, bombing and kidnapping carried out have given the Abu Sayyaf group three advantages even though the number and strength of personnel is not too large, namely: (a) media coverage that increases the popularity and strength of group propaganda, (b) economic sabotage of state power, and (c) get money from extortion or

⁸ International Crisis Group Reports, 2008

⁹ Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah...,” p.22

¹⁰ Soliman M. Santos, et.all, *Primed And Purposeful Armed Groups And Human Security Efforts In The Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p.364-377.

ransom.

In the context of member recruitment, the Abu Sayyaf group conducted a recruitment process for young people in Mindanao who are around 20 years old. The youths who were generally recruited by the Abu Sayyaf group were youths who themselves and their families were victims of war. The recruitment process is carried out by the Abu Sayyaf group by offering a sum of money, weapons and guarantees of protection if they want to join the Abu Sayyaf group.¹¹

Zachary Abuza (2005) argues that there is no formal process in recruitment, training and indoctrination patterns in the Abu Sayyaf group. Some first generation members of the Abu Sayyaf group are former MNLF combatants, MILF or combatants who have participated in military camps in Afghanistan. Young people who have ideological or criminal tendencies are usually recruited to carry out a specific task in the ad hoc training process that they must complete.

In this context, Rommel Banlaoi then gave an explanation of the “Four Basic Truths” published by Abdurajak Janjalani in 1993-1994 as a basic guide for the Abu Sayyaf group :

1. Abdurajak Janjalani (Abu Sayyaf), founder and first leader of the Abu Sayyaf group that has attended military training camps in Afghanistan. Killed was killed in a Philippine military attack in December 1998.
2. Khadafy Janjalani, the younger brother of Abdurajak Janjalani and became the second leader of the Abu Sayyaf

¹¹ GMA News Online, “Abu Sayyaf actively recruiting young blood – police”, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/101477/news/regions/abu-sayyaf-actively-recruiting-young-blood-police>, accessed on April 14, 2014

group after the death of Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998. Khadafy Janjalani was later killed in a battle with the Philippine military in the Jolo islands in December 2006.

3. Aldam Tilao (Abu Sabaya), spokesman and military leader of the Basilan faction of the Abu Sayyaf group. Abu Sabaya was later killed in a military attack in Zamboanga in June 2002.
4. Galib Andang (Robot Commander), the military leader of the Sulu faction Abu Sayyaf group was considered responsible for the kidnapping operation of 21 tourists at Sipadan in 2000. Ghalib Andang was later killed in a riot in Manila prison in 2005.
5. Radullan Sahiron (Putol Commander), veteran fighter from the MNLF and MILF who later became the military commander of the Sulu faction of the Abu Sayyaf group which later united the other factions under his leadership.
6. Yasser Igasan, (Commander of Diang), one of the founding members of the Abu Sayyaf group who also attended military camp training in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Allegedly Yasser Igasan has a close relationship with Al Qaeda's international network.
7. Isnilon Totoni Hapilon (Abu Musab), one of the Abu Sayyaf military leaders from the Basilan faction. Hapilon was considered responsible for several kidnapping, hostage-taking and murder cases carried out by the Abu Sayyaf group.
8. Albader Parad, one of the Abu Sayyaf military commanders from the Sulu faction. Albader Parad is allegedly responsible for the kidnapping of International Red Cross volunteers in Sulu. He was declared dead in a

military operation launched by the Philippine marines in February 2010.

9. Sulaiman Pattah, one of the Abu Sayyaf military commanders from the Sulu faction. He earned his reputation when leading the kidnapping operation of the presenter Ces Drilon and two television crew on Jolo.
10. Nurhassan Jamiri, one of the Abu Sayyaf military commanders from the Basilan faction. Jamiri was allegedly involved in the kidnapping and beheading of 10 marines in the 2007 battle.
11. Furuji Indama, one of the Abu Sayyaf military commanders from the Basilan faction. He is part of the same faction as Nurhassan Jamiri and is considered responsible for various other kidnapping and terrorism cases in Basilan.
12. Abdul Basit Usman, bomb assembly expert and senior member of the Abu Sayyaf group. Abdul Basit Usman was declared killed by a US army missile attack on the Afghan border in January 2010.
13. Gumbahali Jumdale (Doctor of Abu), one of the leaders of the Abu Sayyaf regional level who is suspected of being responsible for various kidnapping and terrorism cases that occurred in the Southern Philippines. Killed was killed in an attack launched by the Philippine military in February 2012.
14. Alhamser Limbong (Kosovo Commander), was involved in the October 2002 bombing in Zamboanga. He was also suspected of being involved in kidnapping foreign tourists on Palawan Island and was also accused of the bombing of a ferry which killed 100 people.

15. Abdul Basir Latip, a key leader of the Abu Sayyaf group. Having links with various other militant groups such as Jamaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda.

Concluding

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that the Abu Sayyaf radicalism and conflict in the South Philippines, Southeast Asia that have an impact on the Southeast Asia region are closely related to the context of colonialism, regional, socio-cultural and political issues. Religion and ethnic identity that coincide with each other even have an important role in the long conflict and terror.

In Philippines, conflict began to be closely related to the competition of the Islamic and Christian/post-13th century mission. State oppression and discrimination against Muslim minority groups became more pronounced when the authorities called them Moro who had a pejorative connotation, meaning that they were identical with Islamic groups that had invaded and occupied Spain. Moro responded to the humiliation and oppression with acts of violence *jihad fi sabilillah* as resistance to the infidels. The relatively young Abu Sayyaf group, because it is only around nineteen years old, has succeeded in carrying out terrorist acts in the Philippines which have caused the Philippine government to carry out policies or actions against this group. The Philippine government has indeed been preoccupied by two other movement groups, such as the MNLF and the previous MILF.

In tackling the Abu Sayyaf group, regimes in the Philippines have carried out attacks on the Abu Sayyaf camp. But this group is very difficult to be paralyzed

because it has a base in the community and controls the terrain such as in the interior of Basilan island and other islands.

The Philippine government in its repetition of this movement also requested assistance from foreign parties, namely the United States. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has been incessantly carrying out a war on terrorism, and the target of its destruction is the Abu Sayyaf movement in the Philippines.

But that effort was not entirely successful. Rebellion by Moro Muslim groups and terrorist acts by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Southern Philippines are more due to injustice and injustice in economic and political life, which coincide with religious and ideological differences in the Southeast Asia region.

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UNDERSTANDING RELATIONSHIP OF ABU SAYYAF AND AL QAEDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

SINCE the late 1980s there have been clear indications that Al Qaeda has ideologically penetrated and managed to establish an operating base in Southeast Asia. In 1988, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law had set up a branch in Manila, Philippines from the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). This organization is a social institution from Saudi Arabia that provides assistance to Islamic organizations in Southeast Asia, and at that time also indirectly functioned as a regional network center for Al Qaeda.

In this political context of global terrorism, Al Qaeda is considered to have provided ideological, financial and operational support for networks of radical groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines, Jemaah Salafiyah (JS) in Thailand, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia, Collection of Malaysian Mujahidin (KMM) in Malaysia, Arakan Rohingya Nationalist Organization (ARNO) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in Myanmar and Bangladesh.¹

¹ Rohan Gunaratna, "Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Threat And Response," *Research Paper*, Center For Eurasian Policy Occasional (Islamism In Southeast Asia), Series II, No. 1, (Singapore: Hudson Institute, 2006), p. 1-7

In addition to military training camps in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda also sends trainers to form or train military training camps in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East. At present many small military camps of Muslims have sprung up in a number of conflict areas in the region as compensation for the control of Afghanistan by the United States, where the diaspora will produce a third generation wave of Mujahideen.

In addition, the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and 9/11 intellectual actor Khalid Sheikh Mohammad traveled to Southeast Asia in 1994 to plan the “Bojinka” operation, which included bombing 12 US airlines over the Ocean Pacific.

Similarly, in the Abu Bakar military camp led by MILF, Kuwaiti military instructor, Omar Al Farooq, founded a Vietnamese military camp to train Southeast Asian groups in conducting guerrilla warfare and acts of terrorism. The aim of this military camp training is to form a core commitment to the “liberation” operation of oppressed Muslim groups under a US-backed government regime throughout the Southeast Asia region.²

Through consistent infiltration efforts, Al Qaeda has succeeded in influencing the political objectives of separatist groups and religious groups in Southeast Asia to win battles at the territorial level and then launch universal jihad throughout the world. For example, the Singapore branch of Jemaah Islamiyah, led by Mas Selamat Kastari, had planned to hijack and crash the Aeroflot aircraft from Bangkok, Thailand to Changi International Airport in Singapore. According to Kastari's statement, the choice to use Russian

² Rohan Gunaratna, *Terrorism in Southeast Asia...*, p. 6

airlines is to give Moscow lessons on what was done to Muslim brothers in Chechnya. Likewise, attacks in Bali and the Jakarta Marriot Hotel were intended to cause mass deaths of civilians.

Such tactics were not previously known by the Southeast Asian group, and are clear examples of methodologies taken from the influence of Al Qaeda. Then the most powerful impact of Al Qaeda's influence on Southeast Asian militant groups is the idea of fighting against "distant enemies" or as Osama bin Laden said "snake head" addressed to the United States. Imam Samudera, a JI member and one of the key planners in the Bali Bombing attack, revealed during his interrogation that Australia was specifically targeted in the Bali attack due to the direct support it received from the United States.

Al Qaeda then called for the establishment of the Islamic Front for Jihad World against the Jews and the Crusaders in February 1998, making this resistance front the main coordination route for Islamic resistance groups around the world. The idea of forming a front was then influenced by militant groups in Southeast Asia that adapted Al Qaeda's military ideology and tactics. The dissemination of the idea of a unifying ideology of Al Qaeda was marked by the establishment of a regional level organization that overshadowed groups in Southeast Asia, namely, the Rhabitah Al Mujahideen [Legion of the Fighters of God] formed by Hambali in 1999. But some groups such as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia, rejected Hambali's efforts, which are affiliated to Al Qaeda, to unite the ethno-nationalist resistance movement which they have been stretching into regional organizations with universal goals.

In this context, a different response was given by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which had agreed to cooperate with Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda in carrying out political resistance and alliances with other militant groups in Southeast Asia.³

History and The Social Background

Related to the interests of expanding Al Qaeda's network in Southeast Asia, Osama bin Laden is believed to be using the network with Abdurajak Janjalani to form cell networks in the Philippines. Intelligence documents from the Philippine National Police (PNP) show that intellectual actors from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yousef, supported the idea of forming an Abu Sayyaf group that could be useful as cell contacts and networks of Al Qaeda groups in the Philippines.

Ramzi Yousef, instructor of bomb assembly training at the Khost camp in Afghanistan, then traveled with Abdurajak Janjalani in the Philippines from December 1991 to May 1992 at the request of Osama bin Laden to provide bomb-making training to Abu Sayyaf members in their military camps in the Basilan archipelago. Then Ramzi Yousef was introduced to the Abu Sayyaf leaders and as a "bin Laden envoy" and he was called by the nickname "the Chemist" because of his ability in making bombs.⁴

³ Adhe Nuansa Wibisono, "Kelompok Abu Sayyaf dan Radikalisme di Filipina Selatan: Analisis Organisasi Terorisme Asia Tenggara," *Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin* 5(1), UIN Syarif Hidayatullah and HIPIUS, Januari 2006, p.117-130.

⁴ Zachary Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf* (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p.3.

The Abu Sayyaf group was later widely known by the public when their first bombing took place in August 1991 which destroyed the M/V Doulos ship, a Christian missionary ship docked in Zamboanga, Southern Philippines.⁵

Initially, Abu Sayyaf was funded through a financial network founded by Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, brother of Osama bin Laden, who had been sent to the Philippines in 1991, and established an Islamic charity network. Kahlifa is an official member who directly touches the area for the base of Saudi charity, the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO), this support is not only for the Philippines but also for radicals in Indonesia, Thailand and Taiwan.

In addition to the relationship with al-Qaeda that has provided financial support from this movement, Abu Sayyaf also established a relationship with JI (Jamaah-Islamiyyah).⁶

Ironically, the Abu Sayyaf group became known in the world in the mid 1990s when it failed to do the two big mission, which attacked 12 commercial aircraft belonging to the United States and assassinate Pope John Paul II. Abu Sayyaf is estimated to have 2,000 supporters

Al-Qaeda is alleged to be in addition to financial assistance, but has also helped with its military training to members of the Abu Sayyaf Group. Philippine Military

⁵ Garrett Atkinson, "Abu Sayyaf: The Father of the Swordsman A review of the rise of Islamic insurgency in the southern Philippines," *American Security Project*, retrieved from <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Abu-Sayyaf-The-Father-of-the-Swordsman.pdf>

⁶ "Siapakah Sebenarnya Abu Sayyaf," *article*, retrieved from <http://www.kabarmakkah.com/2016/03/siapa-sebenarnya-abu-sayyaf-bapaknya.html>, accessed on February 10, 2019.

Officials said that Abu Sayyaf received material and financial assistance as well as military training. Most Abu Sayyaf members train at Al Qaeda's military base in Afghanistan.

Although after the 9/11 tragedy, the cooperation between the two extremist groups was no longer heard, the Abu Sayyaf members had good relations with the Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist group in the Philippines.

Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, is alleged to have provided funds to Abu Sayyaf through a money laundering attempt under the guise of the charity he founded, the Islamic Relief International Organization.

In the next development, after the death of Abdurajak Janjalani, the frame mover of struggle spirit of the Abu Sayyaf, situation began to calm and orderly. A young brother of Abdurajak Janjalani namely, Khadaffi Janjalani was considered unable to replace the role of his brother, because he did not have military capability.

In February 1998, Abu Sayyaf said that his warrior group supported Osama bin Laden, to fight "Jews and Crusaders". However, Abu Sayyaf's support ended when their leader, Abdurajak Janjalani, died at the hands of the Philippine army in late 1998.⁷

In addition to obtaining funds from crimes such as extortion and kidnapping, Abu Sayyaf is expected to receive logistical assistance and have good relations with other radical groups such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.

In September 2001, the Philippine military confirmed speculatively that al-Qaeda had shown support for material, leadership and training. As a transnational terrestrial

⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, "Terrorism in Southeast Asia", p. 3

organization, al-Qaeda has developed through the regions of the Middle East, Western Europe, North America and South Asia. Plus, to Southeast Asia as a key base and preparation area.

In addition to providing funds for Abdurajak Janjalani in the formation of the Abu Sayyaf group, Osama bin Laden also provided assistance to the newly formed organization. Wali Khan Amin Shah, senior militants who fought alongside bin Laden in Afghanistan were sent to the Philippines to recruit, train and help the Abu Sayyaf group.

Financial flows and funding also began to flow in, the Abu Sayyaf group began receiving arms shipments from Victor Blout, a Tajik arms trader who had good contacts with both the Thaliban and Al Qaeda networks.⁸

Many people, elites, leaers and state apparatus in Manila Phillipines understand the beliefs held firmly and the motivation of the Abu Sayyaf group, it is very important to understand the deep feeling of the struggle for injustice which later embodies the Moro identity.

The ideological motivation behind the formation of the Abu Sayyaf group can be seen as an active effort to seek justice and independence, for all Moro Muslim minorities in the southern Philippines. Here, Jihad Fi-Sabilillah, which translates to Isalmic jihadism, is the noblest form in the struggle in the way of Allah to form an independent country who use Islamic sharia laws as the basis of moral authority from the laws of the country, and then the sharia law is implemented and obeyed by citizens who live in the country.

⁸ Garrett Atkinson, "Abu Sayyaf: The Father of the Swordsman"

Structures of Organization

After the death of Abdurajak Janjalani, the leadership of the Abu Sayyaf was taken over by his younger brother Khadafy Janjalani, who was considered not to have inherited a firm and charismatic leadership from his brother. Then the Abu Sayyaf group split into two main factions based in the Basilan Islands and others based in the Sulu archipelago and acted independently.

In 2002, the Basilan faction consisted of 10 armed groups while the Sulu faction consisted of 16 armed groups. The Sulu faction is led by “Commander“ Ghalib Andang who kidnapped and ransomed (Kidnapped for Ransom Activities). Although Khadafy Janjalani is located in the Basilan region, he is controlled by Abu Sabaya (Aldam Tilao) who also kidnaps and asks for ransom.

With the emergence of these two factions, the Abu Sayyaf group underwent a phase of degeneration which made it like a criminal organization. Ghalib Andang and Abu Sabaya transformed the Abu Sayyaf group from a religious-terrorist organization into what is referred to as “Entrepreneur of violence“.⁹

According to the Philippine anti-terrorism unit, the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), the strength of the Abu Sayyaf group's personnel in 2005 was estimated at 350 people. But then the Philippine military, Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP), on an assessment in the second quarter of 2008 stated that the strength of the Abu Sayyaf group amounted to around 380 people.

When compared with the strength of the personnel of

⁹ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah: Essays On the Abu Sayyaf Group* (Quezon City: PIPVTR, 2012), p.25.

the New People's Army (NPA) which amounted to 8000 people and the strength of personnel of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with 10,000 personnel, of course the strength of the Abu Sayyaf group is minimal. ¹⁰

The factionalization and internal conflicts that occurred with the Abu Sayyaf group were quickly exploited by the Philippine military. By conducting intensive military operations, the Philippine government was able to reduce the strength of the Abu Sayyaf group by 70%. From its peak around 1,269 fighters in 2000 were reduced to only around 350 personnel in mid-2005. ¹¹

Other data suggest that in the early 1990s, it was estimated that the Abu Sayyaf group had a membership of 650 people, and at the moment of the Sipadan hostage crisis in 2000, the Abu Sayyaf was believed to grow with a total of 3,000 militants (Torres, 2001). A military brigade commander who was involved in fighting in February 2005 on Jolo Island estimated that there were about 300 Abu Sayyaf combatants on the island (Pajarito 2005). Other figures that correspond to intelligence estimates and the defense department mention numbers of around 409 and 500 people (Banlaoi, 2006b). A former commander of the Abu Sayyaf group in Sulu said that the group had 650 regular armed personnel and thousands of others as reserve personnel. ¹²

The consequences resulting from the influence of Al Qaeda in the Southeast Asian region look quite clear and have a big impact. The case of the October 2002 bombing in

¹⁰ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah...* p.15

¹¹ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah...* p.25

¹² Soliman M. Santos, et.all, *Primed and Purposeful Armed Groups And Human Security Efforts in The Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010).

Bali and the bombing case at the US Consulate in Denpasar, Bali was considered the second most deadly terrorist bombing after 9/11. Furthermore, in the case of the Superferry 14 ship bombing in Manila, the Philippines is one of the biggest maritime assault cases to date.

The Philippine and US governments have tried to tackle acts of terrorism in the Philippines by attacking the Abu Sayyaf headquarters in the Philippines in June 2002 which killed the current Abu Sayyaf leader, Abu Sabaya.

The Abu Sayyaf then appointed Yasser Igasan as the leader of this group in 2007, although Igasan did not have military capability.

Observers consider the Abu Sayyaf has now far left the ideology of Islam which at first they fought for, and became a radical group that committed crimes without a clear political motive.

The Abu Sayyaf spreads the threat of terror, murder and kidnapping during the reign of President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in the Southern Philippines and the area near the South China Sea. In December 1994, Abu Sayyaf blew up a Philippine Airlines flight to Manila - Tokyo which left one person dead. Abu Sayyaf also attacked Ipil City in 1995, leaving 50 people dead. Three years later, Abu Sayyaf detonated a shopping center in Zamboanga, leaving 30 people dead.

To date, Abu Sayyaf remains a major threat to security in the Southern Philippines. From the al-Qaeda network led by Osama bin Laden until 1995, and the two groups continued to make contact.

Abdurajak Janjalani together with his group is a group that does not approve the peace process between the MNLF

which does not approve the conduct of the peace process between the MNLF and the Philippine Government. Abdurajak Janjalani on 18 December 1998 was killed in a battle with police in the Lamitan village of Basilan Province but Abu Sayyaf supporters continued the struggle through forced kidnapping, bombing and money collection. Khadafi Janjalani (brother of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani) later became the leader of the Abu Sayyaf. The main goal is still the same, namely establishing an Islamic State.

After Abdurajak Janjalani's group was divided into different factions, its activities were further colored by robbery and kidnapping rather than political struggle. This was proven in 2000, this group has kidnapped 53 people including priests, several teachers and students. To redeem the Abu Sayyaf hostage for ransom and two hostages reportedly beheaded.

When the hostage was held in April 2000 members of the Abu Sayyaf Lanya operation crossing the territory of the southern Philippines to the resort island of Sipadan island travel in the territory of Malaysia. At Malaysia resorts they kidnapped 21 foreigners consisting of 9 Malaysians, 3 Germans, 2 Frenchmen, 2 South Africans, 2 Finns, 1 Lebanese Female, 2 Filipinos, all of these abductees were taken to the Abu Sayyaf camp in Taawi-Tawi to be held hostage and then moved to Jolo.

After the Philippine military attack failed to free hostages a number of representatives of European countries, Malaysia and Libya joined the Philippine negotiations in an effort to free hostages. Parties Abu Sayyaf published a number of list of demands, namely the establishment of the State Moro independent, the release of some terrorists who

diahan abroad, the banning of fishing boats operating in the sea of Sulu, the protection of Filipinos residing in Sabah Malaysia and ransom drbsar about 1 million US dollars Union for one hostage.

During the twenty-three hostages, the Abu Sayyaf group also held hostage to a German journalist and was released after ransom. Then took hostage three TV journalists Perandis, two Filipinos and several Filipino priests who tried to visit hostages. At the end of August 2001, a US citizen was taken hostage after visiting the Abu Sayyaf camp, a ransom was paid to release the hostage. Negotiation efforts with this group failed to free all hostages. Four Months later, in August 2000, the hostage takers demanded a ransom of one million US dollars in return for the release of three Malaysian citizens.

Meanwhile on September 10, 2000 night, three Malaysian nationals were rushed from the Pandanan Island tourist resort off Malaysia's Sabah Coast by the Abu Sayyaf group using a high-powered motorboat exceeding the speed of the Philippine naval vessel. Some suspect they used the ransom beforehand to buy new equipment. On May 21, 2000, the Sayyaf ash group again killed three US citizens and seventeen Filipinos from the Palawan tourist resort in the Philippines.

Until the end of 2001, the Abu Sayyaf group still carried two United States citizens and one nurse from the Philippines on the kidnapped island of Basilan seven months ago. This was discovered when the group offered their release negotiations in the city of Zamboanga in April 2002. In June 2002 a hostage of US citizens Martin Burnham died during an attack by Filipino forces against the Abu

Sayyaf base that held him hostage, while his wife Gracia Burnham can be saved. Meanwhile Filipino nurse Ediborah Yap has been killed during a rescue operation by the Philippine military.

In June 2002, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped foreign nationals. Four Indonesian citizens were victims of their kidnapping and hostage taking. The four foreigners were the Ship Fruit (ABK) Ship SM-88 who were carrying coal from Indonesia to Cebu Island in the Central Philippines.

The ambush against them was carried out off the coast of Jolo Island and the four were then taken to the land of Jolo Island. Two days later one Indonesian crew member Ferdinand Joel was rescued. Then in March 2003, one Indonesian crew member, Zulkifli, managed to save himself and reported that another Indonesian AK, Muntu Jacobus Winowatan, was thought dead. He was shot in a Philippine military rescue operation in February 2003. The last Indonesian ABK hostage Lerrech managed to escape from Abu Sayyaf detention date April 11, 2003.

In August 2014, an Abu Sayyaf official also stated that he had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In March 2016, the Abu Sayyaf group again kidnapped 10 Indonesian citizens who were Brahma Tug Boat crew members who contained coal belonging to a mining company from Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan.

Political peace and stability does not seem to have been fully realized in the South Philippines. The high intensity of conflict and violence in the region is marked by the presence of terrorist organizations that actively carry out various acts of terror such as kidnapping, armed violence and intimidation.

One of the most prominent terrorism organizations today in the Southern Philippines is the Abu Sayyaf Group.

On April 11, 2014, the Philippine military launched an attack on the Abu Sayyaf group and left three Abu Sayyaf militants dead and around 20 Filipino soldiers injured. The Philippine military is launching military operations in the Basilan region in order to capture Puruji Indama, the Abu Sayyaf Commander, who is considered responsible for various cases of kidnappings and killings of both Filipinos and foreign nationals in recent years.¹³

Another recent action allegedly carried out by the Abu Sayyaf group was the kidnapping of a school principal on March 31, 2014, in an area in the province of Basilan. Kidnapping victims were identified as Benita Enriquez Latonio, a resident of Barangray Talisayan, who served as Principal at Manggal Elementary School, Sumisip City, Basilan.¹⁴

Not only stopped there on February 16, 2014, the Abu Sayyaf group was also recorded as kidnapping a married couple on the Jolo islands. The husband and wife, both employees of local companies, were abducted by six terrorist suspects from the Abu Sayyaf group in front of their home in the San Raymudo village on Jolo.¹⁵

¹³ The Guardian report, "Abu Sayyaf extremists battle troops in Philippines, leaving 20 soldiers injured," <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/11/abu-sayyaf-extremists-battle-troops-philippines>, accessed on April 13, 2014

¹⁴ Philstar News, "Abu Sayyaf abducts school principal in Sumisip", <http://www.philstar.com/nation/2014/03/31/1307219/updated-abu-sayyaf-abducts-school-principal-sumisip>, accessed on April 15, 2014

¹⁵ Philstar News, "Couple kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf Group in Jolo", <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/02/16/1291092/couple-kidnapped-abu-sayyaf-group-jolo>, accessed on April 15, 2014.

In addition, the Abu Sayyaf group is known as a militant terrorist group that does not hesitate to kill its abductees, usually the Abu Sayyaf group kidnaps and then demands ransom in exchange for the safety of their hostages, but in how many cases did Abu Sayyaf kill and even beheading the hostages.

Terrorism actions carried out by the Abu Sayyaf group certainly make this group one of the most dangerous active terrorism groups in Southeast Asia today.

Leaders and Elites

The Amir or the first leader of the Abu Sayyaf group was its founder Abdurajak Janjalani (who has the alias name Abu Sayyaf). He was killed in a police attack in December 1998 and was replaced by his younger brother Khadafy Janjalani (Abu Mochtar). Then after that a typical “bandit” leadership pattern emerged, represented by a former Abu Sayyaf spokesman, Aldam Tilao (Abu Sabaya) and Ghalib Andang (Robot Commander), who later died.

The typical death of the bandit leadership then represented the cleansing of the Abu Sayyaf leadership and returned to its original roots, the roots of the Moro Nation rebellion and Islamic jihad.

The death of Khadafy Janjalani and his lieutenant Jainal Antel Sali, Jr. (Abu Solaiman) in September 2006 and January 2007 ushered in a new era of leadership for the Abu Sayyaf group. The leadership position was later successfully reunited with one command to the Sulu Abu Sayyaf commander, the commander Radullan Sahiron (Commander of Putol), who was reportedly nearly killed by Filipino

marines in Sulu in December 2008. ¹⁶

Some of the names believed to be related to the Abu Sayyaf leadership under Radullan Sahiron are: Yasser Igasan is one of the early members of the Abu Sayyaf, Mr. Awliya who was one of the early members of the Abu Sayyaf group and leaders of Abu Sayyaf Basilan, Isnilon Toton Hapilon (Abu Musab).

The structural pattern of the Abu Sayyaf group, which consists of two main organizational branches, each with its own local commanders both in Sulu and Basilan, is likely to continue. The main stream of leadership is now estimated to be in Sulu. Some observers say that the new generation of militants seems to have begun taking over leadership in the body of the Abu Sayyaf.

Security Report The Philippine government states that Albader Parad and Sulaiman Pattah in Sulu, then Nurhassan Jamiri and Furuji Indama in Basilan are the names of the new leaders. Albader Parad is a follower of Ghalib Andang's "Robot Commander", who is more inclined to typical leadership of bandits rather than patterns of terrorism or separatism. ¹⁷

The Abu Sayyaf Group operates around the Basilan island province and the Sulu archipelago, as well as three provinces on the Zamboanga peninsula in the western region of Mindanao. This area is generally a rural area. The area suspected of being the base of the Abu Sayyaf group includes the Sampinit complex in Upper Kapayoan, in the

¹⁶ Soliman M. Santos, et.all, *Primed and Purposeful Armed Groups...*, p. 365

¹⁷ Soliman M. Santos, et.all, *Primed and Purposeful Armed Groups...*, p. 366

Basilan district of Isabela, where the Abu Sayyaf group once had a permanent base including the Al-Madinah military camp. In addition there is also a group base in Punoh Muhaji in the central area of Basilan, where the Abu Sayyaf group once had a base called the Abdurajak military camp.

Then there was also the headquarters occupied by Radullan Sahiron in the town of Patikul, the headquarters occupied by Doctor Abu at the Karawan Complex on the border of the town of Indanan-ParangMaimbung, and the headquarters of the Robot Commander was in Talipao city. The Abu Sayyaf group is believed to have been able to make bombing attacks and seek a protection base in a number of areas in Central Mindanao that have traditionally been linked to the base of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Actions for Terrorism

From 1991-2000, the Abu Sayyaf group was involved in 378 acts of terrorism which included bombings, assaults and killings which resulted in the death of 288 civilians. In the same period, the Abu Sayyaf group was recorded as having kidnapped and prosecuted ransom 640 times and involved 2,076 victims of abduction. With financial and military assistance from Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia, the position of the Abu Sayyaf is getting stronger, and growing. Abu Sayyah and Al Qaeda have the same interest of attacking and disrupting US/Western interests in Southeast Asia, in addition to terror, occupy and destabilizing some cities and area in the Philippines, Indonesia and other neighboring countries.

Below are various acts of terrorism carried out by the Abu Sayyaf group which include acts of bombing, murder and kidnapping, including:

1. April 4, 1991, carried out a bombing using geranat in the city of Zamboanga, southern Philippines, which left two people dead.
2. April 14, 1995, carried out an attack on a Christian residential town in the city of Ipil which resulted in the deaths of 53 people (both civilians and military forces) and 30 other people being victims of hostage taking.
3. April 23, 2000, the Abu Sayyaf militia attacked a tourist resort in Sipadan and then took 20 people hostage, including Malaysian police officers and tourists from Europe and the East Middle.
4. July 1, 2000, the Abu Sayyaf group kidnapped Filipino Christian evangelists in the forest area on Jolo. As many as 13 people became hostages in kidnapping cases that.
5. May 28, 2001, the Abu Sayyaf militia carried out armed attacks on the Dos Palmas tourist resort. In this attack case there were 20 foreign and local tourists being abducted. The case triggered a military operation from the Philippines government to save the hostages.
6. June 2001, there were armed clashes between the Abu Sayyaf group and the Philippine military which took place at Mount Sinangkap, Tubaran. This incident caused as many as 16 people were killed and 44 people were injured.
7. August 2002, six people from the Philippine Jehovah's Witnesses Sect were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf group, two of whom were then beheaded.

8. March 4, 2003, a bomb exploded outside the main terminal building of Davao International Airport, Philippines. A spokesman for the Abu Sayyaf group through broadcasts on national radio stations claimed responsibility for the bombing attack. This action resulted in the deaths of 21 people and as many as 148 people were injured.
9. February 9, 2004, a bomb placed on the lower deck of the Superferry 14 ship exploded and sank the ferry. A total of 116 people died as a result of the incident and made it the deadliest terrorist bomb attack in the Philippines. The Abu Sayyaf group claimed responsibility for the bombing attack
10. February 14, 2005, three bombs were detonated by the operation of the Abu Sayyaf group in the cities of Makati, Davao and General Santos. This event came to be known as the "Valentine's Day Bomb". Based on the statement of the spokesman for the Abu Sayyaf group at the time, Abu Solaiman, said that the bomb was a "gift" for President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The incident left 8 people dead and 96 injured.
11. February 27, 2010, the Abu Sayyaf group killed one militia and 10 civilians in Maluso, Philippines.
12. December 5, 2011, the Abu Sayyaf group kidnapped retired Australian soldier Warren Richard Rodwell. The Abu Sayyaf group requested a ransom of US \$ 2 million replace hostage release. Until June 2012, Rodwell's fate and whereabouts were unknown.
13. February 1, 2012, the Abu Sayyaf group kidnaps European citizens (Swiss and Dutch nationals) and Filipino tour guides around the Tawi-Tawi islands.

14. July 10, 2012, Abu Sayyaf militants were allegedly involved in the killing of seven rubber plantation workers after attacking their vehicle in Sumisip, Basilan. This incident left 7 people dead and 18 injured
15. July 28, 2012, the Abu Sayyaf group killed seven Filipino marines during a gun battle with security forces in Panglayahan, Jolo.
16. May 25, 2013, armed clashes between Filipino marines in the town of Patikul, Sulu. The clash caused the deaths of 7 Filipino marines and 5 Abu Sayyaf militants.
17. November 17, 2013, the Abu Sayyaf group allegedly committed murder and kidnapping of two tourists from Taiwan in the Pom Pom Islands, Sabah. One person among the hostages was declared dead in the incident.
18. February 16, 2014, allegedly kidnapping a married couple on the Jolo islands. The husband and wife, both employees of local companies, were abducted by six terrorist suspects from the Abu Sayyaf group in front of their home in the San Raymudo village on Jolo.
19. March 31, 2014, the Abu Sayyaf group kidnapped a woman named Benita Enriquez Latonio, a resident of Barangray Talisayan who served as Principal at Manggal Elementary School, Sumisip City, Basilan.

Concluding

Having motivated by the al-Qaeda, a notorious terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden, Abu Sayyaf, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, has been modeled by the style of al-Qaeda's Islamic Wahabism/Arabism.

Phillipines and Indonesia in Southeast Asia is a soft target for the terrorists and their presence to be very

comfortable because this country is a fertile ground for radical movements and fundamentalists. Recognition of the crime of terrorism suspects Bom Bali 12 October 2002, a clearly visible expression of religious emotions.

Ali Gufron, one of the Bom Bali terror suspects, even states with sikapnya simple and emphatic: “... *reply to tyranny and arbitrary rule of the US and allies against the Muslims with the intention that they will stop the oppression.* “

There is a value that work and dictate the way they thought. Ali Ghufron, for example, states that the bombardment was the “action devoted to God.” Then Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and the group felt a *delusion of grandeur*, represent or have any feelings or decree and be part of the elements of greatness that assure themselves have special mission from God. The terrorist always feel themselves as a “warrior of God” is one with a call to act in the name of God and religion, to “hand of God” on earth to realize “his wrath” of the same shape in the resistance on, bombardment.

The presence of Abu Sayyaf and Al-Qaeda to spreading its influence in the Southeast Asia more easier because in addition to many injustices and economic inequality, this region has long time been beset by religious mindedness. It is no more than an evidence that the teaching of religions in developing countries like Phillipines and Indonesia can be potential tool to reach a political gain by building practical relationship between individuals and Islamist groups. It is a transformation of religious political system, also known as *religio-political system*.

This is also what Clifford Geertz claimed to be “religious mindedness,” a process of how the religion ideo-

logy comes into existence. Although the Abu Sayyaf and Al Qaeda can be cut back on their influence and area of its operations in Southeast Asia, but this terrorist group still has cells, networks and supporters in a region that is predicted to be long-lasting and long-lived. These are the challenges and problems that must be solved jointly by the people and countries in Southeast Asia.

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